, 77 A.L.R. 1400. In Lesser v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 124 Conn. 59, 198 A. 252, an action against a mortgagee who had foreclosed a mortgage secured by land and a building specially adapted for bowling alleys, the court stated the general rule (p. 64): "There is a strong tendency as between mortgagor and mortgagee to hold that such articles are a part of the realty whereas, in the case of landlord and tenant or other holder of a limited term, the tendency is the other way. The reason for this rule is that the owner of the equity is presumed to make improvements for the permanent benefit of the property, while a mere tenant is more likely to make them for his personal convenience." The court also said that especial stress should be given to whether a building was specially adapted to certain uses. If so adapted, then "the instrumentalities to carry out those purposes are ordinarily considered a part of the realty.

. . ."Id. at 183, 368 A.2d at 47 (quoting Lesser v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 124 Conn. 59, 64, 198 A. 252 (1938)). While property may be contractually designated as personal property for the protection of the vendor, that property reverts to realty when the vendee's obligation to the vendor is discharged. Lesser, supra, 124 Conn. at 65, 198 A. at 254.

This “test focuses on the objectively manifested intent of the annexer.... Ordinarily, if not invariably, the character of personal property attached to realty is to be determined as of the date when the property is attached.... The intent sought is not the subjective intent or undisclosed purpose of the annexer, but the intent manifested by his actions.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., supra, 193 Conn. at 216, 477 A.2d 988 ; Lesser v. Bridgeport–City Trust Co., 124 Conn. 59, 64, 198 A. 252 (1938) ( “owner of the equity is presumed to make improvements for the permanent benefit of the property, while a mere tenant is more likely to make them for his personal convenience”); Webb v. New Haven Theatre Co., 87 Conn. 129, 133, 87 A. 274 (1913) (“whether [articles become] fixtures or [remain] personal property is to be determined largely by the intention with which they were attached, as indicated by all the facts in the case”); Radican v. Hughes, 86 Conn. 536, 542, 86 A. 220 (1913) (“[i]n cases of this kind every fact and circumstance should be considered which tends to show what intention is properly imputable to him who located the article in position”). “We have previously indicated that the narrow question of intent is a question of fact, the determination of which is not reviewable unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is one which cannot reasonably be reached.”

t finding that the tanks were an ‘indispensable element’ to the business ... is also consistent with the trial court's conclusion that the tanks are personalty" and not fixtures); Toffolon v. Avon , 173 Conn. 525, 535, 378 A.2d 580 (1977) (upholding finding by trial court that processing plant, which was specially adapted for prospective use, constituted fixture); Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp . v. Mauro , 171 Conn. 177, 185, 368 A.2d 44 (1976) (concluding that, unlike prior cases in which buildings had been adapted for particular uses, "the building ... as constructed, was not adapted to bowling alleys, but the alleys were installed in a vacant area in a shopping center already built and adapted to produce rental income from any source"); Cleaveland v. Gabriel , 149 Conn. 388, 392, 180 A.2d 749 (1962) (noting that, because "some of the equipment ... was adapted primarily to [be] use[d] in a barn, there was some objective indication of an intention to annex the equipment to the barn"); Lesser v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co. , 124 Conn. 59, 64, 198 A. 252 (1938) (recognizing "the proposition that [when] a building is specially adapted to certain uses, the instrumentalities to carry out those purposes are ordinarily considered a part of the realty" as fixtures); Radigan v. Hughes , 86 Conn. 536, 543, 86 A. 220 (1913) (concluding that small toolhouse that "was not adapted to or necessary for the use and enjoyment of the land [on] which it stood" is not fixture); Stockwell v. Campbell , 39 Conn. 362, 365 (1872) (concluding that furnaces, for which "[p]its were made in the bottom of the cellar [that were] adapted to [the furnaces] in size and depth, and for the express purpose of receiving them," were fixtures); Fernwood Realty, LLC v. AeroCision, LLC , 166 Conn. App. 345, 362–63, 141 A.3d 965 (concluding that electrical components that were specifically adapted to property were fixtures), cert. denied, 323 Conn. 912, 149 A.3d 981 (2016). In other words, the personalty affixed to the realty is more likely to be considered part of that realty if i

