Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-7403
March 11, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Keith Eugene Lentz, an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford ("SCI-Graterford"), asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against SCI-Graterford Superintendent Donald T. Vaughn, Deputy Superintendent David Diguglielmo, Major Francis Feild, and Corrections Officer James Majikes. The Complaint requests declaratory and injunctive relief and punitive damages for alleged violations of Plaintiff's federal and state constitutional rights when he was removed from the general prison population.
Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Motion.
I. Background
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the relevant facts are as follows. Prior to May 21, 2002, Plaintiff was housed in SCI-Graterford's general population. (Compl. at ¶ 8). In an incident report dated May 21, 2002, Major Feild stated that he received reports that Plaintiff was becoming increasingly angry and agitated when prison staff attempted to speak with him. See DC-141, Part 1, attached to Plaintiff's Complaint. Major Feild interviewed Plaintiff and noted that he became defensive and angry, refused to answer questions, and threatened to sue Major Feild if his access to other prisoners was limited.Id. Major Feild suspected that Plaintiff was not taking his prescribed psychotropic medication and was concerned that he would be in danger if he remained in the general population. Id. Major Feild recommended placement in the Special Needs Unit ("SNU"), a form of administrative custody, for the purpose of evaluation and treatment.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), a copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes. Accordingly, attachments to Plaintiff's Complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss. Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990).
Officer Majikes served notice on Plaintiff that the Program Review Committee ("PRC") was planning to meet to discuss placing him in the SNU. (Compl. at ¶ 13). This notice did not include a form on which an inmate could provide his version of events. It also failed to include a witness statement, a request for witnesses, or representation forms.Id. When he inquired, Plaintiff was advised that those forms were not applicable to administrative segregation proceedings.Id. at ¶ 14.
On May 21, 2002, Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation. Two days later, the PRC held a hearing regarding his placement.Id. at ¶ 11. The PRC decided to adopt Major Feild's recommendation that Plaintiff be housed in the SNU. Major Feild was a member of the PRC. Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff remained in administrative segregation for 94 days. Id. at ¶ 10. During that time, he was deprived of an "adequate opportunity for meaningful exercise activity" and "work opportunity." Id. at ¶ 48. II. Legal Standard
When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild. O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted only when it is certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved by the plaintiff. Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988). Furthermore, a pro se complaint, such as Plaintiff's, "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
III. Analysis
To state a cause of action under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that (1) Defendants acted under color of state law; and (2) their actions deprived him of rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal statutes. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993). In this case, it is not disputed that during the relevant time period, all Defendants acted as officials of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, an executive agency of the state government. 71 P.S. § 61. Thus, the issue is whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants deprived him of his rights under the United States Constitution or federal statutes.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to state a claim with respect to Defendants Vaughn and Diguglielmo because the only allegations against them involve failure to respond to or act favorably on Plaintiff's grievances. It is well-established that liability cannot lie in a § 1983 action absent personal involvement on the part of the defendant.Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1997), citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Respondeat superior generally is insufficient to show personal involvement. Id. However, a supervisor can be liable for the actions of a subordinate if he had actual knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unlawful acts. Id. The inquiry is whether the supervisor actually possessed authority over the individual committing the alleged violation. Id.
Defendants correctly note that failure to respond to grievances is not, in and of itself, a constitutional violation. See Rauso v. Vaughn, 2000 WL 873285, at *16 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2000). However, that is not the only allegation Plaintiff raises with respect to these Defendants. Plaintiff claims that Vaughn and Diguglielmo had "knowledge and acquiescence of unlawful conduct of prison officials subordinates." (Compl. at p. 2). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, particularly in light of the liberal pleading standards afforded pro se litigants, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the personal involvement of Defendants Vaughn and Diguglielmo.
A. Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff claims that he was deprived of an "adequate opportunity for meaningful exercise activity while he was confined to the SNU. (Compl. at ¶ 48). The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that "violates civilized standards of humanity and decency." Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1992)). In some circumstances, lack of exercise may violate the Eighth Amendment. Lewis v. Prison Health Services, Inc., et al. 1988 WL 95082, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1988) ("A prisoner's health that is compromised because he was denied adequate exercise may constitute such a violation").
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed because he does not plead any facts in support of his allegation that he was not afforded sufficient exercise, other than to allege that the SNU exposes the residents to "widespread idleness." (Compl. at ¶ 48). However, as a matter of law, inadequate exercise may provide grounds for an Eighth Amendment violation. Here, the Court cannot conclude that no set of facts will entitle Plaintiff to relief because he may be able to establish that lack of exercise affected his health. Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations based on inadequate exercise will not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Defendants suggest in a footnote that this claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. They state, "[i]t does not appear from the attachments [to the Complaint] that he specifically grieved the alleged lack of exercise in the SNU." (Motion to Dismiss at pp. 7-8). Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2001). However, the Third Circuit has held that "failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense to be pleaded by the defendant." Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim will not be dismissed at this time due to failure to exhaust. B. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff's Complaint also alleges that the SNU deprived the residents of "work opportunity." (Compl. at ¶ 48). This allegation fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. It is well established that prisoners have no constitutional right to employment.See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (deprivation of employment does not violate the Eighth Amendment); James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989) (prisoners have no property interest in any job under the Fourteenth Amendment).
Plaintiff asserts causes of action under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court will address only the Fourteenth Amendment claims. The Fifth Amendment applies only when the federal government denies a person due process of law. Local 1498, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL/CIO, 522 F.2d 486, 492 (3d Cir. 1975). As no claims have been asserted against the federal government in this case, the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable.
