Opinion
00-Civ.-3475 (WGB).
April 6, 2001
Russell E. Lerman, Pro Se, Dover, N.J.
Wanda Y. Ortiz, DAG, Division of Law/Transportation Trenton, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant.
O P I N I O N
Defendant Albert Ari, Acting Director, State of New Jersey, Division of Motor Vehicles, ("Defendant") moves to dismiss Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 putative class action suit pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff moves to "strike" Defendant's motion, to reinstate the entry of default against Defendant, and to enter default judgment or summary judgment against Defendant. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff's motion to reinstate the entry of default and for default judgment is denied. Plaintiff's motion to "strike" Defendant's motion or for summary judgment is dismissed as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
On October 29, 1995, Plaintiff was stopped and issued a ticket for a traffic violation. The date of the Summons was set for November 1, 1995. Plaintiff failed to appear in the Township of Randolph Municipal Court on that summons date. (Compl., at 3, ¶ 3.) A warrant for Plaintiff's arrest was issued on December 22, 1995. (Id. at 3, ¶ 4.) According to Plaintiff, the warrant was not executed for 30 days and as a result, the Automated Traffic System ("ATS") automatically "closed out the `complaint.'" (Id. at 3, ¶ 5.)
The ATS allegedly then provides the Division of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") with a weekly electronic transmittal of all "close-outs," which triggers a Scheduled Suspension Notice. (Id. at 3, ¶ 6.) That Notice is sent to the defendant in the underlying municipal court action allowing the defendant 60 days to submit to the jurisdiction of the municipal court before the defendant's driver's license is suspended pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a). (Id.)
Plaintiff received a Scheduled Notice of Suspension indicating that his driver's license would be suspended on March 29, 1996 unless he answered his Summons. Although Plaintiff does not expressly so state, because he seeks, among other things, reinstatement of his driver's license, Plaintiff presumably did not answer his Summons and his driver's license was in fact then revoked.
Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, alleges that a driver's licence is a constitutionally protected property and liberty interest that absent probable cause is protected from seizure by the Fourth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 5, ¶ 10.) He therefore contends that the ATS and the DMV "close-out" procedures are also unconstitutional. Moreover, Plaintiff maintains that N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a), which authorizes the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles to suspend or revoke driver's licenses and registration certificates, is unconstitutionally vague.
Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to permanently enjoin the enforcement of N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a) and a judgment declaring that that statute and the application of the ATS are unconstitutional. Further, Plaintiff requests that his driver's license be reinstated.
B. Procedural History
The Complaint was filed on July 18, 2000. Default was entered against Defendant on September 26, 2000. By Opinion and Order filed November 21, 2000, the Court granted Defendant's motion to vacate entry of default and permitted Defendant to answer out of time.
Defendant now seeks to have Plaintiff's Complaint dismissed, contending that the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and moreover, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In response, Plaintiff moves to "strike" Defendant's motion to dismiss, to have the entry of default reinstated, and to have default judgment or summary judgment entered against Defendant.
At the outset, the Court notes with great dismay that the briefing by the Deputy Attorney General ("DAG") on behalf of Defendant is woefully inadequate. Plaintiff, although he is pro se, articulated in his motion for summary judgment legal issues, which the DAG should have addressed. In responding to Plaintiff's motion, however, the DAG submitted only a very short letter. That letter does not address any of Plaintiff's legal arguments, but rather, consists solely of sweeping, unsupported, and even inaccurate statements such as "Plaintiff introduces nothing new before the Court which undermines Defendant's motion to dismiss." Such poor lawyering is unacceptable. For the sake of judicial efficiency, however, the Court will consider Defendant's motion to dismiss on the merits and only issue this reprimand. But in the future, the Court will not adjudicate motions where the briefs are substandard.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Reinstatement of Entry of Default
Because Plaintiff seeks a reversal of this Court's Opinion and Order filed on November 21, 2000, vacating entry of default, Plaintiff's motion is in essence a motion for reconsideration and will be construed as such. A motion for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7.1(g) must be filed within 10 days of the entry of the order on the original motion and must set forth "the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Judge or Magistrate has overlooked." Here, Plaintiff's motion challenging the Court's November 21, 2000 Opinion and Order was filed on December 12, 2000, more than 10 days after the entry of the Opinion and Order. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion is untimely.
