Opinion
00 CIV. 6680 (DLC)
October 16, 2001
For Petitioner: Mitchell J. Briskey, The Legal Aid Society, Criminal Appeals Bureau, New York, NY.
For Respondent: Morrie I. Kleinbart, Assistant District Attorney, New York County, New York, NY.
OPINION AND ORDER
On August 28, 2000, this Court's Pro Se Office received from Tony Legree ("Legree") this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction for murder, which was entered following a jury trial held in New York State court in 1995. Legree principally contends that his signed and videotaped confessions should not have been admitted at trial because they followed too closely in time statements made in response to custodial interrogation before the administration of Miranda warnings. On May 17, 2001, Magistrate Judge Andrew J.
Peck issued a Report and Recommendation ("Report") recommending that the petition be denied. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
BACKGROUND
On January 11, 1991, Jason Janovcsik ("Janovcsik") was robbed and killed in Manhattan. The police did not have any leads in the case until Deas Bynum ("Bynum"), following his arrest for a series of unrelated robberies, told the police that Legree and Larry Simmons ("Simmons") were involved with him in the Janovcsik murder. The 19th Precinct detectives investigating the Janovcsik murder lodged a "wanted card" for Legree so that they would be notified if he had any contact with the police.
On May 1, 1994, Legree was arrested for robbery ("May 1 charge"). On May 2, 1994, at about 6 p.m., Detective Thomas Ryan of the 19th Precinct was informed that Legree was in the courthouse holding cells awaiting arraignment. Detective Ryan went to the courthouse, handcuffed Legree, and drove him to the 19th Precinct for questioning. Detective Ryan did not advise Legree of his Miranda rights.
Legree asked where they were going and Detective Ryan said they were going to the 19th Precinct where some detectives wanted to talk to Legree. According to Detective Ryan, Legree volunteered that "[h]e didn't have any bodies on him. He said he hadn't been north of Thirty-Fourth Street since approximately 1984." Legree did not make any statement to Detective Ryan about the Janovcsik murder, request a lawyer, or indicate any unwillingness to speak with the detectives.
When they arrived at the 19th Precinct, Detective Ryan placed Legree, who was still in handcuffs, in an interview room.
Ryan had no further part in Legree's questioning. Detectives Michael Charles and Greg Yovane, who were working on the Janovcsik investigation, came into the interview room at about 7 p.m. Legree asked the detectives why he had been brought to the precinct. In response, the detectives told Legree about the 1991 robbery-homicide of Janovcsik and, before advising Legree of his Miranda rights, tried to find out if Legree knew anything about the crime. The detectives showed Legree crime scene pictures and told him the names and showed him pictures of Bynum and Simmons.
Legree initially denied recognizing either man. After Legree made some admissions, the detectives asked Legree if he was willing to make a statement. When Legree said yes, the detectives advised him of his Miranda rights.
Legree dictated a statement which Detective Charles wrote down and which Legree and the detectives signed. At about midnight, Legree was again advised of his Miranda rights and gave a videotaped statement to an Assistant District Attorney.
Prior to trial, Legree moved to suppress the written and videotaped statements because he had not been advised of his Miranda rights before the initial questioning. Defense counsel argued that the Miranda warnings which were given to Legree immediately after he made his initial admissions came too late.
Defense counsel did not identify any other improper or any coercive tactics employed to obtain the initial statements.
Justice James Leff of the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, held a hearing on Legree's motion on March 13 and 14, 1995.
The trial court held that the post-Miranda statements were admissible. Specifically, the trial court stated:
[I]n [t]his case in good faith police officers were in a position to take the defendant into custody. He had been arrested unquestionably and he was in police custody when they had information regarding the involvement by the defendant with Bynum and Simmons. And what they had an obligation to do since both Bynum and Simmons were potential co-defendants in a homicide case, was to ascertain from the defendant whether he wished to exculpate himself and to get statements before they gave Miranda warnings.
There is no magical moment at the juncture at which the . . . investigative detective believed it was appropriate to take a statement. The Miranda warnings were given. I find they were understood.
(Emphasis supplied).
Legree's signed and videotaped statements, each of which had been given after the administration of Miranda warnings, were admitted at trial. On October 19, 1995, Legree was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and first and second degree robbery. As a second felony offender, Legree was sentenced to concurrent terms, the longest of which was 25 years to life imprisonment, on November 9, 1995.
