Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Richard Adler, Judge., Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LC070480.
Arthur Leeds and Ann Leeds, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Venable, Aaron H. Jacoby and Christopher Williams for Defendants and Respondents.
CHAVEZ, J.
Appellants Arthur and Anne Leeds (appellants) appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint, which was entered after the trial court sustained respondents Galpin Motors, Inc. and Galpin Jaguar Lincoln Mercury’s (respondents) demurrer to appellants’ second amended complaint (SAC) without leave to amend. Appellants also appeal from an award of attorney fees entered in favor of respondents. We affirm.
CONTENTIONS
Appellants contend that the five causes of action set forth in the SAC adequately state claims for breach of contract, fraud and intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, violation of Business & Professions Code section 17500 (section 17500), and violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200 (section 17200). Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717, subd. (a) and that, even if such an award were proper, the award was far in excess of the amount established to be reasonable and necessary.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In May 2003, appellants purchased a new Volvo automobile from respondents. A written retail installment contract was signed by appellants in connection with their purchase of the Volvo. According to appellants’ allegations, respondents also made oral representations in connection with the sale of the car. Those oral representations included the promise that, if service was required on the Volvo during the new car warranty period, a loaner car would be provided free of charge to appellants while the Volvo underwent service. Appellants allege that the representation that a free loaner car would be provided during the warranty period was made orally by a sales representative as well as on “at least one sign” posted at respondents’ new car showroom and, on information and belief, “through other promotional and advertising materials.” Appellants further allege that no exception to the term “free of charge” was stated or otherwise made for the cost of a collision damage waiver by any person representing respondents or in any printed advertising materials.
Appellants allege that they justifiably relied on the oral representations in deciding to purchase the new Volvo from respondents. They further allege that the contract they entered into with Volvo was part written and part oral. However, the written agreement contained the following provision, which was initialed by both appellants: “This contract contains the entire agreement between you and us relating to this contract. Any change to the contract must be in writing and both you and we must sign it. No oral changes are binding.”
On or about August 18, 2004, respondents provided appellant Anne Leeds with the use of a courtesy rental car while appellants’ Volvo was being serviced by respondents. In connection with her use of the loaner vehicle, Anne Leeds reviewed and signed two documents. By signing the first such agreement, captioned “Request for Rental Car,” Mrs. Leeds agreed to the following provision: “I fully understand that I am responsible to pay any charges in excess of the provision stated above, or all charges where no coverage is provided.” The second agreement, captioned “Rental Agreement,” gave Mrs. Leeds the option of purchasing a comprehensive collision damage waiver, which she specifically declined. The agreement specifies, “By declining the waiver, You accept responsibility for all loss or damage to the Vehicle.”
Appellants admit that “the loaner car was slightly damaged while being driven by [appellant] Anne Leeds.”
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 14, 2004, respondents filed a complaint in small claims court seeking $4,914.58, which was the cost to repair the loaner vehicle that was damaged while Anne Leeds was driving it. (Galpin Motors, Inc. v. Anne Leeds (Small Claims Ct. L.A. County, 2004, No. 04V11290).) On February 3, 2005, appellants filed their initial complaint against respondents, along with an application to transfer respondents’ small claims action and consolidate it with appellants’ superior court action. Appellants’ initial complaint contained causes of action for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, and violations of sections 17200 and 17500. While the initial complaint contained allegations of respondents’ false representations regarding “the free loaner cars,” and suggested that respondents wrongly charged insurance fees for these loaner cars, it did not mention the comprehensive collision damage waiver (CCDW).
On March 30, 2006, appellants filed a first amended complaint (FAC). The FAC expanded the allegations, contending that “it was, at all relevant times, [respondents’] secret intent and policy to require recipients of such loaner cars to ‘purchase’ insurance and/or a collision damage waiver (at unreasonable rates) rather than include the cost of insurance and/or a collision damage waiver in the ‘free of charge’ loaner car.”