Even if Plaintiff's motion had been timely filed, the Court would not grant reconsideration. A court may grant a motion for reconsideration based upon an intervening change in the law or new, previously unavailable evidence. Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S.E.P.A., 705 F. Supp. 698, 702 (D.D.C. 1989) (citations omitted). A party seeking reconsideration under Local Rule 7.1(g) must do more than disagree with the Court's decision. Mere "recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the Court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden." G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990); see also Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1986); Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 1986).
Moreover, a motion for reconsideration is improper when it is used "to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought through — rightly or wrongly." Oritani Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Md., 744 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.N.J. 1990) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 989 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, reconsideration motions may not be used to relitigate old matters or raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to entry of judgment. Polizzi Meats, Inc. v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 931 F. Supp. 328, 339-39 n. 2 (D.N.J. 1996); see also Resorts Intern. V. Great Bay Hotel and Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992) (noting that Local Rule 7.1(g) invites counsel to draw the court's attention to decisions that may have been overlooked by the court, not those overlooked by counsel). Finally, "only if the matters which were overlooked, if considered by the Court, might reasonably have resulted in a different conclusion will the court entertain such a motion." Polizzi Meats, Inc., 931 F. Supp. at 339.
Plaintiff has not presented any intervening change in the law or new, previously unavailable evidence. Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown that the Court has overlooked any matters. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion to reinstate the entry of default and for default judgment against Defendant is denied.
B. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the State by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff does not dispute that the Division of Motor Vehicles is a state agency.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of a Foreign State."
It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states and state officials for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.See Graham, 473 U.S. at 169; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Eleventh Amendment immunity bars actions for monetary relief against a state agency; however, such immunity is not absolute. States may waive their right to immunity by consenting to suit in federal court. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Alternatively, Congress may abrogate immunity by showing a clear and unmistakable intent to do so in the language or legislative history of the particular legislation. Seeney v. Kavistski, 866 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D.Pa. 1994) (citing Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)), aff'd 107 F.3d 8 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not bar a plaintiff from suing state officials for violations of federal law where future injunctive relief is sought. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit suit to enjoin state Attorney General from enforcing state statute that allegedly violated Fourteenth Amendment); see also Edelman, 415 U.S. 651.
Here, Plaintiff does not seek monetary damages; rather, he seeks a declaratory judgment and future injunctive relief prohibiting the enforcement of N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a) and the reinstatement of his driver's license. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this matter. Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) is denied.
2. Failure to State a Claim
i. Standard for A Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for a dismissal based upon the pleader's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Since the long-established federal policy of civil litigation is to decide cases on the proofs, district courts generally disfavor Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Melo-Sonics Corp. v. Cropp, 342 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1965); Panek v. Bogucz, 718 F. Supp. 1228, 1229 (D.N.J. 1989).
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all allegations in the pleadings must be accepted as true and the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every favorable inference that can be drawn from those allegations. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957);Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 83 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1987);Markowitz, 906 F.2d at 103. "All the rules require is a short and plain statement of the claim that gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance "dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
Accepting the facts in the pleadings as true and giving them all reasonable inferences, a court must dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "[i]f as a matter of law `it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'"Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326-27.
ii. Analysis
Certain of Plaintiff's claims are grounded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes a cause of action against:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 "`is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides `a method for vindicating Federal rights already conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and demonstrate that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988); Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Shaw v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1142 (3d Cir. 1990).
1. Fourteenth Amendment
While the complaint is not entirely clear, Plaintiff briefly mentions that he was denied due process when, in violation of New Jersey Court Rule 7:12-1, he was only given 3, rather than 5 days, notice to appear. Due process requires that the notice be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Here, notwithstanding the 2 day difference, Plaintiff cannot dispute that he was given notice and an opportunity to be heard on November 1, 1995.
