Lehman v. Garfinkle

5 Citing cases

  1. Hoffman v. The Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.

    21-CV-02509 (GBD) (VF) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2023)

    There is no lesser sanction that would be effective after such a lengthy period of inaction. Id. at *2; see e.g., Ruzsa, 520 F.3d at 178; Lehman v. Garfinkle, No. 08-CV-9385 (SHS), 2013 WL 5637700 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013) (“Lehman has still not responded to this Court's September 24 order to show cause, making it unclear how any sanction short of dismissal with prejudice would prove effective.”).

  2. Monte Ting Hay v. PBR Sales, LLC

    18-CV-5736 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 2, 2022)   Cited 1 times

    Finally, “‘[t]aking into consideration the full history of this action,' and [Plaintiff's] record of non-compliance with [orders issued] by another judge in this district [as well as those of this Court], the Court finds that no sanction short of dismissal with prejudice would prove effective.” Lehman v. Garfinkle, No. 08-CV-9385, 2013 WL 5637700, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013) (quoting Kent v. Scamardella, No. 07-CV-844, 2007 WL 3085438, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2007)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's case is dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute.

  3. Melendez v. City of N.Y.

    12-cv-9241 (AJN) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2014)   Cited 18 times

    Nevertheless, in appropriate circumstances courts have dismissed such claims for failure to prosecute. See, e.g., Ruzsa, 520 F.3d at 177-78; Lehman v. Garfinkle, No. 08-cv-9385, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149016, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013); Lynch v. Downs, No. 07-cv-134, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31944, at *6-13 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2009).

  4. McCord v. City of N.Y.

    13-cv-2008 (AJN) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 4, 2014)   Cited 1 times

    And fifth, there is no lesser sanction available after such a lengthy period of inaction. See, e.g., Ruzsa v. Rubenstein & Sendy Attys. at Law, 520 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[I]n light of [plaintiff‘s] failure to respond to the notice threatening dismissal, it is equally unclear that a 'lesser sanction' would have proved effective in this case."); Lehman v. Garfinkle, No. 08 Civ. 9385 (SHS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149016, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013) ("Lehman has still not responded to this Court's September 24 order to show cause, making it unclear how any sanction short of dismissal with prejudice would prove effective."); Blake, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15120, at *5-6 (dismissing case with prejudice for failure to prosecute after substantial period of time passed with no contact from plaintiff); Jones v. Reid, No. 85 Civ. 4515 (PKL), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14591, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1990) (dismissing case with prejudice due to "plaintiff's refusal to comply with [magistrate judge's] repeated orders [that] caused [the] case to stagnate for almost a year"). III. CONCLUSION

  5. Ocamp v. Doe

    13-cv-5284 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014)

    Thrall v. Cent. N.Y. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 399 F. App'x 663, 666 (quoting Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 179 (2d Cir. 2001)). The Court concludes that such a sanction is warranted here where the Court has not received any communication from Plaintiff since the Complaint was filed in this action well over a year ago. See, e.g., Ruzsa v. Rubenstein & Sendy Attys. at Law, 520 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[I]n light of [plaintiff's] failure to respond to the notice threatening dismissal, it is equally unclear that a 'lesser sanction' would have proved effective in this case."); Lehman v. Garfinkle, No. 08 Civ. 9385 (SHS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149016, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013) ("Lehman has still not responded to this Court's September 24 order to show cause, making it unclear how any sanction short of dismissal with prejudice would prove effective."); Blake, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15120, at *5-6 (dismissing case with prejudice for failure to prosecute after substantial period of time passed with no contact from plaintiff); Jones v. Reid, No. 85 Civ. 4515 (PKL), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14591, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1990) (dismissing case with prejudice due "plaintiff's refusal to comply with [magistrate judge's] repeated orders [that] caused [the] case to stagnate for almost a year"). III. CONCLUSION