There is no lesser sanction that would be effective after such a lengthy period of inaction. Id. at *2; see e.g., Ruzsa, 520 F.3d at 178; Lehman v. Garfinkle, No. 08-CV-9385 (SHS), 2013 WL 5637700 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013) (âLehman has still not responded to this Court's September 24 order to show cause, making it unclear how any sanction short of dismissal with prejudice would prove effective.â).
Finally, ââ[t]aking into consideration the full history of this action,' and [Plaintiff's] record of non-compliance with [orders issued] by another judge in this district [as well as those of this Court], the Court finds that no sanction short of dismissal with prejudice would prove effective.â Lehman v. Garfinkle, No. 08-CV-9385, 2013 WL 5637700, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013) (quoting Kent v. Scamardella, No. 07-CV-844, 2007 WL 3085438, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2007)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's case is dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
Nevertheless, in appropriate circumstances courts have dismissed such claims for failure to prosecute. See, e.g., Ruzsa, 520 F.3d at 177-78; Lehman v. Garfinkle, No. 08-cv-9385, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149016, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013); Lynch v. Downs, No. 07-cv-134, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31944, at *6-13 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2009).
And fifth, there is no lesser sanction available after such a lengthy period of inaction. See, e.g., Ruzsa v. Rubenstein & Sendy Attys. at Law, 520 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[I]n light of [plaintiffâs] failure to respond to the notice threatening dismissal, it is equally unclear that a 'lesser sanction' would have proved effective in this case."); Lehman v. Garfinkle, No. 08 Civ. 9385 (SHS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149016, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013) ("Lehman has still not responded to this Court's September 24 order to show cause, making it unclear how any sanction short of dismissal with prejudice would prove effective."); Blake, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15120, at *5-6 (dismissing case with prejudice for failure to prosecute after substantial period of time passed with no contact from plaintiff); Jones v. Reid, No. 85 Civ. 4515 (PKL), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14591, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1990) (dismissing case with prejudice due to "plaintiff's refusal to comply with [magistrate judge's] repeated orders [that] caused [the] case to stagnate for almost a year"). III. CONCLUSION
Thrall v. Cent. N.Y. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 399 F. App'x 663, 666 (quoting Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 179 (2d Cir. 2001)). The Court concludes that such a sanction is warranted here where the Court has not received any communication from Plaintiff since the Complaint was filed in this action well over a year ago. See, e.g., Ruzsa v. Rubenstein & Sendy Attys. at Law, 520 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[I]n light of [plaintiff's] failure to respond to the notice threatening dismissal, it is equally unclear that a 'lesser sanction' would have proved effective in this case."); Lehman v. Garfinkle, No. 08 Civ. 9385 (SHS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149016, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013) ("Lehman has still not responded to this Court's September 24 order to show cause, making it unclear how any sanction short of dismissal with prejudice would prove effective."); Blake, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15120, at *5-6 (dismissing case with prejudice for failure to prosecute after substantial period of time passed with no contact from plaintiff); Jones v. Reid, No. 85 Civ. 4515 (PKL), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14591, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1990) (dismissing case with prejudice due "plaintiff's refusal to comply with [magistrate judge's] repeated orders [that] caused [the] case to stagnate for almost a year"). III. CONCLUSION