On April 12, 2006, respondents filed a demurrer to the FAC and each of the causes of action contained therein. Respondents argued, among other things, that the written retail installment contract which appellants signed when they purchased their new vehicle was a fully integrated contract, and the failure of that contract to mention loaner cars precluded appellants’ breach of contract claim. The trial court agreed that the contract was fully integrated and could not be changed by oral agreement. The court further held that “[appellants] failed to set forth any facts showing why the parol evidence [rule] should not apply in light of an integrated written contract between the parties.” The court granted appellants’ leave to amend within four court days.
On May 25, 2006, appellants filed the SAC. The SAC attached a copy of the written retail installment contract, a copy of the request for rental car, and a copy of the rental agreement. Appellants alleged that, “No exception to the term ‘free of charge’ was stated or otherwise made for the cost of a collision damage waiver by [respondents’] Sales Manager, sales representative, or any other person representing [respondents], or in its aforesaid point of sale advertising, printed brochure, advertising materials, or other promotional materials, and [appellants] did not understand that such exception was being made.” Appellants further alleged that respondents’ representations that they would provide a loaner vehicle free of charge were misleading, false and untrue because it was “[respondents’] secret intent and policy to require recipients of such loaner cars to ‘purchase’ a collision damage waiver (at unreasonable rates) rather than include the cost of insurance and/or a collision damage waiver in the ‘free of charge’ loaner car.”
Respondents again demurred to the SAC, arguing that it was based on the same defective allegations which were fatal to the FAC. On June 2, 2006, following a hearing on respondents’ demurrer to the SAC, the trial court issued a ruling sustaining respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend.
As to the first cause of action for breach of contract, the court explained that “the written contract is fully integrated.” In support of its application of the parol evidence rule to exclude appellants’ allegations of collateral oral representations, the court cited Alling v. Universal Manufacturing Corp. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1412, which states: “The parol evidence rule . . . is a principle of substantive law. The rule derives from the concept of an integrated contract and is based on the principal that when the parties to an agreement incorporate the complete and final terms of the agreement in a writing, such an ‘integration’ in fact becomes the complete and final contract between the parties, which may not be contradicted by evidence of purportedly collateral agreements.” (Id. at pp. 1433-1434.) In addition, the court found that even if a valid oral contract regarding a free loaner car existed, according to appellants’ allegations “the oral contract does not state that [appellants] would be provided free collision coverage.” Further, “even if [appellants] assumed that collision coverage was provided for the loaner car free of charge, they were disabused of this notion by the rental agreement,” which informed Mrs. Leeds that she had the option of purchasing a collision damage waiver and described the consequences of her decision to decline such a waiver. The trial court refused to “add terms to the oral contract – namely, that ‘free rental’ means ‘free rental and free collision coverage.’”
As to the second and third causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, the trial court first noted that fraud actions are subject to a stricter pleading standard. The court then held that, to the extent that any representation was made to appellants, it was that a free loaner car would be provided and “not that a free loaner car and free collision coverage would be provided.” The court rejected appellants’ argument that the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule should apply, and concluded that “a promise of a free loaner car does not mean that a party would provide free collision coverage.”
As to appellants’ cause of action for violation of section 17500, which prohibits false advertising, the trial court again noted that the alleged advertising referred to in the complaint did not indicate that free collision coverage would be provided. The court concluded that, “It is not reasonable for a party to believe that a ‘free loaner’ car includes free collision coverage.” As to the fifth cause of action for violation of section 17200, which prohibits “unlawful and fraudulent business acts and practices,” the trial court noted that appellants had not cited any statute which respondents had allegedly violated. In denying appellants leave to amend, the court pointed out that appellants did not allege “substantial injury.” The court further noted that because “[appellants’] interpretation of the phrases ‘free loaner car’ and ‘free of charge’ is unreasonable for the reasons noted above, there is no basis to claim a [section] 17200 violation.”
On June 7, 2006, the trial court set respondents’ motion for attorney fees and costs for hearing on July 11, 2007. In its motion, respondents sought more than $54,622. The trial court awarded respondents $7,200. On July 11, 2007, judgment was entered against appellants and their action was dismissed in its entirety.