"Ordinarily, if not invariably, the character of personal property attached to realty is to be determined as of the date when the property is attached. Giuliano Construction Co. v. Simmons, [supra]; Lesser v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 124 Conn. 59, 63, 198 A. 252." Cleaveland v. Gabriel, supra. "The intent sought is not the subjective intent or undisclosed purpose of the annexer, but the intent manifested by his actions.

The character of the property being conveyed to a lot holder is to be ascertained as of the date when it is annexed to the realty. Cleaveland v. Gabriel, 149 Conn. 388, 391, 180 A.2d 749; Lesser v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 124 Conn. 59, 63, 198 A. 252. Whether these crypts may be characterized as personal property in other situations, as, for example, in a dispute between a vault manufacturer and a funeral director or between a funeral director and a vault purchaser, is irrelevant in the present case. The relevant issue is the nature of the property being conveyed to a lot holder.

The court stated: "[I]t is essential to constitute a fixture that an article should not only be annexed to the freehold, but that it should clearly appear from an inspection of the property itself, taking into consideration the character of the annexation, the nature and the adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which that part of the building was appropriated at the time the annexation was made, and the relation of the party making it to the property in question, that a permanent accession to the freehold was intended to be made by the annexation of the article." See Merritt-Chapman Scott Corporation v. Mauro, 171 Conn. 177, 368 A.2d 44; Lesser v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 124 Conn. 59, 198 A. 252. In Giuliano Construction Co. v. Simmons, 147 Conn. 441, 443, 162 A.2d 511, the court stated: "Whether a permanent accession to the freehold was intended is to be determined from a consideration of all the facts, including the character of the annexation, the nature and adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which the land was appropriated at the time of the annexation, and the relation of the annexer to the property."

Ordinarily, if not invariably, the character of personal property attached to realty is to be determined as of the date when the property is attached. Giuliano Construction Co. v. Simmons, 147 Conn. 441, 443, 162 A.2d 511; Lesser v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 124 Conn. 59, 63, 198 A. 252. For it to acquire the character of a fixture, it is essential that "a permanent accession to the freehold was intended to be made by the annexation." Capen v. Peckham, 35 Conn. 88, 94; Stone v. Rosenfield, 141 Conn. 188, 192, 104 A.2d 545. As we recently stated in Giuliano Construction Co. v. Simmons, supra, "[w]hether a permanent accession to the freehold was intended is to be determined from a consideration of all the facts, including the character of the annexation, the nature and adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which the land was appropriated at the time of the annexation, and the relation of the annexer to the property.

The character of the pile of topsoil as real or personal property is to be ascertained as of the date when the topsoil was placed upon the lot. Lesser v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 124 Conn. 59, 63, 198 A. 252. It is essential, to constitute a fixture, "that a permanent accession to the freehold was intended to be made by the annexation of the article." Capen v. Peckham, 35 Conn. 88, 94; Stone v. Rosenfield, 141 Conn. 188, 193, 104 A.2d 545. Whether a permanent accession to the freehold was intended is to be determined from a consideration of all the facts, including the character of the annexation, the nature and adaptation of the article annexed to the uses and purposes to which the land was appropriated at the time of the annexation, and the relation of the annexer to the property.

" It remains to apply this rule to the evidence in this case, "considered in that aspect most favorable to the plaintiff." Morris v. King Cole Stores, Inc., 132 Conn. 489, 491, 45 A.2d 710, citing Lesser v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 124 Conn. 59, 61, 198 A. 252, and Sedita v. Steinberg, 105 Conn. 1, 5, 134 A. 243. If the evidence is so considered, the jury might have found the following facts.