Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch

12 Citing cases

  1. DeANDA v. AIU INS

    2004 OK 54 (Okla. 2004)   Cited 5 times

    When a copy of the certification order is filed in the offices of any court clerk and county clerk, and is entered on the judgment docket, the certified unpaid award acquires by force of statute the efficacy of a district court judgment, "transforming an unpaid award in default into an enforceable district court adjudication by clothing the obligor's compensation liability with the attributes of a district court judgment." Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch, 1988 OK 121 ¶ 9, 764 P.2d 191, 195. "When filed in the district court, the certification affords a legal vehicle for enforcement proceedings to be conducted in that forum." Lee Way Motor Freight, 1988 OK 121 ¶ 10, 764 P.2d at 195.

  2. Bishop v. Wilson Quality Homes

    1999 OK 60 (Okla. 1999)   Cited 14 times

    When a copy of the certification order is filed in the offices of any county clerk and court clerk and entered on the judgment docket, the certified unpaid award acquires by force of statute the efficacy of a district court judgment, "transforming an unpaid award in default into an enforceable district court adjudication by clothing the obligor's compensation liability with the attributes of a district court judgment." Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch, 1988 OK 121 ¶ 9, 764 P.2d 191, 195. "When filed in the district court, the certification affords a legal vehicle for enforcement proceedings to be conducted in that forum." Lee Way Motor Freight, 1988 OK 121 ¶ 10, 764 P.2d at 195.

  3. Pepsico, Inc. v. Sharp

    1989 OK 114 (Okla. 1989)   Cited 8 times

    Id. The Lum holding was recently reaffirmed in Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch, 764 P.2d 191 (Okla. 1988). Welch also gave retrospective effect to PepsiCo's guaranty, making it responsible for awards granted during Lee Way's own-risk permit, including awards for injuries sustained before the guaranty agreement was submitted to the Workers' Compensation Court.

  4. Beyrer v. The Mule, LLC

    2021 OK 45 (Okla. 2021)   Cited 4 times

    This growth in the common law came after our use of Kerby and Drury as persuasive authority, and while we are not required to implement these more recent common law principles from the courts in Kansas and Kentucky, as in a circumstance of Oklahoma statutory adoption with a prior judicial interpretation, we may use them to the extent they are persuasive as authority in our controversy and when consistent with our more recent precedential authority and the statutory language in 12 O.S. § 651. See, e.g., Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch, 1988 OK 121, n.14, 764 P.2d 191, 195 (when our Legislature has expressly adopted a statute from another State then the Legislature has also adopted that State's judicial construction of the statute which occurred prior to the adoption, and the legislative adoption of judicial construction "has the same effect as though it had been expressly carried into the body of our legislative law") (citing In re Estate of Speake, 1987 OK 61, n. 5, 743 P.2d 648, 650); Brook v. James A. Cullimore & Co., 1967 OK 251, 436 P.2d 32, 34 (presumed adoption of judicial construction of foreign statute is judicial construction made by highest court in the foreign State); Valley Vista Dev. Corp. v. City of Broken Arrow, 1988 OK 140, n. 22, 766 P.2d 344, 349 (judicial construction by foreign State court was not adopted by the Oklahoma Legislature when the judicial construction occurred after the date of the Oklahoma adoption, and the judicial construction was persuasive authority).

  5. Glasco v. State

    2008 OK 65 (Okla. 2008)   Cited 46 times
    Recognizing that in using the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of" the Legislature intended for the specific statute using that language to govern instead of a more general statute

    Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, 760 P.2d 816, 822. 85 O.S. 2001 § 42[ 85-42]; Kuykendall v. Gulfstream Aerospace Technologies, 2002 OK 96, 66 P.3d 374; Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch, 1988 OK 121, 119, 764 P.2d 191, 195. B.

  6. State ex rel. Fick v. Miller

    252 Neb. 164 (Neb. 1997)   Cited 23 times

    Courts that have considered the precise question now before us have concluded that a final judgment for money must specify the amount awarded. U.S. v. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 78 S. Ct. 674, 2 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1958) (final judgment for money must, at the least, determine amount or specify means for determining amount); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch, 764 P.2d 191 (Okla. 1988) (money judgment must state with certainty amount to be paid); Roach v. Roach, 164 Ohio St. 587, 132 N.E.2d 742 (1956); H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bay, Inc., 808 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App. 1991) (judgment awarding unascertainable amount not final). We adopt that reasoning and hold that in order to be final, a judgment for money must specify the amount awarded or specify the means for determining the amount.

  7. Lepak v. McClain

    1992 OK 166 (Okla. 1992)   Cited 9 times

    See 12 O.S. 1991 § 850[ 12-850], Historical Notes.Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch, Okla., 764 P.2d 191, 195 n. 14 (1988); Matter of Estate of Speake, Okla., 743 P.2d 648, 650 n. 5 (1987); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, Okla., 659 P.2d 930, 934 (1983); Horath v. Pierce, Okla., 506 P.2d 548, 554 (1973). Kansas jurisprudence antedating our statehood — Burrows I, Burrows II and O'Connell — and extant Oklahoma decisional law applying the teachings of the binding Kansas authority are consistent with the notion that orders directing delivery of specific non-exempt property to be applied towards the satisfaction of a debt and orders for payment from an identifiable non-exempt fund then in existence and available must be distinguished from general orders for payment of a debt.

  8. Heirshberg v. Slater

    1992 OK 84 (Okla. 1992)   Cited 11 times
    In Heirshberg v. Slater, 833 P.2d 269 (Okla. 1992) we observed that at one time an appellant could delay filing an appeal until after a post-judgment order adjudicating reserved attorney's fees.

    United States v. Choctaw, O. G.R. Co., 3 Okla. 404, 41 P. 729, 749 (1895).Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch, Okla., 764 P.2d 191, 195 n. 14 (1988); Matter of Estate of Speake, Okla., 743 P.2d 648, 650 n. 5 (1987); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, Okla., 659 P.2d 930, 934 (1983); Horath v. Pierce, Okla., 506 P.2d 548, 554 (1973). When we originally adopted the provision for a delayed new trial petition, now in § 655, the Kansas Supreme Court had held that verification was not required for motions or petitions,but affidavits were mandatory when new trial was sought on grounds of misconduct, accident or surprise or newly discovered evidence.

  9. Pepsico, Inc. v. Tate

    806 P.2d 644 (Okla. 1991)

    In contrast, the opposite result applies to an award for permanent disability. See Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch, 764 P.2d 191 (Okla. 1988). An award of permanent disability benefits operates as a final adjudicated obligation. "An employer's or insurance carrier's ten-day default in payment of a compensation award effects a statutory acceleration of the unpaid adjudicated obligation and the unaccrued installments are at once commuted to a lump sum, thus making the entire unsatisfied obligation immediately due."

  10. Pepsico, Inc. v. Burden

    786 P.2d 1226 (Okla. 1990)   Cited 4 times

    This appeal, as many others presently before this Court, resulted from litigation of PepsiCo's liability as guarantor of workers' compensation awards against Lee Way, formerly PepsiCo's wholly-owned own-risk subsidiary. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Sharp, 781 P.2d 814 (Okla. 1989); Lee Way Freight, Inc. v. Welch, 764 P.2d 191 (Okla. 1988); Lum v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 757 P.2d 810 (Okla. 1987). The recent decision in Sharp held that PepsiCo's guaranty of workers' compensation awards against Lee Way includes claims arising before the guaranty was executed but not adjudicated until after PepsiCo revoked the agreement.