On August 3, 2007, appellants filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment. [Citation.]” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) The legal sufficiency of the complaint is reviewed de novo. (Montclair Parkowners Assn. v. City of Montclair (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 784, 790.)
II. The First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract Fails as a Matter of Law
Appellants contest the trial court’s decision to sustain the demurrer to the first cause of action on two grounds. First, they challenge the trial court’s finding that the written retail installment agreement was a fully integrated contract. Second, they argue that the court erred in finding it unreasonable for appellants to interpret respondents’ promise of a “free loaner” car as including a promise of free collision coverage. For the reasons set forth below, we reject each of appellants’ arguments.
In addition, appellants claim that, in contrast to the trial court’s ruling, they sufficiently pled consideration for the promise of a free loaner car. Because, as set forth more fully below, we find that the breach of contract cause of action cannot survive regardless of whether or not consideration was adequately pled, we do not address this issue.
A. Contract Integration
The first issue involves the question of precisely what constituted the contract between the parties. Respondents take the position, as did the trial court, that the written retail installment contract was the entire contract between respondents and appellants. Because it was a fully integrated contract, any representations regarding the free loaner car could not have constituted a breach of that contract. Appellants disagree arguing that the oral representations regarding a free loaner car were, in part, what induced appellants to purchase the car. Appellants contend that on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court could not have concluded that the written installment contract was fully integrated. Instead, appellants claim, the contract was partially written and partially oral. In support of their position, appellants point to their allegations that they “understood that the written portion of the agreement . . . was meant to and did constitute only part of the agreement between the parties and that other portions of the agreement (including the existence of a new car warranty and a provision for free loaner cars while the new Volvo was being serviced under the warranty) were covered by the oral agreement.”
The retail written installment contract was attached to the SAC as Exhibit A. It included the following language: “This contract contains the entire agreement between you and us relating to this contract. Any change to the contract must be in writing and both you and we must sign it. No oral changes are binding.” Both appellants initialed this specific provision.
We agree with the trial court’s determination that this integration clause renders the contract fully integrated. However, appellants cite Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 954, for the proposition that where there is a dispute as to the intent of the parties with respect to integration, the question is not one of law and therefore is not properly subject to demurrer. Our review of the case does not reveal any support for appellants’ proposition, but only confirms that “[w]hether a contract is integrated is a question of law when the evidence of integration is not in dispute.” (Ibid.) Appellants do not dispute the validity of the written contract, or that they read and signed it. Therefore, the evidence regarding integration is not in dispute.
We disagree with appellants’ position that the language stating “[t]his contract contains the entire agreement between you and us relating to this contract” (italics added) renders the contract integrated only as to the financing of the contract and not on “all matters.” The language is unambiguous and its clear intention is to fully encompass all matters relating to the retail installment sale agreement.
Because the contract is fully integrated, the parol evidence rule bars consideration of respondents’ alleged oral representations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856.) As set forth in Alling v. Universal Manufacturing Corp., supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at page 1434:
“[W]hen the parties to an agreement incorporate the complete and final terms of the agreement in a writing, such an ‘integration’ in fact becomes the complete and final contract between the parties, which may not be contradicted by evidence of purportedly collateral agreements. . . . Extrinsic evidence is excluded because it cannot serve to prove what the agreement was, this being determined as a matter of law to be the writing itself. . . . [P]rior and contemporaneous negotiations, oral or written, are excluded.”
The fully integrated written retail installment contract does not promise a free loaner car, and the parol evidence rule prevents the court from considering any alleged collateral oral representations on the subject. Thus, appellants cannot claim that respondents breached the sales agreement by failing to uphold any purported representations regarding a free loaner vehicle.
B. Respondents Did Not Promise to Provide a Free Collision Damage Waiver
We have found that the written retail installment agreement did not contain a promise regarding a free loaner car, therefore respondents cannot, as a matter of law, have breached that agreement by failing to fulfill the alleged promises regarding the free loaner car. However, even assuming that respondents did make an actionable promise to provide a free loaner car, appellants’ cause of action for breach of contract still fails because respondents made no representations regarding a free collision damage waiver.
Appellants point to the “Request for Rental Car,” (request) attached as exhibit B to the SAC, as support for their claim that the sales agreement was amended in writing to include the promise of a free loaner car. Using strained logic, appellants make the following argument: first, the “comments” section of the request contains the handwritten notation “Gas + Ins.” According to both parties, this notation was meant to create exclusions for gas and insurance. In other words, gas and insurance would not be included with the rental car. Next, appellants point to the rental agreement, attached as exhibit C to the SAC. The section of that document discussing the comprehensive collision damage waiver contains the following caption: “Comprehensive/Collision Damage Waiver (CCDW) (CCDW Is Not Insurance).” Thus, because respondents affirmatively expressed that the comprehensive collision damage waiver is not insurance, and because only gas and insurance were excluded from the free rental coverage, appellants reach the conclusion that the collision damage waiver was, therefore, included in the free price.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, it defies logic to conclude that, because the collision damage waiver was not expressly excluded on the request, it was therefore automatically included in the rental agreement. There is simply no basis for this conclusion and it will not support a claim for breach of contract. Second, by initialing her consent to specifically decline the collision damage waiver, Mrs. Leeds affirmatively acknowledged that the waiver was not included at no cost in the rental agreement. She also affirmatively accepted “responsibility for all loss or damage to the Vehicle.” Under no reasonable interpretation of either the request or the rental agreement was there a promise to provide a free collision damage waiver. In fact, the rental agreement provides the exact opposite, allowing Mrs. Leeds to purchase such a waiver should she choose to do so. She chose not to.
Next, appellants argue that Civil Code section 1936, subdivisions (j) and (g)(1) required respondents to specifically exclude the cost of a collision damage waiver if they did not wish to include such cost in their promise of a free loaner car. The statutes reveal no such requirement. Civil Code section 1936, subdivision (g)(1) provides that, “A rental company that offers or provides a damage waiver for any consideration in addition to the rental rate shall clearly and conspicuously disclose the following information in the rental contract or holder in which the contract is placed and, also, in signs posted at the place, such as the counter, where the renter signs the rental contract.” Among those things that a renter must disclose are that the renter may purchase an optional damage waiver to cover all liability, and the range of charges for the damage waiver.
Appellants argue that respondents “did not, at any time through the signing of Exhibit B, ‘include in that advertisement a clearly readable statement of the charge for a damage waiver and a statement that a damage waiver is optional.’” What appellants fail to mention is that such information was included in exhibit C, which was signed on the same date.
Civil Code section 1936, subdivision (j) provides: “A rental company that disseminates in this state an advertisement containing a rental rate shall include in that advertisement a clearly readable statement of the charge for a damage waiver and a statement that a damage waiver is optional.” Again, nothing in this language suggests a requirement that respondents specifically exclude the cost of a collision damage waiver in the promise of a free rental car. Further, the optional nature of the collision damage waiver and the consequences of declining the waiver were set forth in full in the rental agreement, which Mrs. Leeds read and signed.
In sum, we find that none of the allegations in the complaint or arguments set forth in appellants’ briefs reference an actual or implicit promise to provide a free collision damage waiver. If anything, the rental agreement, which Mrs. Leeds signed, reveals the opposite--that Mrs. Leeds could have purchased such an optional waiver. She affirmatively declined to do so, and accepted all responsibility for damage to the vehicle.
III. The Second Cause of Action for Fraud and Intentional Misrepresentation, and the Third Cause of Action for Negligence, Fail as a Matter of Law
Appellants present only one novel argument regarding their causes of action for fraud and misrepresentation: that the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule applies (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (g)), therefore the allegations describing appellants’ oral representations regarding a free loaner car should be considered.
We find that the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule does not apply. The exception applies only “to establish illegality or fraud.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (g).) As discussed in greater detail above, appellants have made absolutely no allegations suggesting that respondents promised a free collision damage waiver or agreed to take responsibility for damage to the vehicle caused by the lessee. Therefore there is no legitimate suggestion that any fraud took place.