Legree appealed his conviction, which was unanimously affirmed by the First Department on February 25, 1999. People v. Legree, 685 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (1st Dep't 1999). In his appeal,
Legree argued that: (1) his initial statements were the product of unwarned custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda; (2) all of his statements should have been suppressed by the trial court as part of a single chain of events that began without Miranda warnings; (3) the belated Miranda warnings administered to him "tread on the heels" of his prior unwarned admissions and were thus "hollow and ineffectual" and rendered his waiver invalid; and (4) the circumstances in which he made his initial statements were highly coercive. To support his last argument, Legree pointed to the fact that he had been under arrest for more than 28 hours on an unrelated charge without being arraigned or having counsel appointed. Without setting forth any additional facts regarding the allegedly coercive atmosphere, Legree argued that "the police certainly exploited appellant's arrest and lack of timely arraignment," which "had to greatly magnify the coercive effects of that Miranda violation."
The Appellate Division held: "The challenged written and videotaped statements, which were preceded by Miranda warnings, were admissible since they were free of any taint from defendant's earlier uncounseled statements." Id. The Court of Appeals denied Legree's motion for leave to appeal on June 29, 1999. People v. Legree, 93 N.Y.2d 973 (N.Y. 1999).
In his timely-filed habeas petition, Legree alleges that he was denied due process when his post-Miranda statements were admitted at trial because those statements followed on the heels of statements he had made in response to questioning by the police that was not prefaced with Miranda warnings.
Specifically, Legree alleges that he was "questioned relentlessly and continuously" in violation of Miranda. He also claims that his arraignment on the May 1 charge was delayed "for the sole purpose of gathering more evidence by the District Attorney." On October 25, 2000, the Legal Aid Society filed a notice of appearance on Legree's behalf, and on December 7, 2000, filed a brief in support of Legree's petition. On June 22, 2001, Legree's counsel filed timely objections to the Report.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing the Report, this Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which objection is made. See id.; United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997).
Section 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), provides the following standard of review for a challenge to a state conviction:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Second Circuit recently outlined the procedure to follow when applying Section 2254(d)(1). Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 2001). First, courts must determine whether a petitioner's claim is based on "federal law `clearly established' by the Supreme Court." Id. at 309. A principle of law is "clearly established" when it is a holding as opposed to dicta in a Supreme Court decision "`as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.'" Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)).
Here, Legree claims that his statements made after Miranda warnings were administered should have been suppressed by the trial court because he had previously made unwarned statements during custodial interrogation. Because the Supreme Court's holding in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985), establishes the test to be applied here, that federal law was "clearly established" at the time of the state court proceedings against Legree. See Sellan, 261 F.3d at 309.
Because Legree's habeas claim is based on clearly established federal law, the next question is whether the state court decision "constituted an `adjudicat[ion] on the merits.'" Id.
For the purposes of AEDPA deference, a state court "adjudicate[s]" a state prisoner's federal claim on the merits when it (1) disposes of the claim "on the merits," and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment. When a state court does so, a federal habeas court must defer in the manner prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to the state court's decision on the federal claim — even if the state court does not explicitly refer to either the federal claim or to relevant federal case law.
Id. at 312 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The Second Circuit has further explained:
"[W]e determine whether a state court's disposition of a petitioner's claim is on the merits by considering:
(1) what the state courts have done in similar cases;
(2) whether the history of the case suggests that the state court was aware of any ground for not adjudicating the case on the merits; and
(3) whether the state court's opinion suggests reliance upon procedural grounds rather than a determination on the merits."
Id. at 314 (quoting Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1999)). Applying this test, Legree's Miranda claim was adjudicated on the merits by both the trial court and the Appellate Division. Accordingly, this Court must apply the deferential standards set forth in Section 2254(d)(1).
A state court decision is "contrary" to clearly established federal law if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts."
Gilchrist, 260 F.3d at 93 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law "if a state court `identifies the correct governing legal principles from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [a] prisoner's case.'" Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).
While "`[s]ome increment of incorrectness beyond error is required, . . . the increment need not be great.'" Id. (quoting Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000)). An unreasonable application of clearly established federal law may include an "unreasonable refusal to extend a Supreme Court precedent" to cover situations not yet confronted by the Court. Lurie v. Wittner, 228 F.3d 113, 130 (2d Cir. 2000).
AEDPA also provided a deferential standard for review of findings of fact. With respect to factual findings, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct" and a petitioner is required to rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 2001).