Further, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a) expressly provides not only the grounds for suspension or revocation of a driver's license, but also requires "due notice in writing of such proposed suspension, revocation, disqualification or prohibition and the ground thereof." Plaintiff received the Scheduled Suspension Notice and had another chance to be heard. He ignored that notice as well. Having twice failed to answer the Summons, Plaintiff cannot now complain that he was deprived of due process.
Next, Plaintiff contends that Defendant was required to have factual evidence before suspending Plaintiff's driver's license. In so arguing, Plaintiff relies on the language in N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a) that provides that the director of the DMV "may also summon witnesses to appear before him . . ., to give testimony in a hearing which he holds looking toward a revocation of a license or registration certificate issued by or under his authority." While the statute authorizes the director to summon witnesses to appear or give testimony, it does not require the director to do so. Accordingly, Defendant did not violate Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process when it suspended his driver's license and did so using the ATS and the DMV "close-out" procedures.
2. Fourth Amendment
Plaintiff claims that the suspension or revocation of his driver's license requires probable cause because it constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. The Court, however, knows of no authority that supports Plaintiff's novel position. Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant was not required to establish probable cause before suspending or revoking Plaintiff's driver's license.
b. 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq.
N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a) authorizes the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles ("Director") to suspend or revoke driver's licenses and registration certificates for violating any of the provisions of Title 39 or "on any other reasonable grounds." Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the phrase "any reasonable ground," is unconstitutionally vague. As set forth in the Scheduled Suspension Notice, Plaintiff's license was to be suspended for failure to answer a summons. Plaintiff concludes that failure to answer a summons falls within the "catchall vague standard of guilt clause `other reasonable grounds,'" (Br. in Support of Pl.'s Motion, at 14.) (emphasis omitted), and that that was the basis on which Defendant suspended Plaintiff's license.
Plaintiff, however, fails to recognize that the statute expressly provides that
[a] person who fails to obey the summons shall be subject to a penalty not exceeding $100.00, to be recovered with costs in an action at law, prosecuted by the Attorney General, and in addition the vehicle registration or driver's license, or both, as the case may be, shall forthwith be revoked.
N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a). In accordance with this statute, the Scheduled Suspension Notice alerted Plaintiff that once his license is suspended, he must pay a $50 restoration fee.
Because Plaintiff's license was suspended for "fail[ure] to obey the Summons rather than "on any other reasonable grounds," Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the "on any other reasonable grounds" clause of N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a). Plaintiff presents only a generalized grievance regarding that portion of the statute. In order to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a plaintiff must have "a personal stake in the outcome" of an otherwise justiciable controversy. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975), U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 2. "[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to `show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' . . . and that the injury `fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision . . .'" Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not have standing because he has not demonstrated that he has suffered or imminently will suffer an injury that is traceable to the "on any other reasonable grounds," provision of N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a). Moreover, even if this Court were to find that challenged phrase to be unconstitutional, Plaintiff's injury would not be redressed because as discussed above, the suspension of Plaintiff's license for failure to obey the summons is specifically authorized by the statute as a basis for license suspension.
C. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or to Strike Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's motion to dismiss should be stricken because it is frivolous. Alternatively, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment. In light of the Court's ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss, however, Plaintiff's motion to strike or for summary judgment is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff's motion to reinstate the entry of default and for default judgment is denied. Plaintiff's motion to "strike" Defendant's motion or for summary judgment is dismissed as moot.
An appropriate order follows.
O R D E R
This matter having come before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); on Plaintiff's motion to "strike" Defendant's motion, to reinstate the entry of default against Defendant, and to enter default judgment or summary judgment against Defendant; and
The Court having considered the submissions of the parties; and
The Court having decided this matter without oral argument pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; and
For the reasons set forth in the Court's Opinion issued this day; and
For good cause shown;
It is on this ___ day of April, 2000 ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is granted; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to reinstate the entry of default and for default judgment is denied; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to "strike" Defendant's motion or for summary judgment is dismissed as moot; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall close this case.