Summary
In Lepper v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 188 Pa. Super. 158, 146 A.2d 337 (1958), in addition to direct interest, the statute expressly disqualified any member of the class of workers which was involved in the dispute.
Summary of this case from Haskon, Inc. v. ColemanOpinion
November 11, 1958.
December 9, 1958.
Unemployment compensation — Unemployment due to labor dispute — Claimant not member of union but covered by collective bargaining agreement — Unemployment Compensation Law.
1. In an unemployment compensation case, in which it appeared that claimant was not a member of a union which was the sole bargaining agent for all the employes of claimant's employer; that claimant was unemployed during a strike called by the union because of failure of management to consummate a new collective bargaining agreement with the union; and that claimant belonged to a grade or class of workers covered by the new agreement, under which he benefited; it was Held that claimant was unemployed because of a labor dispute and was properly denied benefits under § 402(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Act.
2. Curcio Unemployment Compensation Case, 165 Pa. Super. 385, Held controlling.
Before RHODES, P.J., HIRT, GUNTHER, WRIGHT, ERVIN, and WATKINS, JJ. (WOODSIDE, J., absent).
Appeal, No. 231, April T., 1958, by claimant, from decision of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B- 48068, in re claim of Walter D. Lepper. Decision affirmed.
Walter D. Lepper, appellant, in propria persona.
Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him Thomas D. McBride, Attorney General, for appellee.
Argued November 11, 1958.
A labor union known as Division 85 of Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employes of America was the sole bargaining agent for all employes of Pittsburgh Railways Company covered in the labor-management agreement which expired on September 1, 1957. Claimant had been in the employ of Pittsburgh Railways Company as a substation operator for about 46 years. He was eligible for membership in the union but, under the labor-management agreements he was not required to join the union as a condition of his continued employment because of his long service with the company. Claimant never joined the union but Division 85 nevertheless became his bargaining representative in negotiating labor relations with his employer by reason of the fact that he, as a "Substation Operator", along with other employes within that job classification, was covered in the labor-management agreement with which we are concerned.
Claimant's last day of work was October 12, 1957. He was unemployed thereafter until on or about December 7, 1957, during the period of a strike called by Division 85, because of the failure of the management until that date to consummate a new collective bargaining agreement with the union. The board denied unemployment compensation benefits under § 402(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Act as amended May 23, 1949, P.L. 1738, 43 P. S. § 802.
On the above undisputed facts, which are reflected in the findings of the board, this appeal by claimant from the denial of benefits by the board, is ruled by Curcio Unemployment Compensation Case, 165 Pa. Super. 385, 68 A.2d 393 followed in Stahlman Unempl. Compensation Case, 187 Pa. Super. 246, 144 A.2d 670. We need not repeat what we there said. It is sufficient to note that the claimant here, was unemployed because of a labor dispute, and he, although not a member of the striking union belonged to a grade or class of workers, to wit: that of "Substation Operator" covered by the union-management agreement, which participated in the strike. Moreover there can be no question that claimant was directly interested in the dispute and that he benefited by the new agreement which was negotiated by the union in representing all of the members of his classification. In his testimony before the referee claimant admitted that he had benefited by the raise in pay for members of his group classification, secured by the union in negotiating the new agreement with the company which became effective on or about December 27, 1957. On his admission claimant's hourly pay under the new agreement was increased from $2.26 to $2.44. The admitted facts clearly bar claimant from benefits under § 402(d).
Decision affirmed.