Lefebvre v. Waldstein

9 Citing cases

  1. Stacy v. Johnson

    Civil No. 07-cv-51-SM, Opinion No. 2007 DNH 103 (D.N.H. Aug. 28, 2007)   Cited 1 times

    Glaser v. Medford-Marlboro Knit Gaiter Co., 93 N.H. 95, 99 (1944). Moreover, although not dispositive, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has opined that "[w]hether there is an agreement between the parties to share losses is an important . . . test" to determine whether a relationship constitutes a joint venture.Lefebvre v. Waldstein, 101 N.H 451, 455 (1958). Under the agreement between Johnson and Wyatt, Johnson assumed the exclusive responsibility to provide legal representation to Brault in pursuit of a Texas guardianship over Stacy, while Wyatt was to provide legal support services in connection with that proceeding.

  2. Stone Michaud Ins. v. Bk. Five for Sav.

    785 F. Supp. 1065 (D.N.H. 1992)   Cited 28 times
    Applying New Hampshire law and citing Higgins v. Higgins, 125 N.H. 806, 809, 486 A.2d 294, 296

    Both of these relationships are assumed voluntarily, and thus whether or not either relationship has been created depends upon the intent of the parties. See Higgins v. Higgins, 125 N.H. 806, 809, 486 A.2d 294, 296 (1984) (citation omitted) (with a partnership, requisite intent may be express, either written or oral, or implied by the parties' actions); Lefebvre v. Waldstein, 101 N.H. 451, 455, 146 A.2d 270, 274 (1958) (intent determinative of creation of joint enterprise). Generally, the issue of intent is a question of fact and is best left to the trier of fact to determine.

  3. Lapierre v. Cabral

    122 N.H. 301 (N.H. 1982)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that, absent indications the parties intended a writing to be the full agreement among themselves, the existence of a writing does not itself preclude additional terms to the contract

    [9-12] The first step in determining whether parol evidence is admissible is to consider whether the writing is a total integration and completely expresses the agreement of the parties. See Emery v. Caledonia Sand and Gravel Co., 117 N.H. 441, 445, 374 A.2d 929, 932 (1977) (quoting 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 573, at 357 (1960)); Lefebvre v. Waldstein, 101 N.H. 451, 456, 146 A.2d 270, 275 (1958). Even when an integration clause is included in the writing, as in this case, this court will allow the admission of parol evidence to prove that the writing was not a total integration.

  4. Town of Merrimack v. Spade

    426 A.2d 19 (N.H. 1980)

    The damages resulting from the injunction, if proved, may properly be recovered under the bond. See Lefebvre v. Waldstein, 101 N.H. 451, 456-57, 146 A.2d 270, 275 (1958); Fowler v. Taylor, 99 N.H. 64, 65, 104 A.2d 746, 747 (1954). Remanded.

  5. Cohen v. Frank Developers, Inc.

    118 N.H. 512 (N.H. 1978)   Cited 31 times
    Finding no unjust enrichment where defendant benefitted from plaintiff's relationship with a third party

    [3-5] We agree that an agent may bind a joint venturer to contracts, at least if the agent acts within the scope of his authority. Cf. Lefebvre v. Waldstein, 101 N.H. 451, 146 A.2d 270 (1958); 46 Am. Jur. 2d Joint Ventures 4 (1969). However, whether an agent has acted within his actual or apparent authority, and has thereby bound his principal, is a question for the trier of fact.

  6. Griswold v. Heat Corp.

    108 N.H. 119 (N.H. 1967)   Cited 47 times
    In Griswold, the court relied upon the implied covenant to hold that the contract at issue "required the plaintiff to provide a level of services consistent with good faith."

    This is especially true, where as in this case, there is a dispute between the parties as to what was intended by the particular words used in describing Griswold's promise. Lefebvre v. Waldstein, 101 N.H. 451, 456; Rivier College v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co., 104 N.H. 398, 402. There was evidence that the nature of the services rendered by Griswold to Heat from its origin in 1956 to December 2, 1963, the date of the agreement, were well known to both Griswold and Illig.

  7. Rivier College v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co.

    187 A.2d 799 (N.H. 1963)   Cited 19 times

    "In accordance with the modern tendency (9 Wig. Ev. (3d ed.) s. 2465) it has long been the rule here that the facts surrounding an undertaking including conversations in preliminary negotiations are admissible to aid in interpreting an agreement." Lefebvre v. Waldstein, 101 N.H. 451, 456; see also, Perry v. Company, 99 N.H. 451, 454; see Berke Co. v. Bridge Co., 98 N.H. 261, 266. The parol evidence was properly admitted, and therefore we overrule the defendant's exception to its admission.

  8. Fuller Enterprises v. Manchester Sav. Bank

    152 A.2d 179 (N.H. 1959)   Cited 18 times
    In Peter Fuller Enterprises, Inc. v. Manchester Sav. Bank, 102 N.H. 117, 120-121, the New Hampshire Supreme Court had before it notes containing an acceleration clause but with no provision that acceleration would become effective at the option of the obligees.

    White M't'n c. Co. v. Murphy, 78 N.H. 398, 403. No decision holding that a court will order a discharge of a mortgage the condition of which has not been performed so, as to enable the mortgagor to make a profit on an advantageous sale has been presented to us. Nor has any statutory law in our state granting such authority to the Trial Court been brought to our attention. Cf. RSA 511:48-50, 53. Williams v. Mathewson, 73 N.H. 242; Perry v. Company, 99 N.H. 451; Lefebvre v. Waldstein, 101 N.H. 451. Our answer to issue No. 2 is "no." The bill in equity for reformation not having been heard on the merits the order is

  9. Gulf Oil Co. v. Rybicki

    149 A.2d 877 (N.H. 1959)   Cited 16 times

    " All of the above findings being supported by the record are binding on this court (Lefebvre v. Waldstein, 101 N.H. 451, 455) and furnish a sufficient basis for a decree of specific performance. Dunlap v. Foss, 82 N.H. 449, 450.