Opinion
May 9, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Lama, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the plaintiffs-respondents and defendant-respondent in action No. 1, appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
While we agree with the defendant Kendall Leek that the allegations contained in the original complaint sounded exclusively in negligent supervision and negligent entrustment, and as such, failed to state a cause of action upon which his injured daughter could recover against him (see, Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332; Holodook v Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35), the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment of the complaint under the circumstances presented (see, CPLR 3025 [b]; McCaskey, Davies Assocs. v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 59 N.Y.2d 755).
Moreover, although the amended complaint contains numerous similarly nonactionable allegations regarding negligent supervision and entrustment, we find that a viable cause of action is stated solely by the allegation that the injuries were caused by Kendall Leek's negligence in providing a minibike with defective brakes to his injured daughter. Only this allegation premises liability upon an alleged breach of duty to the world-at-large based on the defective nature of the minibike itself rather than upon the breach of a duty which arises solely from the familial relationship of the parties (see, Grivas v Grivas, 113 A.D.2d 264; Lynch v Lynch, 88 A.D.2d 972; Hurst v Titus, 77 A.D.2d 157). Accordingly, denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint and cross claim in action No. 1 was warranted for this reason (see generally, Semmens v Hopper, 128 A.D.2d 767; Fowler v Attenborough, 124 A.D.2d 780). Weinstein, J.P., Eiber, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.