Plaintiff argues that the decision to place him in administrative segregation and his resulting placement in the SNU violated his procedural due process rights in several ways. First, he claims that the decision to house him in the SNU was made arbitrarily and on the basis of inaccurate information. (Compl. at ¶¶ 17, 23). He also challenges Major Feild's presence on the PRC that approved his own recommendation that Plaintiff be placed in the SNU. (Compl. at ¶ 27). Finally, he claims that the notice of the hearing that Officer Majikes provided was constitutionally defective because it did not include an inmate's version form, a witness statement, a request for witnesses, or representation forms. (Compl. at ¶¶ 44-46).
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Accordingly, "a liberty interest of constitutional dimension may not be abrogated by governmental action without certain procedural safeguards." McGrath v. Johnson, 67 F. Supp.2d 499, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1999). Such a liberty interest exists either because it is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution itself or because state law has created it. Id. To implicate the Due Process Clause directly, the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected must exceed his sentence or otherwise violate the Constitution. Asquith v. Dept. of Corrections, 186 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). State prison regulations may, in some circumstances, create liberty interests that are protected by the federal Due Process Clause. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). However, "[T]hese interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484.
The Third Circuit has held that highly restricted housing conditions inside the prison do not constitute an atypical and significant hardship unless they persist for an extremely long time. See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 704, 706-9 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that fifteen months in administrative detention at SCI-Graterford did not implicate a liberty interest); Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding no protected liberty interest where prisoner was held in disciplinary detention for 15 days and administrative segregation for 120 days); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (determining that seven months in disciplinary confinement did not infringe a protected liberty interest). In the instant case, where Plaintiff was in the SNU for only 94 days, there has been no atypical or significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Thus, Plaintiff does not have a state-created liberty interest in not being placed in the SNU for 94 days.
The only case where the court found an atypical and significant restriction was Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2000), where the prisoner had been held in solitary confinement for eight years.
However, Plaintiff has alleged that the conditions of the SNU violated the Eighth Amendment. As stated earlier, this allegation will not be dismissed because the Court cannot conclude that no set of facts would, if proven, entitle Plaintiff to relief. If Plaintiff is successful in proving that the conditions of his administrative confinement violated the Eighth Amendment, he also has a protected liberty interest arising directly out of the Due Process Clause. Asquith, 186 F.3d at 407.
Assuming arguendo that such a liberty interest exists, the Court must examine whether the procedures utilized in conjunction with the deprivation comported with due process. The Supreme Court has held that, in determining what process is due in the prison context, prison administrators are "obligated to engage only in informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting [plaintiff's] administrative confinement, including whatever statement [plaintiff] wished to submit, within a reasonable time after confining him to administrative segregation." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983);see also Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2000). As long as the prisoner receives some notice, is given the opportunity to make either an oral or written statement, and the adjudicator reviews the charges and the available evidence, the Due Process Clause is satisfied.Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476.
In the instant case, Plaintiff's Complaint acknowledges that he received notice of the administrative proceedings, that a hearing was held within two days of his placement in administrative segregation, and that the PRC periodically reviewed his placement thereafter. (Compl. at ¶¶ 11, 13). This satisfies the requirements of due process imposed inHewitt, Plaintiff does not claim that he was denied the opportunity to present his views at the hearing. In fact, he specifically argues that he was not "given opportunity to present his inmate version in writing." (Compl. at ¶¶ 44-45). As explained above, Plaintiff did not have the right to make a written statement. Thus, it is apparent from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief under the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment Claims will be dismissed.
C. First Amendment
Plaintiff claims that the motivation for his placement in the SNU was "retaliation and punishment for legal actions taken against Feild and other staff personnel for constitutionally protected activities for redress of grievances and other proper purposes or otherwise criticizing Feild and other prison officials." (Compl. at p. 5). Although Plaintiff refers to legal actions, his Complaint notes that he has never before brought suit against the parties herein named. (Compl. at p. 4). Defendants argue that the decision to move Plaintiff to the SNU could not have been retaliatory because his placement predated the grievances he submitted. (Motion to Dismiss at p. 11).
Even if assigning Plaintiff to the SNU was not unconstitutional, "an otherwise legitimate and constitutional government act can become unconstitutional when an individual demonstrates that it was undertaken in retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment speech." Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997). Filing an administrative grievance or a civil action constitutes an exercise of First Amendment rights. See Hill v. Blum, 916 F. Supp. 470, 473-74 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
It is true that the grievance forms attached to Plaintiffs Complaint are all dated subsequent to his placement in the SNU. However, nothing in the Complaint forecloses the possibility that Plaintiff had filed other grievances in advance of being placed in the SNU. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that there are no facts which would entitle Plaintiff to relief. Accordingly, Plaintiff's First Amendment claim will not be dismissed at this time.
D. State Law
In addition to his § 1983 claim, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. These claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Pennsylvania law provides "that the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity." 1 Pa. Con. Stat. § 2310. The legislature has specifically waived sovereign immunity in nine narrow categories of negligence cases. See 42 Pa. Con. Stat. § 8522(b). The instant allegations, based on violations of the state constitution, do not fall into any of the categories for which sovereign immunity has been waived. Thus, Plaintiff's state law claims must be dismissed.
The categories of cases for which sovereign immunity has been waived are: (1) vehicle liability; (2) medical-professional liability; (3) care, custody or control of personal property; (4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody or control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines. 42 Pa. Con. Stat. § 8522(b).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff's claims based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as his state law claims will be dismissed. His Eighth Amendment inadequate exercise claim and First Amendment retaliation claim will not be dismissed. An appropriate Order follows.