In reading the foregoing conclusion we are not unmindful of the numerous holdings to the effect that instructions as to a particular degree of homicide should be given in the event of any doubt as to whether the evidence raises an issue as to such degree of homicide. See Freeman v. State, 158 Ga. 369 (2a) ( 123 S.E. 126); Graham v. State, 34 Ga. App. 598 (2) ( 130 S.E. 354); Cain v. State, 39 Ga. App. 128 (2) ( 146 S.E. 340); Jackson v. State, 43 Ga. App. 468 ( 159 S.E. 293); Lee v. State, 70 Ga. App. 61 ( 27 S.E.2d 347); Davis v. State, 93 Ga. App. 253 (3) ( 91 S.E.2d 316). But if we concede in this case, in arguendo, that the evidence did indicate or could support a finding of involuntary manslaughter in one form or another, the failure to submit these issues to the jury was actually favorable to the accused, for unless the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the essentials of either murder or voluntary manslaughter were present, it had no alternative but to acquit the accused, either on the theory of an accidental shooting or for other reasons, and under these circumstances the accused has no just ground for complaint. Hill v. State, 41 Ga. 484. 505 (10); Fair v. State, 171 Ga. 112 (2) ( 155 S.E. 329); Harris v. State, 184 Ga. 165, supra; Walton v. State, 190 Ga. 746 (2) ( 10 S.E.2d 755); Hicks v. State, 216 Ga. 574, supra. There is no merit in any of the enumerated errors discussed in this division of the opinion, and the accused has abandoned the eleventh enumerate

1. There being evidence from which the jury would have been authorized to find that the defendant did not intend to kill the deceased, and that the killing was the result of culpable neglect on the part of the defendant in that he carelessly handled a loaded rifle which he knew was easy to discharge, and that such careless handling resulted in the death of the deceased, such evidence would have authorized a finding that the defendant was guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection, and the trial court erred, therefore, in failing to charge the jury even without request the law on involuntary manslaughter as embodied in Code §§ 26-1009 and 26-1010, as complained of in special ground 1 of the motion for a new trial. Warnack v. State, 3 Ga. App. 590, 595 (2) ( 60 S.E. 288); Lee v. State, 70 Ga. App. 61 ( 27 S.E.2d 347); Wager v. State, 74 Ga. App. 729, 731 ( 41 S.E.2d 342). 2.

"There being evidence from which the jury would have been authorized to find the accused guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection, it was error for the judge to omit to instruct the jury on the law relating to that grade of manslaughter." Jackson v. State, 181 Ga. 753(2) (184 S.E. 279); Lee v. State, 70 Ga. App. 61 ( 27 S.E.2d 347). It is true that there can be no involuntary manslaughter, where the intention is to kill. If there is any evidence to raise a doubt, even though slight, as to the intention to kill, the court should give in charge the law of involuntary manslaughter, but if there is nothing to raise such a doubt, the failure to charge on that subject will not require a new trial. Jackson v. State, 76 Ga. 473 (3a).

This is the second appearance here of this case. In Lee v. State, 70 Ga. App. 61 ( 27 S.E.2d 347), where the accused was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, this court held: "Under the evidence and the defendant's statement to the jury, the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection was also involved, and the court erred in failing to instruct the jury upon that branch of involuntary manslaughter." Upon the trial now under review, the court evidently charged upon that branch of involuntary manslaughter, since there was no special assignment of error in the motion for a new trial.