Opinion
December 4, 1951.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County, M.B. Smith, J.
Garland W. Spencer, Sanford, and Tom Watson, Orlando, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant was tried and convicted on a charge that he "did unlawfully ravish and carnally know and abuse Lucy Mae Brooks, a female child under the age of ten years, to-wit, the age of eight years".
The appellant has propounded two questions: first, Was the State's evidence sufficient to support a verdict of guilty? and; second, Was it error for the lower court to deny appellant's motion for a new trial? The lower court held the evidence sufficient and denied the appellant's motion for a new trial.
In cases of this kind no good purpose can be served by narrating in detail all of the nauseating testimony. It is sufficient to say that Lucy Mae Brooks, a female child of eight years of age, testified directly and positively to the act in question. Her testimony was supported by her brother who said that he actually saw the act. Two physicians testified that they made an examination of the girl and found injuries which in their opinion could have been caused by the act testified to by Lucy Mae and her brother. There was other corroborating testimony not necessary to repeat. The defendant, of course, denied the charge and attempted to prove an alibi. The testimony offered by the State and by the defendant presented a jury question. The jury had the right to believe Lucy Mae and her brother or to believe the defendant and his witnesses. The jury heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor on the witness stand, and after so doing decided the questions in favor of the State. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict.
The appellant here, defendant below, argues that the fact that the jury recommended mercy evidenced a doubt in the minds of the jury as to the guilt of the defendant and that this doubt should have been resolved in favor of the defendant. We do not agree to this theory. The evidence showed that the defendant was twenty years of age and that the habits and morals of the boys and girls in this community were rather loose. It is more reasonable to assume these facts caused the jury to recommend mercy.
A strong plea was made at the time of the oral argument that mercy, if nothing else, should prompt this Court to grant a new trial. The jury having found the defendant guilty and having recommended mercy, which carries a life sentence, has granted all of the mercy possible to be granted by the courts under our laws.
Our Constitution and laws provide a most tolerant and lenient system for the granting of mercy by the establishment of the Pardon Board and the Parole Commission, and providing for liberal rules of procedure.
We have carefully considered the record and all of the contentions of the appellant here, defendant below, and we find no reversible error.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and TERRELL and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.