In that regard, "upon motion of any party, made before or at trial, or on its own initiative, the court may make whatever order may be just" ( id.). Whether expert disclosure is so late as to warrant preclusion "is left to the sound discretion of the trial court" ( McGlauflin v Wadhwa, 265 AD2d 534; Tamborino v Burakoff, 224 AD2d 609; Lesser v Lacher, 203 AD2d 181). A party should not be precluded from proffering expert testimony "merely because of noncompliance with the statute, unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party" ( Hernandez-Vega v Zwanger-Pesiri Radiology Group, 39 AD3d 710, 710-711 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; St. Hilaire v White, 305 AD2d 209, 210; Lanoce v Kempton, 8 AD3d 449, 451; Karoon v New York City Tr. Auth., 286 AD2d 648). Further, good cause has been found to exist to permit an expert to respond to evidence at trial where the need for the testimony came as a surprise during the trial ( see e.g. Benedict v Seasille Equities Corp., 190 AD2d 649, 649-650; Simpson v Bellew, 161 AD2d 693, 698, lv denied 77 NY2d 808).
The various trial rulings cited by defendants as grounds for a new trial are either unpreserved for appellate review, insufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial, or were proper exercises of the court's discretion. In particular, the trial court's failure to include on the verdict sheet an interrogatory requiring the jury to conclude, prior to awarding damages, that plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the assault, was harmless error in light of the fact that the issue of proximate causation was fully explained in the jury charge (cf., Booth v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 169 A.D.2d 663; Herbert H. Post Co. v. Sideny Bitterman, Inc., 219 A.D.2d 214). The trial court's determination to receive the testimony of plaintiff's expert despite plaintiff's failure to abide by CPLR 3101(d) was a proper exercise of discretion (see, Campoli v. Lobmeyer, 183 A.D.2d 1049;Lesser v. Lacher, 203 A.D.2d 181), in light of plaintiff's showing that defendants delayed notifying plaintiff of their intention to offer expert testimony and were late in presenting plaintiff with their expert's report. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's awards for lost wages and pain and suffering. Plaintiff's expert economist testified respecting plaintiff's loss of future wages and plaintiff, his mother and two experts testified to the significant and debilitating personality changes plaintiff had undergone as a result of the 1993 assault and stated that, as a consequence of those changes, plaintiff was no longer able to obtain or retain employment.
Appeal from Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.). Defendant's motion to preclude plaintiff from offering expert testimony for failure to timely comply with the written notice requirements of CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) was properly denied upon supportable findings that such failure was neither willful nor prejudicial ( see, Lesser v. Lacher, 203 A.D.2d 181; Peck v. Tired Iron Transp., 209 A.D.2d 979). We have considered defendant-appellant's remaining claims and find them to be without merit.
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Karla Moskowitz, J., and a jury). The trial court's ruling not to preclude the testimony of plaintiff's expert for noncompliance with CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) was a proper exercise of discretion ( see, Lesser v. Lacher, 203 A.D.2d 181), where such testimony was limited to what was contained in the expert's records that defendants could have obtained well before trial, having been furnished with authorizations therefor. Thus, defendants could have been surprised or otherwise prejudiced only because they did not avail themselves of such authorizations.
We affirm. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the nurse to testify as an expert on Halfen's behalf ( see, CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]; Lesser v. Lacher, 203 A.D.2d 181; Marra v Hensonville Frozen Food Lockers, 189 A.D.2d 1004). The plaintiff cannot claim surprise or prejudice with regard to the content of the nurse's testimony.