[5] An expert can express an opinion from a photograph just as he can from a hypothetical question stating the facts which appear in a photograph. ( Ginnelly v. Continental Paper Co., 57 N.J. Super. 480 [ 155 A.2d 154, 162-163]; Leeper v. Thornton, ___ Okla. ___ [ 344 P.2d 1101]; 32 C.J.S. 368, § 558.) In Woyak v. Konieske, 237 Minn. 213 [ 54 N.W.2d 649, 33 A.L.R.2d 1241], the court stated (54 N.W.2d 655):

In Virginia, similar testimony given by the same expert witness was held to be inadmissible for the reason that it tended to usurp the function of the jury. Venable v. Stockner, 200 Va. 900, 108 S.E.2d 380. But in Leeper v. Thornton, Okla., 344 P.2d 1101, the drivers of both cars were killed, and no eye witness to the accident testified. Experts were used in an effort to reconstruct the collision and show the jury on which side of the highway it occurred.

Where a witness discloses sufficient knowledge to qualify him as an expert, soundness of his conclusions pertains to the weight of his testimony, rather than to its admissibility and is to be determined by the trier of fact. There was no error in permitting their opinion testimony. Leeper v. Thornton, 344 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1959). On direct, plaintiff testified he might have hit a patch of asphalt in the road.

See 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error § 717 (1962); 31A C.J.S. Evidence, at § 190 (1964). Accord, Felde v. Kohnke, 184 N.W.2d 433 (Wis. 1971); Leeper v. Thornton, 344 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1959); Ryan v. Furey, 303 A.2d 221 (Pa.Super. 1973). In this case, expert testimony as to the area of impact was initially introduced by appellants, not respondents. The battle of experts was thus joined by appellants themselves.

In re Southern S.S. Co., 135 F. Supp. 358, 363 (D.Del. 1955); Re Russo's Estate, 33 Del. Ch. 598, 86 A.2d 369, 371 (1952).In re Giambertone's Estate, 38 Misc.2d 784, 238 N.Y.S.2d 883, 884 (1963); In re Lachman's Estate, 208 Misc. 774, 147 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1955); In re Kaiser's Estate, 198 Misc. 582, 100 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (1950); and Leeper v. Thornton, 344 P.2d 1101 (Okl. 1959). Proceeding to the particular factual circumstances of this case, we are of the view, and so hold, that the superior court's application of the allocation formula was not in irreconcilable conflict with the "without regard to age" phraseology of AS 09.55.580(c)(1). For we think there is an adequate rationale for, as well as flexibility embodied in, the formula to reconcile it with the provisions of AS 09.55.580(c)(1).

Some courts have admitted expert evidence when no eyewitness survives. Leeper v. Thornton, Okla., 344 P.2d 1101. Whether this should be permitted under the Ex Necessitate Rei rule is not presented on this appeal.

This was the issue to be decided by the jury and such testimony should not have been permitted. See also Leeper, Adm'x. v. Thornton, Adm'r., Okla., 344 P.2d 1101 at p. 1106(4). The inconclusive nature of the testimony is to be noted.

The appellant having, in its own behalf, utilized expert testimony in the course of the trial in this cause is estopped to complain of the expert testimony on behalf of the appellee which in all events and according to all authorities was proper in the premises. Burleson v. Champion, 283 F.2d 653; Campbell v. Clark, 283 F.2d 766; Continental Southern Lines v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So.2d 211, 65 So.2d 575, 67 So.2d 256; Federal Compress v. Craig, 192 Miss. 689, 7 So.2d 532; Fendalson v. Allstate Ins. Co. (La.), 136 So.2d 814; Leeper v. Thornton (Okla.), 344 P.2d 1101; Lofton v. Agge, 303 F.2d 287; Planters Bank v. Garrott, 239 Miss. 248, 122 So.2d 258; Randall v. Baton Rouge Bus Co. (La.), 114 So.2d 98; Sinclair v. Cook (La.), 128 So.2d 247; Swillie v. General Motors Corp. (La.), 133 So.2d 813; Talbot v. Perkins, 225 Miss. 8, 82 So.2d 570; Venable v. Stockner, 200 Va. 900, 108 S.E.2d 380; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 1501. McGEHEE, C.J.

The court also inquired as to the scientific basis used by Snyder in reaching certain deductions, to which no concrete answer seems to have been given, and we agree with the trial court that it appears that the witness' opinion was, at least to some degree, based upon assumptions, not justified by the evidence. We are aware of the Oklahoma case of Leeper v. Thornton, 344 P.2d 1101, cited by appellants. There, the Court said: "The testimony of the witness, Ralph H. Snyder, when considered with supplemental and corroborative evidence, is sufficient to support the verdict."

The part of said testimony pertaining to the direction in which the vehicles were traveling, previous to the accident, concerned a fact about which there was no controversy. In this connection, notice Leeper v. Thornton, Okla., 344 P.2d 1101, 1106. Nor do we see any pertinent similarity between the above quoted part of Tucker's testimony and the highway patrolman's testimony, whose admission in Maben v. Lee, Okla., 260 P.2d 1964, was held reversible error.