Opinion
# 2017-031-058 Claim No. 126064 Motion No. M-90202 Cross-Motion No. CM-90405
09-29-2017
DEBORAH LEGGIO v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
EUGENE B. NATHANSON, ESQ. HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General BY: THOMAS G. RAMSAY, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Defendant's submissions demonstrate that Claimant's own inattentiveness was the cause of her tripping accident. Claimant's submissions failed to identify any rule or regulation violated or otherwise demonstrate negligence on Defendant's part. Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissal of the claim granted. Claimant's cross motion for summary judgment denied.
Case information
| UID: | 2017-031-058 |
| Claimant(s): | DEBORAH LEGGIO |
| Claimant short name: | LEGGIO |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 126064 |
| Motion number(s): | M-90202 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | CM-90405 |
| Judge: | RENÉE FORGENSI MINARIK |
| Claimant's attorney: | EUGENE B. NATHANSON, ESQ. |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General BY: THOMAS G. RAMSAY, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | September 29, 2017 |
| City: | Rochester |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
The following papers, numbered 1 to 7, were read on motion by Defendant for summary judgment and dismissal of the claim, and on cross motion by Claimant for summary judgment:
1) Defendant's Notice of Motion (M-90202), filed April 3, 2017;
2) Affirmation of Thomas G. Ramsay, Esq., dated April 3, 2017, with exhibits:
3) Claimant's Notice of Motion (CM-90405), filed May 12, 2017;
4) Unsigned statement of Eugene B. Nathanson, Esq., dated May 11, 2016 [sic], with exhibits;
5) Claimant's Memorandum of Law, dated May 11, 2017;
6) Reply Affirmation of Thomas G. Ramsay, Esq., dated June 13, 2017;
7) Filed Documents: Claim and Verified Answer.
With this motion and cross motion, both parties seek summary judgment in their favor. In her claim, filed on April 30, 2015, Ms. Leggio, an inmate at Albion Correctional Facility at the time, alleges that she was injured while participating in an outdoor work crew on October 2, 2014. Claimant alleges that she was tasked with taking tree limbs and branches from a tree that had been cut down by an officer to a truck for disposal. At some point, she apparently stepped backwards over the stump of the tree, fell and broke her right wrist. She alleges that she and her co-workers were not properly trained, warned or supervised for this activity.
In any application for summary judgment, the moving party bears a heavy burden in establishing that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).
Although the provisions of the Labor Law do not apply in the prison context (D'Argenio v Village of Homer, 202 AD2d 883 [3d Dept 1994]), the State, nonetheless, "owes the inmate a duty to provide reasonably safe machinery and equipment with which to work and adequate warnings and instructions for the safe operation of such machinery and equipment" (see Kandrach v State of New York, 188 AD2d 910 at 913 [3d Dept 1992]; Manganaro v State of New York, 24 AD3d 1003 [3d Dept 2005]).
The State also has a duty to apprise the inmate of any dangers known to it that the inmate could not reasonably be expected to discover herself (see Fitzgerald v State of New York, 28 Misc 2d 283, at 285 [Ct Cl 1961]). The State, however, is not an insurer of the safety of a worker and negligence cannot be inferred solely from the happening of an accident (see Killeen v State of New York, 66 NY2d 850, 851 [1985]; Condon v State of New York, 193 AD2d 874 [3d Dept 1993]).
In this instance, Defendant has adequately demonstrated that there was no need to warn Claimant of the existence of the stump as Claimant saw the stump prior to her accident. Indeed, as Claimant was working in that location to remove the debris after the tree had been cut down, Defendant correctly notes that "her entire raison d'etre vis-a-vis that location revolved around that tree trunk" (Ramsay Affirmation ¶ 11). Although Claimant correctly points out that several of the cases cited by Defendant involve a land owner and not an employer, Claimant has failed to demonstrate any difference resulting from this distinction. Claimant has failed to demonstrate how Defendant was negligent and how such negligence resulted in her accident. There is no allegation that improper equipment was provided or that the equipment that was provided failed. Apart from someone watching Claimant's every step and warning her when she came too near the stump, Claimant suggests no negligent act.
Defendant has adequately demonstrated that a tree trunk is incidental to the nature of the property and is not inherently dangerous (Torres v State of New York, 18 AD3d 739 [2d Dept 2005]; Csukardi v Bishop McDonnell Camp, 148 AD2d 657 [2d Dept 1989]; Alcantara v Federated Girl Scout Councils of Nassau County, 24 AD2d 585 [2d Dept 1965]). In response to this, Claimant argues that the fact that the tree stump was open and obvious and known to Claimant relates to Claimant's comparative fault and cannot serve as the basis for summary judgment. While this is true if the condition is inherently dangerous, summary judgment is appropriate if the condition is both open and obvious and not inherently dangerous (Nesbitt v Town of Poughkeepsie, 88 AD3d 774 [2d Dept 2011]; Capasso v Village of Goshen, 84 AD3d 998 [2d Dept 2011]; Dinallo v DAL Elec., 43 AD3d 981 [2d Dept 2007]). As stated in Jang Hee Lee v Sung Whun Oh (3 AD3d 473, 474 [2d Dept 2004]) "[t]here is, however, no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous" (citation omitted).
Simply put, there was no dangerous condition that existed on the property. Claimant's injury was caused by her own inattentiveness to a condition that was not inherently dangerous and was both known to her and incidental to the nature of the property and the work she was doing.
Moreover, Defendant did not have a duty to provide uninterrupted supervision of the inmates on the work program (Mood v State of New York, UID No. 2003-029-326 [Ct Cl, Mignano, J., Nov. 12, 2003]). In light of Defendant's demonstration of Claimant's awareness of the condition which was not inherently dangerous, Claimant has failed to demonstrate that Defendant was in any way negligent.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and claim 126064 is dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED, that Claimant's cross motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
September 29, 2017
Rochester, New York
RENÉE FORGENSI MINARIK
Judge of the Court of Claims