Lee v. Megill

Full title: SUSAN S. LEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM B. MEGILL, D.D.S.…

Court: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

Date published: Mar 29, 2018

DOCKET NO. A-0193-16T3 (App. Div. Mar. 29, 2018)

Opinion

DOCKET NO. A-0193-16T3

03-29-2018

SUSAN S. LEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM B. MEGILL, D.D.S., Defendant-Respondent.

Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Michael Confusione, of counsel and on the brief). Philip M. Lustbader and David Lustbader, PC, attorneys for respondent (David Lustbader, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. Before Judges Ostrer and Rose. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-0885-14. Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Michael Confusione, of counsel and on the brief). Philip M. Lustbader and David Lustbader, PC, attorneys for respondent (David Lustbader, on the brief). PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Susan S. Lee appeals from the summary judgment dismissal of her dental malpractice complaint against defendant William B. Megill, D.D.S. Judge Yolanda Ciccone found that plaintiff's July 2, 2014, complaint was time-barred, because the cause of action arose no later than October 27, 2011. Upon our de novo review, see Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010), we affirm.

The undisputed facts are that defendant last treated plaintiff on October 7, 2011. She continued to feel pain in "tooth number three." So, on October 27, 2011, she obtained treatment at the dental clinic of Columbia University Health Care. A dentist there told plaintiff that defendant had drilled "too deep" and hit the horn of the tooth that caused plaintiff pain. At that point, her cause of action accrued, because she knew or reasonably should have known that she had an injury, and it was the fault of another, specifically defendant. See, e.g., Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, 70 (1981). As she filed her complaint over two years after that, see N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the court properly dismissed it.

Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.

CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION