Lee v. State

14 Citing cases

  1. Bourassa v. State

    811 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 3 times   1 Legal Analyses

    However, where the record before us makes clear that certain of an appellant’s claims of ineffectiveness fail as a matter of law, we need not remand those claims to the trial court for consideration. See Lee v. State , 199 Ga. App. 246, 247 (3), 404 S.E.2d 598 (1991) (remand on certain enumerations unnecessary where appellate court could resolve them without need to further develop the record). The record and briefs before us contain information relevant to the consideration of some of Bourassa’s claims of ineffectiveness.

  2. Heatherly v. State

    336 Ga. App. 875 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 3 times

    And “in numerous decisions our courts have held that corroboration of an accomplice is not necessary to sustain a misdemeanor conviction.” Lee v. State, 199 Ga.App. 246, 246(1), 404 S.E.2d 598 (1991) (punctuation and citation omitted); see also Youmans v. State, 51 Ga.App. 373, 374(3), 180 S.E. 495 (1935). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial here.

  3. Stuart v. State

    274 Ga. App. 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 10 times

    Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 330 (II) (1) ( 240 SE2d 833) (1977).Lee v. State, 199 Ga. App. 246, 247 (3) ( 404 SE2d 598) (1991).Johnson v. State, 171 Ga. App. 851, 853 (1) ( 321 SE2d 402) (1984).

  4. Bradwell v. State

    586 S.E.2d 355 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 2 times

    Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.6(A)(2). A defendant's refusal to take responsibility or to show remorse may therefore properly result in a harsher sentence than that given to an accomplice who has pled guilty. Lee v. State, 199 Ga. App. 246(2) ( 404 S.E.2d 598) (1991); see Johnson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 568, 570-571(2) ( 481 S.E.2d 268) (1997); Thompson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 704, 708-710(5) ( 269 S.E.2d 474) (1980). Nothing in the record reflects that Bradwell's sentence was imposed merely as a punishment for his decision to exercise his right to trial.

  5. Bell v. State

    555 S.E.2d 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 2 times

    See O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 (d); O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 (a); Howard v. State, 234 Ga. App. 260, 261 (2) ( 506 S.E.2d 648) (1998) (full concurrence as to Division 2). Furthermore, Wallace's guilty plea could be regarded as an acknowledgment of guilt and a willingness to assume responsibility for her conduct. See Lee v. State, 199 Ga. App. 246 (2) ( 404 S.E.2d 598) (1991). Although Bell may have expressed that he did not want a jury trial following the entry of Wallace's plea, his continuing recalcitrance and stubborn silence in the face of repeated attempts by the trial court to determine whether he wished to accept the plea offer demonstrated a lack of willingness to cooperate with the trial court and to accept responsibility for his own actions. On these facts, we cannot conclude that Bell was denied equal protection.

  6. Hunt v. State

    247 Ga. App. 464 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 16 times

    Therefore, we conclude that counsel's performance did not fall outside the wide range of reasonable professional judgment, and we will not judge his trial strategy in hindsight. Lee v. State, 199 Ga. App. 246, 247 (3) ( 404 S.E.2d 598) (1991). Judgment affirmed.

  7. Robertson v. the State

    245 Ga. App. 649 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 11 times

    Accordingly, Robertson cannot be deemed to have waived this ground of appeal.Lee v. State, 199 Ga. App. 246, 247 (3) ( 404 S.E.2d 598) (1991). In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Robertson must show that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and establish a likelihood that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.

  8. Johnson v. State

    481 S.E.2d 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 9 times

    However, that rule does not require a trial court to sentence a defendant to the same sentence that would have been appropriate had a defendant entered a guilty plea. See Duncan v. State, 213 Ga. App. 394 ( 444 S.E.2d 583) (1994); Lee v. State, 199 Ga. App. 246 ( 404 S.E.2d 598) (1991) In fact, USCR 33.6 (A) provides specific factors that may be taken into consideration when a guilty plea is entered in determining if leniency is appropriate. The record demonstrates that the trial court took consideration of all of the factors that might influence leniency in sentencing pursuant to that Rule, read them into the record, and specifically found that none of them were present.

  9. Sutton v. State

    210 Ga. App. 247 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 7 times

    Although another lawyer may have conducted the defense in a different manner and taken another course of action, the fact that defendant and his present counsel disagree with the decisions made by trial counsel does not require a finding that defendant's original representation was inadequate.' [Cit.]" Lee v. State, 199 Ga. App. 246, 247 (3) ( 404 S.E.2d 598) (1991). In light of the severity of the injuries sustained by the victim, asserting a defense of justification might well have been more harmful than helpful.

  10. Brundage v. State

    430 S.E.2d 173 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 11 times

    That being so, I agree that it serves no purpose to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing, because the result must be the same. Lee v. State, 199 Ga. App. 246, 247 (3) ( 404 S.E.2d 598) (1991), in disposing of the first two bases of appellant's claim of ineffective assistance, illustrates that where such a claim is newly raised on appeal by new counsel, it need not always be remanded but may be subject to decision as a matter of law. The same procedural principle is recognized in Phillips v. State, 204 Ga. App. 698, 703 ( 420 S.E.2d 316) (1992), where the posture of the case prevented the court from determining, as a matter of law, whether appellant was denied effective assistance.