Where the statute does not clearly indicate the intent of the legislature to make contracts void for violation thereof, contract will be enforced. Maxfield v. Bressler, Ohio App., 55 N.E.2d 424, 425; Gallafent v. Tucker, 48 Idaho 240, 244, 281 P. 375; John E. Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen, 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E.2d 908, 118 A.L.R. 641; Lehmann v. Dalis, 119 Cal.App.2d 152, 259 P.2d 727, 728; Owen v. Off, Cal.App., 218 P.2d 563, 568; 13 C.J. Contracts 423, note 84a. More fundamental than the question of whether a statute was intended for revenue measures or for police regulation is the question of who may claim the benefit of the regulating statute.
Architectural services and engineering services frequently overlap and may be rendered by a licensed architect or a registered engineer. ( Lehmann v. Dalis (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 152, 154 [ 259 P.2d 727].) Business and Professions Code section 6737 provides that a licensed architect may perform many services that are considered as the practice of civil engineering.
This is particularly apparent when it is noted that section 6737 provides that "[a]n architect, who holds a certificate to practice architecture in this State . . . insofar as he practices architecture in its various branches, is exempt from registration under the provisions of this chapter [relating to engineers]." (See also Lehmann v. Dalis, 119 Cal.App.2d 152, 154-155 [ 259 P.2d 727].) [2] Historically, the practice of architecture encompassed all phases of construction, including the drafting of plans, engineering and construction.
They have so read the Civil and Professional Engineers' Act as to allow architecture practiced by a licensed architect to be an exemption from the engineers' licensing provisions and have further restricted the expressed exemption from the architects' licensing requirement to the construction of buildings which come within the exempt category set forth in section 6731 of the Business and Professions Code. In Lehmann v. Dalis, 119 Cal.App.2d 152 [ 259 P.2d 727], where a civil engineer was allowed to recover for drawing plans and sketches for the erection of a bowling alley building and the contention was made that this was the practice of architecture, the court said at page 154: "Defendant contends that because the Civil Engineers' Act expressly exempts architects (§ 6733 of the code) and the Architectural Practice Act (Bus. Prof. Code, §§ 5500-5604) does not expressly exempt civil engineers, the Legislature intended not to permit a civil engineer to perform any architectural service without an architect's license unless he gives written notice that he is not an architect.
5 Am.Jur.2d, Architects, § 3, p. 628. In Lehmann v. Dalis, 119 Cal.App.2d 152, 154, 259 P.2d 727 (1953) the court concluded that the architect licensing statute was of no significance in ascertaining the nature and scope of the work an engineer is authorized to perform as a licensed engineer. In Verich v. Florida State Board of Architecture, 239 So.2d 29, 31-32 (Fl.App. 1970), the court mused that judicial ratification of the traditional line of reasoning concerning the division of the professions would help to establish a clear legal line of demarcation between architecture and engineering.
The California Court of Appeal held that reference to the act defining the practice of architecture is of no significance in ascertaining the nature and scope of the work that a registered engineer is authorized to perform. Lehmann v. Dalis, 119 Cal.App.2d 152, 259 P.2d 727 (1953). Appellant argues that the Board has no authority to construe the Engineering Act.
The litigants have supplied informative briefs, citing several domestic and foreign decisions as well as text authorities. For example, see Heron v. City of Denver, (1955), 131 Colo. 501, 283 P.2d 647; Lehmann v. Dalis, (1953), 119 Cal.App.2d 152, 259 P.2d 727. Smith v. American Packing Provision Co., (1942), 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951; 5 Am.Jur.2d, Architects, Section 3, p. 665; State v. Beck, Inc., (1960), 156 Me. 403, 165 A.2d 433. Without belaboring the matter further, it suffices to note that the legislative bodies, the courts, and the text writers recognize that some degree of "overlap" prevails in the practice of the professions of architecture and engineering. The just-quoted portions of KRS Chapters 322 and 323 pointedly recognize that an "overlap" may properly exist between the two professions.
Given the substantial similarity in the statutory language of the licensing statutes summarized in Verich, Jones, and Arnold, in the interests of brevity we shall only present the relevant portions of Florida's licensing statutes, which define the practice of architecture and engineering as follows: In addition to Verich, Jones, and Arnold, Petitioners summarize the decisional law of various states that have addressed issues similar to that raised in the instant matter including: Rabinowitz v. Hurwitz-Mintz Furniture Co., 133 So. 498 (La.App. 1931); Smith v. American Packing Provision Co., 130 P.2d 951 (Utah 1942); Lehmann v. Dalis, 259 P.2d 727 (Cal.Ct.App. 1953); Johnson v. Delane, 290 P.2d 213 (Idaho 1955); People ex rel Aramburu v. City of Chicago, 219 N.E.2d 548 (Ill.App.Ct. 1966); and Sardis v. Second Judicial District Court, 460 P.2d 163 (Nev. 1969). Architecture