Opinion
NUMBER 13-13-00369-CR
04-23-2015
JOSE ANGEL LERMA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 219th District Court of Collin County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garza, Benavides and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza
Appellant, Jose Angel Lerma, appeals his third conviction for driving while intoxicated ("DWI"), a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). The trial court assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment, suspended the sentence, and placed Lerma on community supervision for seven years. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). We affirm.
This appeal was transferred from the Fifth Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket equalization order issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).
I. BACKGROUND
Clayton Platt testified that he was employed as a highway patrol trooper and was patrolling the Sam Rayburn Tollway in McKinney, Texas, at around 1:00 a.m. on May 26, 2012. Platt was parked in his marked patrol car on the northbound shoulder when he heard a "loud, grinding noise coming up." He observed "a passenger car on the access road traveling northbound" with "what appears to [be] no tire on the front left and it's just sparking as it's driving along, sparks coming out the sides and sparks coming out the rear." Platt drove up behind the car and activated his emergency lights. The driver, whom Platt identified as Lerma, "[d]idn't appear to react at all" to the emergency lights. According to Platt, Lerma was "driving relatively slowly but weaving the whole time." Another officer pulled up alongside Lerma "in order to get [his] attention." Platt used his patrol unit's public address system—"turned up as loud as it could be"—to demand that Lerma stop. Eventually, after about a minute and a half, the car stopped. Platt removed Lerma from the car at gunpoint. Because Lerma "wasn't really complying," another officer "did a leg sweep" and "took him to the ground."
Platt stated: "At that point [we] went up and just started talking with him. We're talking with him, there's an immediate strong odor of alcohol coming from his breath. . . . His eyes were really glassy." Platt therefore decided to conduct three standardized field sobriety tests: horizontal nystagmus, walk-and-turn, and one-leg stand. In order to determine whether Lerma was a good candidate for a horizontal nystagmus test, Platt asked Lerma about any prior head injuries. Lerma stated that he "hit [his head] on the first-aid kit . . . at his office" but did not indicate that "he was still having issues with [the injury]." Lerma also complained of "flu-like symptoms" and that his head was hurting. Platt determined that Lerma was a good candidate for the horizontal nystagmus test. The horizontal nystagmus test showed clues of "lack of smooth pursuit," "distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation," and "onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees" in each eye. According to Platt, these results "certainly indicated intoxication at that point."
In order to determine whether Lerma was a good candidate for the walk-and-turn test, Platt asked Lerma if he had any leg or back injuries. Lerma told him that "a month or two ago . . . a piece of steel hit him in the shin at work." Platt testified: "So—he'd already informed me that he worked at a data entry center, so I was a little—little confused at this point at the—it's a pretty dangerous data entry center to be having all these injuries he had." Lerma also "said he had a little pain in his back but nothing that would keep him from walking." Platt determined that Lerma was a good candidate for this test. After administering the test, Platt observed two out of a possible eight clues of intoxication; in particular, Lerma "failed to keep his balance during the instructions" and "did not touch heel-to-toe as instructed." Platt stated that, for this test, "two or more clues indicate intoxication."
When asked whether "for every test [Lerma] gave you a reason why he might have an injury in that area," Platt replied: "He did." However, he did not believe those alleged injuries would affect his ability to perform the sobriety tests because: "Not only did I ask him if he's okay to perform them, but I didn't see any indication other than him saying that happened . . . that it was still affecting him."
Finally, Platt administered a one-leg stand test. During this test, Lerma was asking "confusing" questions and was "not really communicating effectively." Platt observed three out of a possible four clues of intoxication; in particular, Lerma was "swaying back and forth," he put his foot down, and he hopped. Platt stated that, as with the walk-and-turn test, the presence of two or more clues in this test indicates intoxication. Based on the results of all three field sobriety tests, Platt placed Lerma under arrest for DWI.
Platt testified that, even though Lerma stated that he was heading to his home in Lewisville, Lerma was traveling northbound, away from Lewisville. Platt agreed that, at one point, Lerma "[was] sure he [was] in Lewisville and [the officers were] messing with him."
After the arrest, Platt placed Lerma in his patrol unit and asked for consent to take a breath sample or a blood sample. Lerma refused to consent to either. However, Platt stated that he was authorized by law to take a mandatory blood sample, see TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.), and so he transported Lerma to the Medical Center of McKinney for that purpose. After the blood sample was taken at around 2:15 a.m., Platt took Lerma to the Collin County Jail. Subsequent analysis of the blood sample revealed an alcohol concentration of .06 grams per 100 milliliters, which is below the legal limit in Texas. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).
In fact, the mandatory blood draw statute requires an officer to take a breath or blood sample if the officer has reliable information indicating that the DWI arrestee has two prior DWI convictions and the arrestee refuses the officer's request to submit to the taking of a sample voluntarily. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b)(3)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). We have previously held that the mandatory blood draw statute does not create a new and distinct exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and that a blood draw is generally unconstitutional absent a warrant, exigent circumstances, or consent. State v. Villarreal, No. 13-13-00253-CR, 2014 WL 1257150, at *11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 23, 2014, pet. granted). However, Lerma did not object to the admission of the blood test results into evidence, and so we do not address that issue.
Platt denied that Lerma ever mentioned that something unusual had happened to him earlier that day. He denied that Lerma was hesitant or afraid to speak with him. Platt stated that he never was aware of any information indicating that Lerma "might need additional medical attention on that night."
Platt testified that the fact that the alcohol content of Lerma's blood sample was under the legal limit does not affect his opinion about whether Lerma was intoxicated because "it's pretty clear from the totality of circumstances that night with dealing with him that he was intoxicated." Platt opined that "[i]t's possible he was[] intoxicated solely on alcohol, he just can't handle .06," and that, considering the blood test results, "it's very possible that he also had something else in his system." He also speculated that Lerma's blood alcohol concentration may have declined somewhat between the time Lerma was initially stopped by police and the time the blood was taken.
On cross-examination, Platt conceded that officers were unable to locate the tire that had detached from Lerma's car. He agreed that he had never been given training, beyond "first responder basic training," on how to identify symptoms of a stroke or other neurological disorders. When asked whether it is possible that Lerma's blood alcohol concentration was below .06 at the time of driving, Platt replied: "Anything is possible, sure." He gave the same response to defense counsel's question as to whether it was possible that Lerma's blood alcohol concentration increased from the time of driving to the time of the blood draw.
DPS Trooper Matthew Kasenic testified that, on the night in question, he observed Lerma's vehicle "drive past me northbound on the service road with a loud grinding noise and saw sparks, missing a tire." While pursuing the vehicle along with Platt, he noticed that the car was missing a tire on the front driver's side. He shined a light on the driver and noticed that the driver was "staring straight ahead" and "had both hands on the steering wheel at a ten and two position." The car eventually stopped and Platt directed Lerma to get on the ground. According to Kasenic, Lerma did not comply with the order, and so Kasenic "executed a leg sweep and placed the defendant on the ground behind his vehicle and placed handcuffs behind his back." Kasenic then searched Lerma for weapons. Kasenic noted that Lerma's "speech was slurred" and he "could detect a strong odor of alcohol[ic] beverage."
Kasenic asked Lerma where he was headed and what he was doing. Lerma replied that he was coming from Social 121, a bar located in Plano, and that he was "headed home to Lewisville." When Kasenic asked Lerma about the tire, Lerma "said that he stopped to put air in it and he was just going home right down the street." Kasenic testified that these answers did not make sense because Lerma was traveling away from Lewisville, which was "two cities away from where he was actually at," and because there was no tire into which Lerma could have put any air. Kasenic could not recall Lerma ever mentioning anything about feeling badly or having any problem with his legs or his head. Kasenic opined that Lerma was intoxicated that night, and the fact that Lerma's blood tested under the legal limit did not change his opinion.
A video recording of the traffic stop was played for the jury.
Andrew Macey, a DPS forensic scientist, testified that he analyzed the blood sample taken from Lerma and that it contained 0.062 grams of alcohol per 100 milliltires of blood, which is the under the legal limit of .08 grams per 100 milliliters. See id. He also testified as follows regarding the rates of elimination and absorption in the blood:
Absorption rate is pretty much the time it takes for your body to absorb one drink or several drinks, just depends on how many drinks you have. . . . Elimination is the amount that the time it takes for your body to actually eliminate the alcohol from your body.
Because absorption is so tricky and being that everybody absorbs differently, different factors go into it, different types of alcohol absorb at
different rates. We just kind of like to have very wide range and say that one drink would basically raise your alcohol level .01 to .03 per hour, that is very broad. That's not really known because everybody is different.Macey stated that absorption rate can depend on, among other things, whether the subject is male or female, what type of drink was consumed, whether other drugs were consumed, and if the subject was ill. Elimination rate "normally depends on" whether the subject is an experienced drinker or an alcoholic. Based on a blood alcohol concentration test result and the absorption and elimination rates, a "retrograde extrapolation" can be performed "to work backwards to have an idea of what the number would be at earlier time of the day." However, according to Macey, "it's very difficult" to make a retrograde extrapolation when the time of the last drink consumed is not known.