As Legree concedes, unwarned custodial interrogation does not, by itself, require suppression of Legree's post-warning statements. Instead, to undermine an otherwise valid waiver of rights following the administration of Miranda warnings, the petitioner must establish that the police engaged in deliberately coercive or improper tactics to obtain the initial statement.
[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314.
To support his claim that his uncounseled statements were made in an atmosphere that was "highly coercive," Legree points out that he was held for 28 hours on an unrelated charge without being arraigned and without having counsel appointed. The trial court ruled, in effect, that the officers had not employed any deliberately coercive or improper tactics, when it ruled that they had acted "in good faith." Moreover, the Appellate Division held that the "challenged written and videotaped statements, which were preceded by Miranda warnings, were admissible since they were free of any taint from defendant's earlier uncounseled statements." People v. Legree, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 721 (emphasis supplied). By finding that the statements Legree made after being advised of his Miranda rights were "free of any taint," the Appellate Division necessarily rejected Legree's argument that any coercive atmosphere had rendered the Miranda warnings ineffective. See Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312. These holdings were neither contrary to clearly established federal law nor an unreasonable application of that law.
Nonetheless, Legree argues that these state court decisions are unreasonable applications of Elstad since Elstad relied upon a break in the chain of events to support admission of the statements made after the administration of Miranda warnings, while Legree's second confession came "almost directly on the heels" of the unwarned interrogation. This argument misreads Elstad. In Elstad, an 18-year old burglary suspect made an inculpatory statement when first questioned by the police in his own home. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300-01. He was then transported to the police station and made a full confession approximately one hour later after being advised of his Miranda rights. Id. at 301. The Supreme Court found that the failure to give the suspect Miranda warnings initially, "unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances to undermine a suspect's free will," did not invalidate his subsequent voluntary and informed waiver. Id. at 309 (emphasis supplied). The sole issue in the absence of actual coercion is whether a subsequent statement was "knowingly and voluntarily" made, and there is no need to presume that the unwarned statement "taints the investigatory process . . . for some indeterminate period." Id. As the Supreme Court observed: "There is a vast difference between the direct consequences flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect's will and the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a `guilty secret' freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive question." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312 (emphasis supplied). If there were deliberately coercive or improper behavior, however, it would be appropriate to analyze whether there was a break in the chain of events sufficient to allow an effective waiver of rights when the Miranda warnings are administered. It is only when "a prior statement is actually coerced" that courts should consider "the time that passes between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators" to determine whether the initial coercion "has carried over into the second confession." Id. at 310 (emphasis supplied).
In sum, unless Legree can show that the unwarned statements were the product of actual coercion, it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been a sufficient break in the chain of events to remove the taint that is presumed to affect the statements made after Miranda warnings are administered.
Petitioner argues that the detectives created a coercive environment by confronting him with Bynum's and Simmon's accusation that he was guilty of murder before advising him of his Miranda rights. Because the petitioner did not make this argument to the state courts, however, this claim is unexhausted.
In any event, this method of questioning does not constitute the misconduct designed to coerce a confession that was forbidden by Elstad. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312. Compare Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 709-11 (1967) (defendant interrogated for nine days by numerous officers, driven on a round trip of about 600 miles, and administered several polygraph tests); Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 496 (1966) (defendant interrogated "at length" during 14 hours in custody).
Similarly, the delay in Legree's arraignment on the May 1 charge does not constitute actual coercion. Petitioner does not cite any authority for the proposition that a delay in arraignment on one charge presumes coercion when a suspect is questioned on an unrelated charge. Thus, Legree has not shown that either the trial court's denial of his suppression motion or the Appellate Division's subsequent affirmance was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as clearly established by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner argues that his right to counsel would have attached upon his arraignment for the May 1 charge. The trial court found that, because the May 1 charge was unrelated to the Janovcsik investigation, appointment of counsel on the May 1 charge would not have precluded police questioning on unrelated charges. The trial court's ruling was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. In Texas v. Cobb, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 1338 (2001), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific." Thus, "a defendant's statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses." Id. at 1340 (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991)).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the petition is denied. The Clerk of Court shall close the case. I further decline to issue a certificate of appealability. The petitioner has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a federal right and appellate review is, therefore, not warranted. Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 241 (2d Cir. 1998); Rodriguez v. Scully, 905 F.2d 24, 24 (2d Cir. 1990). In addition, I find pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Opinion and Order would not be taken in good faith. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
SO ORDERED: