Opinion
No. 3D19-1665
04-15-2020
Alfonso LEOS, Appellant, v. Sara HERNANDEZ, Appellee.
Alfonso Leos, in proper person. Sara Hernandez, in proper person.
Alfonso Leos, in proper person.
Sara Hernandez, in proper person.
Before LOGUE, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Appellant, Alfonso Leos, the father, challenges the post-decretal relocation of his minor child to the State of Texas at the behest of appellee, Sara Hernandez, the mother. For the reasons that follow, we are constrained to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Citing the availability of an ideal educational institution and an overall desire for an improved quality of life, the mother petitioned in the proceedings below to relocate with the child to Laredo, Texas. In furtherance thereof, she provided the lower tribunal with the known particulars regarding all requisite "items of information" under section 61.13001(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2019). Raulerson v. Wright, 60 So. 3d 487, 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (citing § 61.13001(3), Fla. Stat.).
The court referred the parties to a general magistrate. The magistrate duly convened an evidentiary hearing, and, at the conclusion of the proceedings, determined relocation was provident. The father timely filed exceptions to the recommended disposition. Shortly thereafter, the mother moved with the child and her paramour to an undisclosed location in Del Rio, Texas.
"A magistrate's report does not have any adjudicatory effect unless and until the trial court adopts it as the order or judgment of the court," thus, on the record before us, the mother prematurely relocated to a different city other than that requested. Seigler v. Bell, 148 So. 3d 473, 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (citation omitted); see § 61.13001(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2019) ("Relocating the child without complying with the requirements of this subsection subjects the party in violation to contempt and other proceedings to compel the return of the child."); Raulerson, 60 So. 3d at 489 ("Section 61.13001 delineates the requirements a primary residential parent must follow before relocating with a minor child who is the subject of an order determining the child's time-sharing, residential care, kinship, or custody.").
The record on appeal is devoid of any indicia that the lower tribunal ever ruled on the asserted exceptions. Moreover, and fatal to our jurisdiction, to date, no final order of relocation has been rendered.
Accordingly, we hereby dismiss the appeal without prejudice to either party seeking timely appellate review of a final order, once one is rendered by the trial court. See Seigler v. Bell, 148 So. 3d 473, 477-78 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) ("While a magistrate's report is more than a mere recommendation, it is not a final judgment, as magistrates lack the authority to enter final judgments.") (citation omitted); Peacon v. Peacon, 578 So. 2d 781, 782 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) ("The Order denying the exceptions did not adopt or ratify the master's report and thus clearly was neither a final nor non-final appealable order.") (citation omitted); see also Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 48 So. 3d 118, 119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ("[T]he father was entitled to receive a hearing on his exceptions to the general magistrate's report because he did timely file his exceptions."); Yoxsimer v. Yoxsimer, 918 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (" Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.490(f) provides that if exceptions are filed to a general magistrate's report, they ‘[must] be heard on reasonable notice by either party or the court.’ ").
We express no opinion as to the merits of the appeal.
--------
Dismissed.