Elimination is a little bit more known and a little bit more consistent. The[re a]re not as many factors that affect the elimination rate. So the range we use on that is a little bit tighter, and it's still kind of wide, and we use point .01 to .02. It's probably closer to .015 to .018. But we use .01 to .02 just to give an idea of the range it could be.
Macey opined that "[i]t is possible" that a person "could have consumed two beers, been pulled over at 1:15 and then at 3:00 a.m. have an alcohol concentration of [.06]." In Macey's opinion, after an hour and 45 minutes of not drinking, a subject would be "more on the elimination side than on the absorption side." However, "[b]ecause the alcohol curve goes up as you're drinking and then you go down as you're eliminating, there's a possibility in that hour and 45 minutes that you actually could be the same as you were at the time of the draw or higher or lower." He stated that, given Lerma's blood test result and the time elapsed since the traffic stop, his blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving could have been "anywhere from .03 to .04" and "up to .08, .085."
Lerma testified that he is forty-two years old, that he has lived in the Dallas/Fort Worth area for about twenty years, and that he has lived in Lewisville in particular for about six years. He works as an analyst at a data center in Lewisville. Lerma stated he was not intoxicated on the night in question. He acknowledged that his memory regarding what happened was not clear, but he stated that he suffered "flu-like symptoms" that day. He stated that he got off work at around 6:00 p.m. and later met some friends at Pier 121, a marina and restaurant in Lewisville where alcohol is sold. Lerma testified that he "took three beers with [him]" to Pier 121—because "from my experience, I knew my limit"—but that he drank only two of them. While he was at Pier 121, he started getting a "really massive headache" such that he "fe[lt his] head [was] about to explode." His legs became "wobbly and shaky" and his "vision started to go out after a while." He stated he "couldn't focus" and "couldn't think right." Nevertheless, he testified: "I decided, you know, I just could go home and sleep it off or something like that. So I thought I could drive and go home, you know."
Lerma elaborated: I just thought it was the flu, and I had to wait to get over it. It was one thing after another one, you know, allergies and then a cough, and then this stuffed nose and just—just like—I thought it was flu symptoms that I could just fight, you know, medication over the counter and get it over with.
Lerma denied knowing about, or ever having been to, Social 121.
When asked how he knew that he only drank two beers if his memory was faded, Lerma stated: "Because I—I told the officer there was another beer in the car, you know. And, like I said, I knew my limits, after the second beer I already started feeling nauseated and headache and stuff—with a headache." The next thing he remembered was being in jail.
Lerma did not recall hitting anything with his car, driving on a rim, or how he ended up in McKinney. He denied taking any illegal drugs that evening. He stated his headache "lasted probably close to three months" and that he continued to have blurred vision for "two, three days after" the night in question. He saw a doctor and was prescribed blood pressure medication and antibiotics for a sinus infection. His symptoms did not go away, however, which scared him. He did not see a specialist because he did not have insurance at the time. He has since had other diagnostic tests. He is currently being treated for cholesterol, high blood pressure, and "a bad nerve coming from my head back over here." He agreed with defense counsel's suggestion that he is "being treated at this time for possibly having an onset of a ministroke." Lerma stated that a doctor informed him that he experienced a ministroke, but a CAT scan of his brain "didn't show anything yet." Lerma denied that his behavior on the night in question was the result of any accidents suffered at work.
Lerma stated that he knew that his behavior on the night in question was due to a "medical issue," not due to intoxication, because "two beers are not going to make me act like that, the way I was acting; that's not going to happen, no."
The jury convicted Lerma as charged and the trial court sentenced him as set forth above. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Lerma argues by two issues on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and (2) the indictment was defective because it failed to define intoxication.
A. Evidentiary Sufficiency
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We give deference to "the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19). When the record of historical facts supports conflicting inferences, we must presume that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and we must defer to that resolution. Padilla v. State, 326 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. A hypothetically correct jury charge in this case would state that Lerma is guilty if he: (1) operated a motor vehicle in a public place while he was intoxicated; and (2) had twice been previously convicted of DWI as alleged in the indictment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.04, 49.09. "Intoxicated" means:
(A) not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other substance into the body; orId. § 49.01(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). The two definitions of "intoxicated" are referred to as the "impairment" theory and the "per se" theory, respectively. Kirsch v. State, 306 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
(B) having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.