Because the representations regarding a free loaner car did not include the promise of a free collision damage waiver, as a matter of law there can be no fraud, intentional misrepresentation, or negligence arising out of respondents’ failure to provide a free collision damage waiver. In addition, Mrs. Leeds’s signature on a specific provision of the rental agreement explaining that the collision damage waiver is optional, and her decision not to purchase such a waiver, completely undermine her claims of fraud, intentional misrepresentation, and negligence.
IV. The Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of Section 17500, and the Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Section 17200, Cannot Survive
A. The Section 17500 and 17200 Claims, as Pled in the SAC, Fail as a Matter of Law
Section 17500 prohibits false advertising. “Section 17500 has been broadly construed to proscribe “‘“not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which[,] although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.”’ [Citation.]” (Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 663, 679.) Even under this broad interpretation of the statute, appellants’ claim for violation of section 17500 fails. Appellants have not alleged any agreement or advertisement which, under any reasonable interpretation, promised them a free collision damage waiver.
Section 17200 prohibits unlawful and fraudulent business acts and practices. “‘“The ‘unlawful’ practices prohibited by . . . section 17200 are any practices forbidden by law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made. [Citation].”’” (South Bay Chevrolet v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 861, 880.) The SAC does not allege any law which respondents allegedly violated, other than section 17500 which, as set forth above, was not violated. Therefore, the SAC fails as a matter of law to state a claim for violation of section 17200.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Permit Amendment of the Section 17500 and Section 17200 Causes of Action
Appellants assert that they should be permitted to amend the SAC to allege a violation of Civil Code section 1936, subdivision (j), as support for their section 17200 and section 17500 causes of action. Civil Code section 1936, subdivision (j) requires a rental company which “disseminates in this state an advertisement containing a rental rate” to “include in that advertisement a clearly readable statement of the charge for a damage waiver and a statement that a damage waiver is optional.” Appellants argue that they have alleged that respondents set forth a rate of “free” in advertisements and did not include in that advertisement a clearly readable statement of the charge for a damage waiver and a statement that a damage waiver is optional. Appellants offer this purported violation of Civil Code section 1936, subdivision (j) as the “practice forbidden by law” which was missing from the SAC.
We note that the SAC contains no allegations of a violation of Civil Code section 1936, subdivision (j), and appellants did not argue to the trial court that they should be permitted to amend their complaint to allege such a violation. Therefore, appellants present this particular theory of liability under sections 17200 and 17500 for the first time on appeal. Nevertheless, an appellant may make a showing as to how the appellant can amend the complaint in the first instance to the appellate court. (Lee v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 848, 854.)
The trial court’s decision not to allow appellants to amend their complaint is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 627, 636.) The court’s decision was based in part on its finding that appellants did not allege “substantial injury,” therefore there “is no basis to claim a [section] 17200 violation.” We agree with the trial court’s assessment of appellants’ claims under both section 17200 and section 17500 in connection with appellants’ proposed amendments.
Business & Professions Code section 17204 (section 17204), as amended by Proposition 64, requires that any person who brings a claim for relief under section 17200 must have “suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result” of the violation. The parties did not address sections 17204 and 17535 in their briefs to this court, therefore we requested supplemental briefing on the question of whether appellants meet the standing requirements set forth in those statutes. As set forth below, we find that appellants do not meet the standing requirements of sections 17204 and 17535. We therefore conclude that appellants could not amend their complaint to allege a violation of Civil Code section 1936, subdivision (j) as the basis for their section 17200 and section 17500 causes of action.
The same requirement applies to claims under section 17500, which was amended pursuant to Proposition 64 as set forth in Business & Professions Code section 17535 (section 17535).
Appellants filed their initial complaint on February 3, 2005, after the passage of Proposition 64. Although the underlying transactions took place prior the passage of Proposition 64, respondents correctly point out that Proposition 64’s standing requirements should be applied in this matter. (Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 232-233 [“For a lawsuit properly to be allowed to continue, standing must exist at all times until judgment is entered”].)
