Additionally, the following cases demonstrate the type of conduct found prohibitive under former versions of Alabama's bribery statutes. See United States v. Chatham, 677 F.2d 800, 801-04 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming RICO judgment of conviction predicated upon a violation of a former version of Alabama's bribery statute, where the president of a building testing and inspection company offered cash payments to a mayor in hopes of securing a testing contract on a contemplated new public hospital and fictional new city hall); Leonard v. State, 484 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (on appeal from a judgment of conviction under § 13A-10-61, for offering police officers $1,000 in cash, a Lincoln Continental, and future monthly payments, in exchange for the police officers' ignoring the defendant's drug operation and "bust[ing]" those who interfered with it); Pope v. State, 365 So. 2d 369, 370 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a bail bondsman's conviction for bribery for offering a police officer $1,000 to supply him and others with "inside information" to protect a contemplated prostitution business to be disguised as an "escort service," as well as a percentage of the business's expected profits); Fuller v. State, 115 So. 2d 110, 111 (Ala. Ct. App. 1958) (affirming chief deputy sheriff's judgment of conviction for bribery for accepting periodic monetary payments to permit the operation of a bordello); Jordan v. State, 156 So. 642 (Ala. Ct. App. 1934) (affirming a state senator's judgment of conviction for demanding mone

In contrast to McLeod I, where we found ample evidence in the record to support our conclusion that McLeod's waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made, the record in this case is totally devoid of any information from which we can make such a determination. Normally, this Court would reverse the conviction in such a situation. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. City of Hartselle, 500 So.2d 1327 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986); Leonard v. State, 484 So.2d 1185 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985). However, because the trial judge in this case was the same trial judge who presided in McLeod I and because the trial judge indicated in his order of November 3, 1988, that something relative to this matter would be entered in the record, we deem it appropriate to exercise our authority under Rule 10(f), A.R.App.P., and remand this cause to the trial court for a determination of whether, in fact, this portion of the record is missing.