Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CV811512.
RUSHING, P.J.
Appellant, Hwa Won Lee, appeals from a judgment entered in her personal injury action after a jury found in favor of respondents, R&L Brosamer, Inc., et al., and the trial court denied her motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).
While the appeal was pending, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. This court found the appeal timely only as to the order denying the JNOV pursuant to rules 8.104 and 8.108 of the California Rules of Court, and dismissed the remaining portions of the appeal. (Lee v. Brosamer, Inc., et al, (Jun. 29, 2007, H030555) [nonpub. opn.].)
In this opinion, we consider appellant’s appeal as to the order denying the motion for JNOV.
We omit a statement of the facts, because neither appellant nor respondent provide a recitation of the underlying facts of the case, and appellant’s appendix contains no complaint or other pleading document containing the facts. Rather, appellant’s appendix appears to contain various letters and reports related to her personal injury case; however, there is no indication whatsoever if those documents were ever introduced or received into evidence in the trial court.
With regard to the motion for JNOV, we note that appellant’s appendix contains only the order denying the motion, it merely states, “the court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the arguments of both parties, and the evidence previously submitted in the matter. Good cause appearing, it is hearby ordered that [appellant’s] motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict . . . is denied.” The appendix does not contain the moving, opposition, and or reply papers for the motion. Although the record does contain the reporter’s transcript of the motion proceeding that occurred on May 12, 2006, appellant’s arguments are not relevant to a motion for JNOV.
The power of the trial court to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict is no broader than its power to direct a verdict. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629; see Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 69-70.) “A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in support. [Citation.]” (Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68.) “The trial judge cannot reweigh the evidence [citation], or judge the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] If the evidence is conflicting or if several reasonable inferences may be drawn, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied. [Citations.]” (Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 877- 878.
In assessing the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for JNOV, we limit our consideration to the question of whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. (Shapiro v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 722, 730.) If the record contains any substantial evidence supporting the verdict, we must affirm the order denying plaintiff’s motion. (Ibid.)
Here, appellant does not satisfy her burden of establishing there is not substantial evidence to support the verdict. Specifically, appellant does not provide an adequate record for this court to review the evidence at trial, and deduce whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict. In addition, appellant does not raise a cognizable argument regarding the denial of the motion for JNOV.
An appellant must affirmatively show error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “We are not required to search the record to ascertain whether it contains support for [plaintiff’s] contentions. [Citation.]” (Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545.) Where no record references are made we may treat a point as waived and pass it without consideration. (Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 218, 229.)
On appeal, the appellant also has the obligation to direct the court to authority that supports the arguments in support of his position. If none is furnished, the court may treat the point as waived and pass it without consideration. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
We appreciate the effort involved in appellant representing herself in these proceedings. But self-representation does not exempt a litigant from the requirements of the law. “A litigant has a right to act as his own attorney [citation] ‘but, in so doing, should be restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as is required of those qualified to practice law before our courts; otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded.’ [Citations.]” (Lombardi v. Citizens Nat. Trust etc. Bank (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206, 208-209.) A self-representing party is due the same consideration as any other party from trial and appellate courts, but no greater. (Monastero v. Los Angeles Transit Co. (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 156, 160; Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1056.) Courts are not obliged to act as counsel for the self-representing party, though we should guard against inadvertence causing a miscarriage of justice. (Lombardi v. Citizens Nat. Trust etc. Bank, supra, 137 Cal.App.2d at pp. 209-211; Taylor v. Bell (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1008; Harding v. Collazo, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 1055.)
Disposition
The order appealed from is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: PREMO, J., ELIA, J.