For blood tests, "alcohol concentration" means the number of grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.)
Lerma does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to show that he operated his vehicle in a public place or that he was twice previously convicted of DWI. He contends solely that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of intoxication. We disagree. Platt and Kasenic testified that Lerma drove his car without a front tire, generating a trail of sparks. Platt stated that Lerma "[d]idn't react at all" to his emergency lights but instead drove slowly, "weaving the whole time," and did not stop until Kasenic pulled up alongside him and Platt used his public address system to order him to stop. Platt testified that Lerma exhibited three clues of intoxication in the horizontal nystagmus test; that he failed to keep his balance or "touch heel-to-toe" in the walk-and-turn test; and that he swayed back and forth, put his foot down, and hopped during the one-leg stand test. Kasenic stated that Lerma's speech was slurred and both officers related that Lerma gave nonsensical and confused answers to their questions. Crucially, the officers both testified that there was a "strong odor" of alcohol coming from Lerma's breath when he was removed from the car. All of this evidence, taken together, would allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Lerma did "not have[] the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol." See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.02(1)(A); Kirsch, 306 S.W.3d at 745 (noting that "evidence that would logically raise an inference that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of driving" includes "erratic driving," "post-driving behavior such as stumbling, swaying, slurring or mumbling words" and "inability to perform field sobriety tests or follow directions").
Lerma contends that his "erratic behavior could be easily explained by medical/neurological conditions." Even assuming that is true, it was the jury's prerogative to believe or disbelieve that explanation. See Padilla, 326 S.W.3d at 200. It chose not to believe that explanation, and because there was evidence to support its decision, we may not disturb it.
Lerma also argues that "it should be undisputed that there was insufficient evidence to support that [his] blood alcohol concentration was of .08 or more." See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)(B). It is indeed undisputed that Lerma's blood sample contained an alcohol concentration of .062, and that this is under the legal limit. See id. However, Macey testified generally that a person's alcohol concentration at the time of driving may be higher or lower than the level established by the blood test results depending on the length of time that elapsed between the driving and the blood test and on the absorption and elimination rates. In any event, under the statute, the jury was authorized to convict if it found that Lerma was intoxicated either under the "impairment" or "per se" definitions.See id. § 49.01 (2); Kirsch, 306 S.W.3d at 743. We have already concluded that there was sufficient evidence to prove intoxication under the "impairment" definition. Accordingly, even if the evidence was insufficient to establish "per se" intoxication, the conviction was nevertheless supported by sufficient evidence.
Macey testified that, given the blood test results and the elapsed time between the arrest and the blood draw, Lerma's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving could have been "anywhere from .03 to .04" and "up to .08, .085" depending on the rates of absorption and elimination. However, there was confusion at trial as to how much time elapsed between the arrest and the blood draw. Platt testified that the stop "was around 1:15 in the morning" and the blood sample was taken "probably about 2:10, 2:15 in the morning"; but in questions posed to Macey, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the time of the blood draw as "3:00 a.m." It appears that Macey assumed that the blood sample was taken at 3:00 a.m. in giving his estimates regarding retrograde extrapolation. For this reason, we do not consider this specific testimony probative as to Lerma's potential alcohol concentration at the time of driving.
The jury charge in this case contained only the "impairment" definition of "intoxicated." See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Generally, if there is evidence to support both definitions of the term, both should be submitted in the jury charge. Kirsch v. State, 306 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
--------
We overrule Lerma's first issue.
B. Indictment
By his second issue, Lerma argues that the indictment was defective because it failed to define intoxication. He argues that "[t]he definition of intoxication as found in [penal code section] 49.01 is essential to make the offense a crime, and is indispensable to the indictment."
The State contends that Lerma waived the issue because he did not move to quash the indictment or otherwise object to it prior to trial. We agree.
If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial on the merits commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity and he may not raise the objection on appeal or in any other postconviction proceeding.TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Because Lerma did not present this argument to the trial court at any time, it has not been preserved for appeal. See id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
Even if the issue had been preserved, it would not be meritorious. The United States and Texas Constitutions grant criminal defendants "the right to fair notice of the specific charged offense." State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.11 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). But in a DWI case, "the definitions of 'intoxicated' are purely evidentiary matters" and "do not need to be alleged in a charging instrument to provide a defendant with sufficient notice." Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d at 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (noting that the definitions "set forth alternative means by which the State may prove intoxication, rather than alternate means of committing the offense"); see Crenshaw v. State, 378 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Lerma's second issue is overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 23rd day of April, 2015.