Opinion
No. N.H. 9612-49393
March 6, 1997
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff and the defendant entered into a one year lease for the period November 1, 1996 to November 1, 1997. The lease called for a monthly rent of $900 payable on the first day of each month.
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, served the defendant with a notice to quit for nonpayment of rent on December 10, 1996. He then commenced this summary process action.
General Statutes § 47a-15a provides in relevant part: "If rent is unpaid when due and the tenant fails to pay rent within nine days thereafter . . . the landlord may terminate the rental agreement in accordance with the provisions of sections 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive." At the time that the notice to quit was served on him, the defendant still had one day remaining to pay the rent. Therefore, the plaintiff could not terminate the rental agreement when he did so.
The parties' lease also provided that the defendant was in default if he failed to pay the rent "within 10 days after it is due".
It is difficult not to sympathize with any honest landlord who, proceeding without a lawyer, attempts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent, only to be stymied by the interposition of the hypertechnicalities of Connecticut summary process law. Nonetheless, the law of this state is that "[a]s a condition precedent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity." Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 729 (1989). "The statutory remedy of summary process is in derogation of the common law and therefore must be strictly construed. Jo-Mark Sand Gravel Co. v. Pantanella, 139 Conn. 598, 601, 96 A.2d 217 (1953)." Wallingford Industrial Park v. Fabricated Metals for Electronics, Inc., 40 Conn. Sup. 107, 109 (1984).
For these reasons, the court is required by law to grant the motion to dismiss.
NOTE: The notice to quit may have had the effect of terminating the lease. The tenancy has thereby become a tenancy by sufferance. Mayron's Bake Shops Inc. v. Arrow Stores, Inc. 149 Conn. 149, 156 (1961); Bushnell Plaza Development Corporation v. Fazzano, 38 Conn. Sup. 683, 686 (1983); cf. General Statutes § 47a-23 (d). A tenant at sufferance has no obligation to pay rent. Longergan v. Connecticut Food Store, Inc., 168 Conn. 122, 130 (1975). Unless there were to be a new tenancy, agreed upon by the parties, any subsequent notice to quit and summary process action would have to be based on General Statutes § 47a-23 (a)(2): "when one originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises but such right or privilege has terminated."
BY THE COURT
Bruce L. Levin Judge of the Superior Court