Additionally, the following cases demonstrate the type of conduct found prohibitive under former versions of Alabama's bribery statutes. See United States v. Chatham, 677 F.2d 800, 801-04 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming RICO judgment of conviction predicated upon a violation of a former version of Alabama's bribery statute, where the president of a building testing and inspection company offered cash payments to a mayor in hopes of securing a testing contract on a contemplated new public hospital and fictional new city hall); Leonard v. State, 484 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (on appeal from a judgment of conviction under ยง 13A-10-61, for offering police officers $1,000 in cash, a Lincoln Continental, and future monthly payments, in exchange for the police officers' ignoring the defendant's drug operation and "bust[ing]" those who interfered with it); Pope v. State, 365 So. 2d 369, 370 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a bail bondsman's conviction for bribery for offering a police officer $1,000 to supply him and others with "inside information" to protect a contemplated prostitution business to be disguised as an "escort service," as well as a percentage of the business's expected profits); Fuller v. State, 115 So. 2d 110, 111 (Ala. Ct. App. 1958) (affirming chief deputy sheriff's judgment of conviction for bribery for accepting periodic monetary payments to permit the operation of a bordello); Jordan v. State, 156 So. 642 (Ala. Ct. App. 1934) (affirming a state senator's judgment of conviction for demanding mone
"The burden is on the State to show that a defendant's waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 63, 62 L.Ed.2d 42 (1979)." Leonard v. State, 484 So.2d 1185, 1189 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985). Reese's previous conviction was for possession of marijuana for personal use only, in violation of ยง 13A-12-214.
Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 63, 62 L.Ed. 2d 42 (1979).โ Leonard v. State, 484 So.2d 1185, 1189 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).""....
Even if we were to find that the record in this case supported a finding that Thomas knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, the record does not indicate that the trial court properly advised him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and it did not advise him that he could revoke his waiver at any time during the proceedings. See Williams v. State, 958 So.2d 911, 913 (Ala. Crim.App. 2006), and Leonard v. State, 484 So.2d 1185 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985). An argument might be made that the trial court's admonitions to Thomas that he abide by the trial court's rulings on objections and that he conduct himself in a professional manner or he would face possible expulsion from the courtroom were attempts to apprise Thomas of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
Therefore, this court should reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for a new trial. See Farid v. State, 720 So.2d 998 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998); Hairgrove v. State, 680 So.2d 946 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995); Leonard v. State, 484 So.2d 1185 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985). WELCH, Judge (dissenting).
Because the record in this case does not indicate that the trial court ever advised the appellant about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and that he had the right to withdraw any waiver of the right to counsel at any time during the proceedings, we should reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for a new trial. See Farid v. State, 720 So.2d 998 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998); Hairgrove v. State, 680 So.2d 946 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995); Leonard v. State, 484 So.2d 1185 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985). Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Even if we were to hold that the appellant impliedly waived his right to counsel when he fired his attorney during a recess in the proceedings, the record in this case does not indicate that the trial court ever advised the appellant about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and that he had the right to withdraw any waiver of the right to counsel at any time during the proceedings. See Leonard v. State, 484 So.2d 1185 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985). Accordingly, we must reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for a new trial.
In these cases, the courts found that the record must definitively show that an accused was offered counsel, but intelligently and voluntarily chose to waive that right. See Tomlin v. State, 601 So.2d 124 (Ala. 1991); Brooks v. City of Enterprise, 644 So.2d 41 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); McLeod v. State, 675 So.2d 619 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991); Leonard v. State, 484 So.2d 1185 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985). We here apply the same standard in reviewing a waiver of the right to a trial by jury.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, rehearing denied, 431 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 2200, 53 L.Ed.2d 240 (1977). 'The burden is on the State to show that a defendant's waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 63, 62 L.Ed.2d 42 (1979).' Leonard v. State, 484 So.2d 1185, 1189 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985). "Reese's previous conviction was for possession of marijuana for personal use only, in violation of ยง 13A-12-214.
The burden is on the State to show that a defendant's waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 63, 62 L.Ed.2d 42 (1979)." Leonard v. State, 484 So.2d 1185, 1189 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985). The defendant's conviction is reversed and this cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.