Opinion
2021–03332 Index No. 614139/16
02-15-2023
William LEON, appellant, v. EAGLE AUTO MALL CORP., et al., respondents.
Kujawski & Kujawski, Deer Park, NY (Jennifer A. Spellman of counsel), for appellant. Keith J. Conway, Melville, NY (Daniel P. McCabe of counsel), for respondents.
Kujawski & Kujawski, Deer Park, NY (Jennifer A. Spellman of counsel), for appellant.
Keith J. Conway, Melville, NY (Daniel P. McCabe of counsel), for respondents.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., BETSY BARROS, LARA J. GENOVESI, JANICE A. TAYLOR, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (John H. Rouse, J.), dated April 27, 2021. The order granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 24, 2014. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. In an order dated April 27, 2021, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine and to his left shoulder did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614, 874 N.Y.S.2d 180 ). The defendant also demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180–day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Nicholson v. Kwarteng, 180 A.D.3d 695, 696, 115 N.Y.S.3d 707 ; Strenk v. Rodas, 111 A.D.3d 920, 976 N.Y.S.2d 151 ; Karpinos v. Cora, 89 A.D.3d 994, 995, 933 N.Y.S.2d 383 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
DILLON, J.P., BARROS, GENOVESI and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.