Thus, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to grant the motions for directed verdicts of acquittal. Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411, 412 (6) ( 276 S.E.2d 590). 2.

The evidence was sufficient to meet the standards of proof required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560), and thus, it was not error to deny Quinn's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411, 412 (6) ( 276 S.E.2d 590) (1981); Humphrey v. State, 252 Ga. 525 ( 314 S.E.2d 436) (1984). 2. a. Appellant Quinn contends it was error to deny his motion for a mistrial after the prosecuting attorney testified and gave hearsay evidence in his opening statement.

Thus, it was not error to deny appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411, 412 (6) ( 276 S.E.2d 590) (1981); Humphrey v. State, 252 Ga. 525 ( 314 S.E.2d 436) (1984). 2.

We find the evidence sufficient otherwise to meet the standard of proof required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560). Thus, there was no error. Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411, 412 (6) ( 276 S.E.2d 590) (1981). 2.

It follows that it was not error to deny appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411, 412 (6) ( 276 S.E.2d 590) (1981). 2.

The standard for reviewing a denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is the same test to be used when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, i.e., under the rule of Jackson v. Virginia, supra, whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Woods v. State, 269 Ga. 60(2), 495 S.E.2d 282 (1998); Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411(6), 276 S.E.2d 590 (1981). OCGA § 16-8-12(a)(3) elevates the crime of theft by taking under OCGA § 16-8-2, to a felony if the property "was taken by ... an officer or employee of a government."

He later died as a result of the approximately 20 stab wounds he received in the struggle. Based on this evidence, the trial court did not err in denying Daniels' motion for directed verdict, Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411, 412 ( 276 S.E.2d 590) (1981), and the jury was authorized to find Daniels guilty of the crimes of which she was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). 2.

Because Dr. Taunton testified that Jones was medically stable and was not in immediate danger of dying, and the state presented no evidence to the contrary, we conclude that the state failed to carry its burden of prima facie establishing that Jesse Jones was in the article of death at the time he made the statement. However, we also hold that the trial court's error in admitting this statement was harmless because substantially the same evidence was properly admitted by way of the victim's statements to William Jones and Joann Spillers. Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59 ( 230 S.E.2d 869) (1976); Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411 (1) ( 276 S.E.2d 590) (1981). 3.

We disagree, and hold that the trial court did not err in denying the appellant's motion for a directed verdict, as, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411 (6) ( 276 S.E.2d 590) (1981); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979)." Wright v. State, 253 Ga. 1 (1) ( 316 S.E.2d 445) (1984).

We disagree, as, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411 (6) ( 276 S.E.2d 590) (1981); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). 2).