Opinion
Rehearing Denied May 13, 1964.
Hearing Granted June 9, 1964.
Helm & Budinger, Studio City, for petitioners.
Alexander R. Tobin, Ontario, for respondents.
Ralph H. Prince, San Bernardino, for City of San Bernardino, and James L. King, San Bernardino, for Bd. of Water Comrs. of City of San Bernardino, real parties in interest, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioners.
John F. Bremer, Downey, and Wilson, Harzfeld, Jones & Morton, San Mateo, as amici curiae on behalf of respondents.
GERALD BROWN, Justice.
This is a proceeding in mandamus to compel the Board of Directors of the San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water District (hereinafter called District) to hold an election under the California Water The Water Code provides that territory within a municipal water district may be excluded from it. (Water Code, § 72150.) Proceedings for such exclusion may be instituted by petition. (Water Code, § 72160.) Where a petition is signed by voters residing in a district equal in number to at least 10 per cent of the number of such voters voting for all candidates for Governor in the most recent gubernatorial election; where no part of the district is within a metropolitan water district and has twice previously voted against joining a metropolitan water district; Where such petition is filed and found by the district secretary to be sufficient and the costs required by law to conduct the exclusion proceedings have been deposited; then the board shall hold an election within 70 days after adopting a resolution granting the petition. (Water Code, § 72190.1).
The pleadings herein establish a cause of action which requires respondents to conduct the exclusion election, unless barred by certain constitutional objections raised by respondents.
The pleadings determine that a petition for exclusion was filed with the District, which its Secretary certified as containing 13,958 signatures of qualified voters of the District, and that 10 per cent of the number of voters for governor in the District in the last preceding election was 8,859. The essential facts establishing compliance with the Water Code were certified by the Secretary. These facts made the petition sufficient, even though the Secretary did not expressly so state. Thereafter the Board refused to carry out its ministerial duty of granting the petition by resolution and holding an election. Petitioners, all of whom were residents, taxpayers, water users and qualified voters within the District, for themselves and all who signed the exclusion petition then applied to this court for a writ of mandate, requiring respondents to grant the petition and call and conduct an exclusion election.
Petitioners possessed representative capacity to bring this action. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 382.)
Mandamus is available to compel a board to perform a ministerial duty. (Metropolitan Water District v. Marquardt, 59 Cal.2d 159, 170, 28 Cal.Rptr. 724, 379 P.2d 159, 170, 28 Cal.Rptr. 724, 379 P.2d 28.) The statute herein concerned allows the Board no discretion, but positively requires it to "grant such petition by resolution, and the election * * * shall be held * * *." (Water Code, § 72190.1.)
It is contended that if the territory votes to withdraw from the District, the District's contract with the State will be impaired. This is without merit. The sole effect of the legislation herein concerned is to empower a fixed percentage of voters within an entire district to determine for the district that an election should be held at which the voters within a certain area may decide for themselves whether that area shall remain within the district. A district, through its board, also may initiate exclusion proceedings. Here, the parties to the contract, in recognition of the prospect that the District might exercise this power, made at least three provisions in the contract dealing with boundary changes. (paragraphs 7c, 15b and 15c of the contract.) That the State has merely extended the means by which the District may exercise such power by removing the Board's discretion in the matter when it is properly petitioned cannot be said to impair the contract, in view of the recognition that changes might be made. The contract as presented by the record contemplates that a portion of one district may be excluded therefrom and join another district having a similar contract with the State. The contract provides for adjustment of rights and duties in the event of a transfer. We are unable to see how the contract will suffer any "impairment" by the occurrence of an event for which it provides. The subject legislation is not unconstitutional as a special law where a general law could be made applicable. It provides a method by which an election is mandatory. There is no applicable general law or other statute authorizing such mandatory feature. As the Water Code otherwise exists, the board would have the discretion of authorizing an election. The Legislature in its wisdom has provided a method, herein utilized, to require the Board to hold an exclusion election, which method is available to any other district throughout the state in a like situation. It is stated in Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 20 Cal.2d 684, 693, 128 P.2d 529, 534:
"None of those constitutional principles is violated if the classification of persons or things affected by the legislation is not arbitrary and is based upon some difference in the classes having a substantial relation to the purpose of which the legislation was designed. (Citing cases.) A law to be general in its scope need not include all classes of individuals in the state. Nor is a classification void because it does not embrace within its every other class which might be included. (Citing cases.) Wide discretion is vested in the Legislature in making the classification and every presumption is in favor of the validity of the statute; the decision of the Legislature as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant the classification will not be overthrown by the courts unless it is palpably arbitrary and beyond rational doubt erroneous. (Citing cases.) A distinction in legislation is not arbitrary if any set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it."
The demurrer is overruled. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed for.
GRIFFIN, P.J., and COUGHLIN, J., concur.