Opinion
No. 3D19-2358
02-17-2021
Allen Lenoir, M.D., in proper person. Tracy Lee Cooper George (Tallahassee), Chief Appellate Counsel, and Nicholas A. Merlin (Tallahassee), Senior Attorney, for appellee.
Allen Lenoir, M.D., in proper person.
Tracy Lee Cooper George (Tallahassee), Chief Appellate Counsel, and Nicholas A. Merlin (Tallahassee), Senior Attorney, for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and SCALES and LOBREE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Worster v. Dep't of Health, 767 So. 2d 1239, 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding: "In an appeal from an administrative proceeding, a party cannot argue on appeal matters which were not properly excepted to or challenged before the agency"); Redfern v. Dep't of Prof. Reg., 498 So. 2d 1313, 1315 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (holding nurse failed to establish that the Department abused its discretion in declining to accept exceptions to a recommended order filed after expiration of the statutory time period for filing such submissions). See also § 120.68(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2021) (providing that "the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact"); Graham v. EstuaryProps., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380 (Fla. 1981) (noting: "The reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency on a finding of fact or the weight thereof"); Lenard v. A.L.P.H.A. "A Beginning" Inc., 945 So. 2d 618, 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (observing that "[w]hen reviewing the findings and conclusions of a government agency, this court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the agency if competent, substantial evidence supports the agency's factual findings and the agency correctly applied the applicable statutory criteria.")