She argues that this delay prevented her from asking the trial court to set aside the judgment within the term of court in which it was entered, when the trial court could have set the judgment aside under its broader, inherent power rather than the more limited grounds of OCGA § 9–11–60. See Ammons v. Bolick, 233 Ga. 324, 325(1), 210 S.E.2d 796 (1974); Miranda, 312 Ga.App. at 291, 718 S.E.2d 123; Lee v. Restaurant Mgmt. Svcs., 232 Ga.App. 902, 903(1), 503 S.E.2d 59 (1998). But even if Guthrie took some act in prosecuting his lawsuit that could be construed as a ground for setting aside the judgment under OCGA § 9–11–60(d)(2), “the alleged [act] is not unmixed with the negligence or fault of [Winslett] in failing to interpose a defense to [Guthrie's] suit.”

She argues that this delay prevented her from asking the trial court to set aside the judgment within the term of court in which it was entered, when the trial court could have set the judgment aside under its broader, inherent power rather than the more limited grounds of OCGA § 9-11-60. See Ammons v. Bolick, 233 Ga. 234, 235 (1) (210 SE2d 796) (1974); Miranda, 312 Ga. App. at 291; Lee v. Restaurant Mgmt. Svcs., 232 Ga. App. 902, 903 (1) (503 SE2d 59) (1998). But even if Guthrie took some act in prosecuting his lawsuit that could be construed as a ground for setting aside the judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (2), "the alleged [act] is not unmixed with the negligence or fault of [Winslett] in failing to interpose a defense to [Guthrie's] suit.

Thus, even if MARTA had made a mistake, Burch still cannot show that the mistake was unmixed with any negligence on her part. See Winslett v. Guthrie, 326 Ga.App. 747, 750 (3) (a) (755 S.E.2d 287) (2014) (holding that the defendant failed to show the default judgment should be set aside under 9-11-60 (d) (2) because, even if the plaintiff had made a mistake in prosecuting his lawsuit, the defendant was properly served with the complaint and the defendant was "charged under the law with the responsibility to ensure that an answer to the complaint was filed.") (citation omitted); Lee v. Restaurant Mgmt. Svcs., 232 Ga.App. 902, 904 (2) (503 S.E.2d 59) (1998) (holding that the restaurant company was not entitled to have the default judgment set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (2) based on its insurance carrier's mistake of failing to file its answer, because there was "no evidence that the 'fault' for th[e] 'mistake' [lay] with anyone other than the named party to the litigation," and the alleged mistake was not "unmixed with negligence or fault" of the defendant in failing to timely respond to the complaint). See also OCGA § 9-11-5 (f) (4) ("When an attorney files a pleading in a case via an electronic filing service provider, such attorney shall be deemed to have consented to be served electronically with future pleadings for such case at the primary email address on record with the electronic filing service provider.").

Thus, even if MARTA had made a mistake, Burch still cannot show that the mistake was unmixed with any negligence on her part. See Winslett v. Guthrie , 326 Ga. App. 747, 750 (3) (a), 755 S.E.2d 287 (2014) (holding that the defendant failed to show the default judgment should be set aside under 9-11-60 (d) (2) because, even if the plaintiff had made a mistake in prosecuting his lawsuit, the defendant was properly served with the complaint and the defendant was "charged under the law with the responsibility to ensure that an answer to the complaint was filed") (citation omitted); Lee v. Restaurant Mgmt. Svcs. , 232 Ga. App. 902, 905 (2), 503 S.E.2d 59 (1998) (holding that the restaurant company was not entitled to have the default judgment set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (2) based on its insurance carrier's mistake of failing to file its answer, because there was "no evidence that the ‘fault’ for th[e] ‘mistake’ [lay] with anyone other than the named party to the litigation," and the alleged mistake was not "unmixed with negligence or fault" of the defendant in failing to timely respond to the complaint). See also OCGA § 9-11-5 (f) (4) ("When an attorney files a pleading in a case via an electronic filing service provider, such attorney shall be deemed to have consented to be served electronically with future pleadings for such case at the primary email address on record with the electronic filing service provider.").

(Footnote omitted.) Lee v. Restaurant Mgmt. Svcs., 232 Ga. App. 902, 904 (2) ( 503 SE2d 59) (1998).Todd v. Dekle, 240 Ga. 842, 844 ( 242 SE2d 613) (1978); Coker v. Coker, 251 Ga. 542, 543 ( 307 SE2d 921) (1983).

In construing this Code section, our Supreme Court has stated: "If words, sentences, or paragraphs are omitted from a judgment, and if there is no factual dispute between or among the parties about such error or omission, the judgment may be corrected under [OCGA § 9-11-60 (g)]."Lee v. Restaurant Mgmt. Svcs., 232 Ga. App. 902, 903 (1) ( 503 SE2d 59) (1998). (Emphasis supplied.)

(Footnote omitted.) Lee v. Restaurant Mgmt. Svcs., 232 Ga. App. 902, 903 (1) ( 503 SE2d 59) (1998). "After the expiration of the term of court in which a default judgment is entered, the discretion of the court in setting aside the judgment is limited to the criteria set forth in OCGA § 9-11-60."

Even assuming without deciding that Capital Cargo's bankruptcy filing stayed the requirement that the judgment could only be modified within the same term of court except to correct clerical errors, the bankruptcy stay was lifted on July 19, 2000, and the modification was made outside that term of court. "The general rule is that after expiration of the term at which a judgment is entered, it is out of the power of the court to modify and revise the judgment in any matter of substance or in any matter affecting the merits." Lee v. Restaurant Management Srvcs., 232 Ga. App. 902, 903(1) ( 503 S.E.2d 59) (1998). OCGA § 9-11-60(g) gives the trial court discretion to amend judgments outside the term of court only to correct "clerical mistakes . . . arising from oversight or omission."

This is incorrect. See, e.g., Goode v. O'Neal, Banks Assoc., 165 Ga. App. 162 ( 300 S.E.2d 191) (1983). Lee v. Restaurant Mgt. Svcs., 232 Ga. App. 902 ( 503 S.E.2d 59) (1998), relied on by Griffin, is inapposite here because in Lee the motion was not filed until after the subsequent term of court began. Id. at 903(1).

After the expiration of the term of court in which a default judgment is entered, the discretion of the court in setting aside the judgment is limited to the criteria set forth in OCGA § 9-11-60. See Lee v. Restaurant Mgt. Services, 232 Ga. App. 902, 903 (1) ( 503 S.E.2d 59) (1998). Thus, this default judgment could be set aside only if the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-60 were satisfied. See Archer v. Monroe, 165 Ga. App. 724, 725 (2) ( 302 S.E.2d 583) (1983).