Opinion
A-14062 0387
09-04-2024
NOBODY JOHN LEGE, f/k/a Alexander Lege, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Tristan Bordon, Assistant Public Defender, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the District Court, First Judicial District, Trial Court No. 1KE-21-00435 CR Ketchikan, Kevin G. Miller, Judge.
Tristan Bordon, Assistant Public Defender, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges.
Nobody John Lege was convicted, following a jury trial, of fourth-degree assault for recklessly placing his former sister-in-law in fear of imminent physical injury. Lege raises three issues on appeal.
AS 11.41.230(a)(3).
First, Lege argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for fourth-degree assault because it failed to show that his former sister-in-law's fear of imminent harm was reasonable. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, this Court must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict. Viewing the evidence in that light, we then ask whether "a fair-minded juror exercising reasonable judgment could conclude that the State had met its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Dailey v. State, 65 P.3d 891, 898 (Alaska App. 2003).
Id.
Viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, the evidence shows that Lege followed his ex-wife and former sister-in-law after a parade and refused to leave them alone despite repeated requests. Lege wanted to see his one-year-old son who was with the two women, but Lege's ex-wife had sole legal and physical custody of their son and Lege was supposed to arrange visitation in advance. When Lege continued to harass the two women, Lege's former sister-in-law gave the baby to the mother and then tried to use the stroller to physically prevent Lege from taking the baby. Lege responded by grabbing the stroller, raising it up high, and trying to throw the stroller over the bridge they were on. The stroller got stuck on the landing, and the former sister-in-law was able to keep it from going off the bridge, although she fell when she was retrieving the stroller. The former sister-in-law testified that, at the time, she "definitely thought [Lege] was go[ing] to try and beat me up."
Given these facts, a fair-minded juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Lege's actions placed his former sister-in-law in fear of imminent physical harm and that her fear was reasonable under the circumstances. We therefore conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction for fourth-degree assault.
See id.
Lege's second claim is that AS 11.41.230(a)(3) (the statutory provision defining fourth-degree fear assault) is unconstitutional as applied to him. He argues that his conduct fell outside the scope of the statute because it was merely "uncomfortable, annoying, and abrasive," and did not create an objective immediate danger to anyone. But, as we just explained, the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, established that Lege's conduct placed his former sister-in-law in fear of imminent physical injury. We accordingly reject Lege's constitutional challenge.
See, e.g., Petersen v. State, 930 P.2d 414, 431 (Alaska App. 1996) ("When a person's words or actions constitute an assault - when they cause other people to reasonably fear for their own safety or the safety of those close to them - the Constitution no longer provides a refuge.").
Lastly, Lege argues that it was plain error for the district court to instruct the jury on various exceptions to self-defense that were not applicable to his case. Lege acknowledges that he did not object to this instruction and that he must therefore show plain error on appeal. We agree with the State that Lege has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the inclusion of the self-defense exceptions, which were correct statements of the law. Lege has therefore failed to show plain error.
See Lengele v. State, 295 P.3d 931, 937 (Alaska App. 2013) ("Incorrect or misleading language in a jury instruction will constitute plain error when (1) the error is not the result of an intelligent waiver or a strategic decision not to object, (2) the error affects substantial rights, (3) the error is obvious, and (4) the error is prejudicial.").
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.