Opinion
24A-CR-620
08-29-2024
Jessica J. Lemaster, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Amanda O. Blackketter Blackketter Law, LLC Shelbyville, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Sierra A. Murray Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Decatur Superior Court The Honorable Matthew D. Bailey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 16D01-2112-F5-1215.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Amanda O. Blackketter Blackketter Law, LLC Shelbyville, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Sierra A. Murray Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Weissmann, Judge.
[¶1] Jessica Lemaster appeals the revocation of her probation, arguing that the trial court: (1) denied her due process by considering an alleged probation violation for which she did not have adequate notice; and (2) abused its discretion by ordering her to serve a portion of her previously suspended sentence as a sanction for her probation violation. Finding neither a due process violation nor an abuse of the trial court's sanctioning discretion, we affirm.
Facts
[¶2] Lemaster pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator in exchange for the State's dismissal of a Level 5 felony charge for carrying a handgun without a license. The trial court sentenced Lemaster to 900 days in the Decatur County Jail, with 574 days suspended to supervised probation. A few months into her probationary term, Lemaster requested that her supervision be transferred from Decatur County to Delaware County. The trial court granted Lemaster's request, but Lemaster never reported to the Delaware County Probation Department. The State therefore petitioned to revoke her probation.
[¶3] After an initial hearing on the State's petition, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the petition's allegations. Lemaster admitted that she failed to report to the Delaware County Probation Department, and the trial court took her admission under advisement. The court then set the matter for a dispositional hearing. But before that hearing could occur, Lemaster was charged in a separate case with unlawful carrying of a handgun, a Level 5 felony. The State therefore filed a supplemental petition to revoke Lemaster's probation, alleging she committed a new criminal offense.
[¶4] Lemaster failed to appear at the scheduled dispositional hearing. However, the trial court issued a warrant for her arrest, and a dispositional hearing was eventually held. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court asked the State if it wished to reset the matter for an initial hearing on its supplemental petition to revoke Lemaster's probation. The State declined, opting instead to proceed with disposition on its initial petition alone. In the end, the trial court accepted Lemaster's admission to the allegations of that petition and, "[b]ased on that admission," found that Lemaster had violated her probation. Tr. Vol. II, p. 28; accord App. Vol. II, p. 51 (probation revocation order).
[¶5] As a sanction for Lemaster's probation violation, the trial court revoked her probation and ordered her to serve 360 days of her previously suspended jail sentence. The court further ordered Lemaster to serve her reinstated sentence consecutively to any sentence that might be imposed as a result of her pending charge for unlawful carrying of a handgun.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] On appeal, Lemaster argues that the trial court: (1) denied her due process in finding she violated her probation; and (2) abused its discretion in sanctioning her. Neither claim prevails.
I. No Due Process Violation
[¶7] Lemaster first claims the trial court denied her due process by considering her alleged commission of a new criminal offense when revoking her probation. According to Lemaster, she did not receive adequate notice of the State's supplemental petition to revoke her probation or its allegation that Lemaster violated her probation by committing unlawful possession of a firearm.
[¶8] "Although probationers are not entitled to the full array of constitutional rights afforded defendants at trial, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does impose procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of the conditional liberty created by probation." Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008) (cleaned up). Among them is a requirement that the probationer be given written notice of their alleged probation violations. Id. "It is error for a probation revocation to be based upon a violation for which the defendant did not receive notice." Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 831-32 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (quoting Bovie v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002)).
[¶9] Here, the State's supplemental petition to revoke Lemaster's probation alleged that she committed the new offense of unlawful possession of a handgun, a Level 5 felony. But contrary to Lemaster's suggestion, the trial court did not find that she violated her probation by committing this new offense. At the outset of the dispositional hearing, the court indicated that it would not consider the State's supplemental petition without first holding an initial hearing thereon. The State therefore chose to proceed with disposition only on its initial petition to revoke Lemaster's probation.
[¶10] The State's initial petition alleged that Lemaster failed to report to the Delaware County Probation Department, and at the fact-finding hearing, the trial court took under advisement Lemaster's admission to this allegation. At the dispositional hearing, the trial court accepted Lemaster's admission and expressly found that she violated her probation on that basis. To the extent the trial court ever considered Lemaster's alleged commission of a new criminal offense, it did so only in fashioning her sanction. But even then, the court did not rule on the truth of that allegation. Instead, the court ordered Lemaster to serve her reinstated sentence consecutively to any sentence that might be imposed as a result of her pending charge for unlawful carrying of a handgun.
[¶11] For these reasons, Lemaster's due process claim fails.
II. No Abuse of Discretion
[¶12] Next, Lemaster claims the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation and ordering her to serve a portion of her previously suspended sentence. According to Lemaster, the trial court should have simply placed her on home detention for the remainder of her probationary term.
[¶13] "Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled." Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). Accordingly, we review a trial court's revocation of probation for an abuse of discretion. Id. "An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the law." Id. (internal citations omitted).
[¶14] Lemaster emphasizes that she has a now-14-month-old child for whom she was the primary caregiver before her arrest. She also points to her testimony at the dispositional hearing that she has lined up certain education, employment, and counseling opportunities, which she plans to pursue if released from jail. But the trial court was not obligated to credit Lemaster's testimony, and we will not reweigh evidence on appeal. Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 639.
According to Lemaster, her child has been adjudicated a child in need of services, and the Indiana Department of Child Services has placed the child in relative care due to Lemaster's incarceration.
[¶15] The record shows that Lemaster failed to report to the Delaware County Probation Department after the trial court granted her request to transfer her probation supervision. She also failed to appear at a scheduled dispositional hearing, requiring the court to issue a warrant for her arrest. And when the dispositional hearing was ultimately held, Lemaster admitted that she had been arrested for failing to appear in another unrelated court proceeding. In sanctioning Lemaster, the court remarked: "I don't believe that she is a good candidate for future probation. Don't think she'll come to court, apparently, without a warrant." Tr. Vol. II, p. 28. Still, the court showed Lemaster additional grace by ordering her to serve only 360 days of her previously suspended 574-day sentence.
[¶16] On these facts, Lemaster has failed to show an abuse of the trial court's sanctioning discretion.
[¶17] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.