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Leggett v. Kumar

212 Ill. App. 3d 255 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
Leggett v. Kumar

8 Citing cases

  1. Jackson v. Bunge Corp.

    40 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1994)   Cited 63 times
    Holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for a district court to exclude evidence of an arbitrator's decision at trial where "the arbitrator never addressed the issue" of whether the employer had a discriminatory motive

    Id. (quoting Oriental Health Spa v. City of Fort Wayne, 864 F.2d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 1988)). Bunge claims that this was harmful error, and it cites two Illinois cases for the proposition that reversal is required if undue emphasis is placed on irrelevant evidence of a party's financial condition, or if the jury's verdict is affected by it. Leggett v. Kumar, 212 Ill. App.3d 255, 156 Ill.Dec. 527, 541, 570 N.E.2d 1249, 1263 (1991); Pagel v. Yates, 128 Ill. App.3d 897, 84 Ill.Dec. 180, 185, 471 N.E.2d 946, 951 (1984). Aside from the fact that federal, not state, evidence law governs in a diversity case, Bachenski v. Malnati, 11 F.3d 1371, 1376 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Fed.R.Evid. 1101, Bunge's primary obstacle is the fact that the parties had previously stipulated to the amount of compensatory damages.

  2. Pike v. Premier Transp. & Warehousing, Inc.

    No. 13 CV 8835 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2016)

    Under Illinois law, mortality tables are admitted in wrongful death actions or personal injury cases involving permanent injuries, to help the jury determine future damages. Danzico v. Kelly, 112 Ill. App. 2d 14, 29 (1st Dist. 1969); Savka v. Smith, 58 Ill. App. 3d 12, 17, 15 Ill. Dec. 579, 583 (3d Dist. 1978); Leggett v. Kumar, 212 Ill. App. 3d 255, 281, 156 Ill. Dec. 527, 543 (2d Dist. 1991). In injury cases, life expectancy tables should not be admitted when pain and suffering is recurrent, but not permanent.

  3. Jentz v. Conagra Foods, Inc.

    Case No. 10-cv-0474-MJR-PMF (S.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2013)   Cited 1 times

    Prompt objections to an attorney's remarks are necessary to allow the Court to instruct the jury to disregard improper statements. See Leggett v. Kumar, 570 N.E.2d 1249, 1264-1265 (Ill.App.Ct. 1991). Otherwise, if counsel is allowed to sit on his hands and later challenge an unfavorable outcome, he could secure a new trial where the Court might have cured any prejudice arising from the improper argument if counsel had timely objected.

  4. Jones v. Jones

    2016 Ill. App. 2d 141254 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    petition being heard. See Leggett v. Kumar, 212 Ill. App. 3d 255, 273 (A court is not bound by an order previously entered by a different judge in the same case and has the power to correct orders which it finds erroneous). We find the trial court abused its discretion in failing to make the reduction retroactive to July 12, 2010 in accordance with the prior trial judge's maintenance order.

  5. Sbarboro v. Vollala

    392 Ill. App. 3d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 17 times

    Admission at trial of evidence which should have been disclosed through discovery is not reversible error absent proof that it resulted in prejudice. Leggett v. Kumar, 212 Ill. App. 3d 255, 276 (1991). As the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery rules lies within the trial court's discretion, this court will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Cyclonaire Corp. v. ISG Riverdale, Inc., 378 Ill. App. 3d 554, 562 (2007).

  6. Muellman-Cohen v. Brak

    836 N.E.2d 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 7 times
    In Brak, "[t]he substantive issue" on appeal was whether a previous version of Rule 3.7(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct applied under the particular facts of the case, and due to the incomplete record, we had "no way of knowing whether the [circuit] court relied on Rule 3.7(a)" at all.

    This rule has been consistently followed in numerous cases. See, e.g., Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 546-47 (1996); Advocate Health Hospitals Corp. v. Heber, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1080 (2005); In re K.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 830, 832 (2000); In re Marriage of Drewitch, 263 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1096 (1994); Leggett v. Kumar, 212 Ill. App. 3d 255, 274 (1991). I therefore would affirm the trial court.

  7. Kramer v. Milner

    639 N.E.2d 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 6 times
    Involving allegations that defendant physician was negligent in failing to recommend or order a screening mammogram that could have revealed decedent's breast cancer and whether defendant's conduct fell below the applicable standard of care

    Finally, Kramer contests the trial court's decision to permit Dr. Milner to testify to background information about his family and about his prior care of Lillian. Illinois has adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 401 (see People v. Monroe (1977), 66 Ill.2d 317, 362 N.E.2d 295), which gives the trial court wide discretion to admit various background evidence. Leggett v. Kumar (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 255, 570 N.E.2d 1249. In his testimony, Dr. Milner testified, over objection on relevancy grounds, that he was married and had three daughters, "one married; one engaged; one in college."

  8. Martin v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R

    237 Ill. App. 3d 910 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 8 times
    In Martin, plaintiff brought a wrongful death action after plaintiff's decedent was killed at a private railroad crossing protected by a "wigwag signal."

    "In determining relevancy, the trial court must consider the evidence in light of the factual issues raised by the pleadings." Leggett v. Kumar (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 255, 276. We agree with plaintiff that the evidence of the ICC's inquiry was properly admitted to establish defendant's knowledge of safety problems at the crossing.