In their supplemental briefing to this court, appellants describe what they believe to be their “injury in fact” as required by sections 17204 and 17535. They point to the SAC, which alleges that “[p]laintiff has been damaged in an amount unknown, but in excess of $5,000.” Appellants propose to amend the SAC to allege that respondents claimed that appellants owed approximately $5,000 for damages to the rental car. They acknowledge that the sum of $4,500 has now been paid to respondents on behalf of appellants by appellants’ insurance company, but argue that under the collateral source rule, such payment should be treated as payment by appellants. In addition, appellants state that according to a small claims judgment awarded respondents against appellants, the sum of approximately $500 is still owed to respondents. Appellants further argue that they will “have to pay substantial additional sums to their insurance carrier for future insurance,” and “overpaid for the new car they purchased since they paid for, but did not receive,” the value of the advertised free loaner cars.
To have standing to bring an action under section 17200, plaintiff must show “‘(1) injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. [Citation.]’” (Daro v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1098, original italics.) We find that appellants’ proposed amended allegations regarding their purported financial losses are insufficient because the alleged financial losses cannot be causally connected to respondents’ failure to contain the proper disclosures regarding the collision damage waiver.
First, any payments made by appellants’ insurance carrier or appellants themselves resulting from damage to the loaner car was a direct result of the automobile accident, not respondents’ failure to properly make its disclosures regarding the collision damage waiver.
Further, appellants cannot claim that they will not benefit from free loaner cars in the future. On the contrary, the allegations show that respondents provided a free loaner car as promised, and there are no allegations that respondents do not intend to do so in the future. As set forth above, the representations regarding a free loaner car did not include the promise of a free collision damage waiver--therefore, appellants are not being deprived of anything they bargained for under the sales agreement. Appellants have not shown that they have suffered any loss of money or property as a direct result of respondents’ alleged failure to specify that the free rental car would not come with a free collision damage waiver--nor can they.
In sum, we find that appellants’ section 17200 and section 17500 causes of action fail as a matter of law and that there is no reasonable possibility that these claims can be cured by amendment. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist., supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 966-967.)
V. The Attorney Fee Award Was Proper
Appellants’ final argument involves the trial court’s award of $7,200 in attorney fees to respondents under Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a). Appellants first claim that the trial court improperly awarded fees under that statute, and further claim that even if they were properly awarded, the fees were substantially too high. We review the trial court’s order granting attorney fees for abuse of discretion. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a) permits an award of attorney fees “[i]n any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded.” As the trial court noted, the rental contract entered into between the parties states:
“You will pay [respondents] on demand all amounts incurred as a result of the rental transaction including but not limited to the following [¶] (d) All attorneys’ fees [and] court costs.”
Appellants argue that because they only attached the first page of the rental agreement to the SAC--not the second page, which contained the attorney fee provision--the court cannot award attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a). We find this argument to be frivolous. The allegations in the SAC clearly place the rental agreement at issue. Despite the fact that appellants attached only the first page of the rental agreement to the SAC, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the second page in connection with respondents’ motion for attorneys fees. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a) based on the attorney fee clause found on that second page.
The trial court took judicial notice of the second page of the rental agreement pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h), which permits a court to take judicial notice of “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.”
We further decline to alter the trial court’s specific award. “[T]he trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. [Citations.]” (PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) “‘The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong’ – meaning that it abused its discretion. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) No such abuse of discretion occurred here. In a well-reasoned statement of decision, the trial court explained that, despite respondents’ request for nearly $50,000 in fees, “not all of the causes of action dealt with the rental agreement.” Thus, in an effort to award respondents only those fees applicable to time spent on the rental agreement, the court awarded $7,200.
Appellants point to local rule 3.2 of the Los Angeles County Superior Court as support for their claim that the award should be no more than $470. However, that rule is only applicable “unless otherwise determined by the court.” The court determined otherwise in this instance, and appellants have failed to show an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety, and the award of attorney fees in favor of respondents, are affirmed.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., DOI TODD, J.