LeHew v. Mellyn

5 Citing cases

  1. In re Estate of Willis

    574 N.E.2d 172 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 2 times

    Willis contends that if the court had done so, it would have determined that the three women failed to file their parentage claims within two years of reaching the age of majority as required by the Parentage Act. Willis cites two cases for the proposition that parentage must be determined before heirship. ( In re Person Estate of Newsome (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 376, 382, 527 N.E.2d 524; LeHew v. Mellyn (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 314, 316, 575 N.E.2d 913.) In Person, the court, citing LeHew, held that in child custody proceedings, where the identity of the natural father has not been determined, and one claiming to be the father is before the court, the court's first duty is to address the issue of paternity. ( Person, 173 Ill. App.3d at 382.

  2. In re Custody of D.A

    201 Ill. App. 3d 810 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 17 times
    Holding the father's petition to establish paternity rights was barred by the statute of limitations in the Illinois Parentage Act where his delay in filing the petition was not reasonable; regardless of mother's earlier representations that he was child's father, he “was free to initiate an action whereby he could obtain legal recognition of his rights as father”

    Since the sole issue before the court was paternity, he argues that no GAL was necessary until that issue was resolved. Citing LeHew v. Mellyn (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 314, 475 N.E.2d 913, petitioner asserts that the GAL exceeded his authority and did not act in D.A.'s best interests because his actions denied D.A. a determination of her biological father. • 18 Courts have inherent equitable power to appoint a GAL for minors interested in litigation.

  3. In re Person Estate of Newsome

    173 Ill. App. 3d 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 14 times
    Standing under 11-5 of the Probate Act

    Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658, 31 L.Ed.2d at 562-63, 92 S.Ct. at 1216. • 6 While upholding visitation rights of a natural father based upon the best interest test, our sister court stated in LeHew v. Mellyn (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 314, 315, 475 N.E.2d 913, 914: "The United States Supreme Court has established that a natural father, absent a finding that he is unfit, has a due process right to maintain a parental relationship with his children.

  4. Public Aid ex Rel. Gagnon-Dix v. Gagnon

    680 N.E.2d 509 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 12 times
    In Gagnon, this court found that there is no presumption that it is in the best interest of a child to have visitation with a biological father who has had nothing to do with the child for eight years.

    This ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We have reviewed the other cases cited by Dix ( Griffiths v. Griffiths, 127 Ill. App.3d 126, 468 N.E.2d 482 (1984); In re Custody of Horbatenko, 176 Ill. App.3d 970, 531 N.E.2d 1011 (1988); LeHew v. Mellyn, 131 Ill. App.3d 314, 475 N.E.2d 913 (1985); People ex rel. Vallera v. Rivera, 39 Ill. App.3d 775, 351 N.E.2d 391 (1976); In re Custody of D.A., 201 Ill. App.3d 810, 558 N.E.2d 1355 (1990)), and they do not require a contrary result. In D.A., for example, petitioner sought a finding of paternity (perhaps to bring a lawsuit for the death of the mother in a Chicago Transit Authority accident) in preference to respondent with whom the child had a parent-child relationship.

  5. McDonald v. McGowan

    163 Ill. App. 3d 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 11 times
    In McDonald v. McGowan (1987), 163 Ill. App.3d 697, 516 N.E.2d 934, the court addressed the same issue presented in this case.

    Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly dismissed the petition. • 5 We remand for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for Kelly. (See LeHew v. Mellyn (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 314, 317, 475 N.E.2d 913; S. v. S. (Mo. App. 1980), 595 S.W.2d 357, 360-61; Wiczynski v. Maher (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 224, 356 N.E.2d 770.) The guardian will have authority to bring a petition to determine the existence of a father and child relationship between Kelly and petitioner (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, pars. 2507(a), (c)), pursuant to which the court can fix their respective rights and privileges (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 2514).