Opinion
18021.
ARGUED NOVEMBER 12, 1952.
DECIDED JANUARY 13, 1953.
Injunction; contempt. Before Judge Thomas. Glynn Superior Court. August 21, 1952.
Highsmith Highsmith and E. Way Highsmith, for plaintiff in error.
Jack J. Lissner Jr. and George B. Cowart, contra.
1. Where no exceptions pendente lite were filed to a judgment overruling a demurrer, an exception to such ruling contained in the bill of exceptions, presented more than twenty days after the date of the ruling complained of, comes too late and can not be considered.
2. The evidence, though conflicting, was sufficient to authorize the trial court to find that the terms of the injunction had been violated, and to hold the defendant in contempt.
No. 18021. ARGUED NOVEMBER 12, 1952 — DECIDED JANUARY 13, 1953.
Mary Alazos and George Alazos filed in Glynn Superior Court, against Mrs. W. H. Leggett, a petition seeking to enjoin the defendant from interfering with the operation of the petitioners' rooming house. A temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the defendant "from going upon the premises of the petitioners and from in any manner interfering with the business of petitioners, and . . from in any manner accosting or molesting petitioners." On August 17, 1952, the court entered an order stating that the "restraining order and injunction granted in favor of [the petitioners and against the defendant] . . . is hereby made permanent."
Thereafter the petitioners filed an application for attachment of the defendant for contempt of court, alleging that she had violated the terms of the injunction. The defendant filed a demurrer and an answer. The trial court overruled her demurrer.
On the trial of the contempt case, Mrs. Mary Alazos testified in part: She and her husband own and operate a rooming house at the corner of Demere Road and Oglethorpe Street on St. Simons Island. The defendant and her husband own and operate a rooming house across the street from the petitioners. On the afternoon of July 21, 1952, Alfred Brown parked his automobile on Oglethorpe Street in front of the petitioners' office. The defendant crossed Demere Road and had a conversation with Brown. The defendant was standing on the petitioners' property at the front window of the car on the righthand side between the car and the petitioners' office. The car was parked about half in the traveled part of the street and half on the petitioners' property.
Alfred Brown testified: He was a resident of Cordele. On the afternoon in question he drove to St. Simons Island where he was looking for the petitioners' rooming house, to which he had been recommended by friends. He stopped his car in Oglethorpe Street facing east and opposite the petitioners' office. He went in the petitioners' house, looked at the rooms, and came back to move his car in front of the petitioners' house for his wife and children, who were with him, to go in and look at the rooms. Before he could move the car the defendant came up and asked him if he was looking for rooms. The witness said he was, whereupon the defendant said she had some very nice rooms across the street. The witness told her he was looking for the petitioners' place, and the defendant said that the rooms in the petitioners' house were hot and uncomfortable and the petitioners were Greeks. The defendant said that her rooms were nicer, quoted the rates, and asked the Browns to come over and stay at her place.
Mrs. Alfred Brown testified to the same effect with respect to the conversation, and where their car was parked.
After hearing evidence, the trial judge passed an order finding the defendant guilty of contempt and sentencing her to pay a fine of $100 or in lieu thereof to serve 10 days in jail. The defendant excepted.
1. In the bill of exceptions error is assigned because the trial court overruled the defendant's demurrer to the application for attachment for contempt. The ruling complained of was made on July 30, 1952. The bill of exceptions was not presented to the trial court until September 10, 1952, and was signed the same day. No exceptions pendente lite were filed complaining of such ruling. Accordingly, the exception comes too late, and presents no question for consideration by this court. Code (Ann. Supp.), §§ 6-902, 6-905; Good v. Good, 205 Ga. 112 (20) ( 52 S.E.2d 610); Pugh v. Moore, 207 Ga. 453 (3) ( 62 S.E.2d 153); Bowers v. Bowers, 208 Ga. 85 (1) ( 65 S.E.2d 153).
2. Counsel for the defendant insist that the judgment finding their client in contempt should be reversed, because no judge has the right to grant a permanent injunction except upon a final decree, and that disobedience of a void judgment is not contempt of court. So far as is disclosed by the record there was no exception to the order making the injunction permanent.
"A perpetual injunction shall be granted only after the hearing and upon a final decree." Code, § 55-111. Manifestly the injunction here should not have been made permanent on an interlocutory hearing, but it was not void. The order was issued by a court having jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, and in a proper proceeding therefor could have been modified so as to be operative only until final trial or further order. See, in this connection, Code, § 55-111; Strickland v. Griffin, 70 Ga. 541, 550 (5); Kniepkamp v. Richards, 192 Ga. 509 (2) ( 16 S.E.2d 24); Pullen v. Meadors, 196 Ga. 796 ( 27 S.E.2d 655). Accordingly, the defendant was not at liberty to violate the injunction on the ground that she was permanently enjoined in advance of a final hearing and decree.
While there does not appear to be any case exactly in point, the question is controlled on principle by Dunn v. Harris, 144 Ga. 157, 160 ( 86 S.E. 556), where it was said: "The power of the superior court to prevent disobedience of its injunctions is an important one. A temporary restraining order granted, to remain of force until the hearing of the application for an interlocutory rescinded or modified by the court. . . [Code, § 55-201]. If the court has jurisdiction, of the person and subject-matter, and grants an injunction, the person enjoined can not justify a violation of it on the ground that it was erroneously or improvidently granted. A motion to have the injunction revoked or modified, or a writ of error (in a case where such writ may be had), is the remedy, if a party enjoined thinks that the injunctive order was erroneously granted." See also Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 201 Ga. 333 (2) ( 39 S.E.2d 861); Pedigo v. Celanese Corp. of America, 205 Ga. 392 (1) ( 54 S.E.2d 252); Hardy v. Thomas, 208 Ga. 752 (7) ( 69 S.E.2d 609). Until changed in one of the ways above indicated, the order of a court of competent jurisdiction was binding upon the defendant.
Finally, counsel for the defendant concede that, if there had been any evidence that the prospective tenants had already engaged rooms with the petitioners, and that the defendant had endeavored to induce them to leave the petitioners' rooms and take her rooms, there would have been a violation of the injunction. In other words, the insistence is that, properly construed, the injunction can only mean that the defendant was enjoined from going upon the petitioners' premises for the purpose of trying to induce their tenants to leave the petitioners' rooms and take rooms with the defendant.
There is no merit in this insistence. The evidence, though conflicting, was sufficient to authorize the trial court to find that the terms of the injunction had been violated, and to hold the defendant in contempt.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.