Opinion
03-23-00454-CV
06-13-2024
Phyllis Lee, Appellant v. Grand Prairie Independent School District, Appellee
FROM THE 201ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-GN 22-002034, THE HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ROSA LOPEZ THEOFANIS, JUSTICE
Phyllis Lee, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's order granting Grand Prairie Independent School District's (the School District) plea to the jurisdiction. Concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court dismissed Lee's suit that sought judicial review of an appeals-panel decision of the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation (the Division). For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's order and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On September 13, 2017, Lee sustained a compensable injury while employed with the School District, a self-insured workers' compensation insurance carrier. On August 30, 2021, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a decision and order following a contested-case hearing. The ALJ determined that under the doctrine of issue estoppel, Lee was barred from pursuing the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a right rotator cuff tear as her compensable injury, and that she was barred from pursuing disability from November 2017 through January 2019 for the compensable injury. The ALJ relied on a prior decision and order concerning Lee's compensable injury that an ALJ issued on January 15, 2019, to conclude that the School District was not liable for the benefits at issue. In the decision and order, the ALJ also determined that Lee's compensable injury "does not extend to or include adjudgment disorder mixed with anxiety and depressed mood, psychological factors adversely affecting medical conditions, or major depression" and that she "did not have disability from January 16, 2019, through April 14, 2020, resulting from the compensable injury sustained on September 13, 2017."
Lee requested review of the ALJ's January 2019 decision and order by an appeals panel, and the appeals panel upheld the decision and order. Lee then appealed the appeal-panels determination to the Dallas County District Court, which affirmed, and Lee did not further appeal that decision. See Lee v. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist., Cause No. DC-19-06171, 2020 Tex. Dist. LEXIS 11702, at *1-2 (44th Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Aug. 17, 2020) (affirming final decision of Division "wherein the Appeals Panel determined that the compensable injury of September 13, 2017, does not extend to and include post-traumatic stress disorder and right shoulder rotator cuff tear").
The ALJ ordered that Lee "remains entitled to medical benefits for the compensable injury in accordance with Texas Labor Code § 408.021." See Tex. Lab. Code § 408.021(a) ("An employee who sustains a compensable injury is entitled to all health care reasonably required by the nature of the injury as and when needed."). In her findings of fact, the ALJ found that the 2017 compensable injury "extends to and includes cervical sprain/strain, right shoulder sprain/strain, and right hand contusion."
Lee requested review of the ALJ's decision and order by an appeals panel of the Division, and on November 12, 2021, an appeals panel upheld the ALJ's decision and order. See Tex. Lab. Code § 410.204(c). In its notice to the parties, the Division notified the parties that the decision and order was final on November 12, 2021, and that if a party was not satisfied with the decision, the deadline to file a suit for judicial review was "not later than the 45th day after the date on which the [Division] mailed the parties the decision of the appeals panel pursuant to Labor Code Section 410.252." See id. § 410.252 (setting deadline of 45 days to seek judicial review); see also id. § 410.251 (providing that party who has exhausted administrative remedies and is aggrieved by appeals-panel decision may seek judicial review).
On December 23, 2021, Lee filed an original petition "for substantial evidence judicial review" against the School District in Dallas County, alleging that "due process violations, fraud, and conspiracies have been committed against [her]" and citing Section 2001.175 of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.175 (addressing procedures for review under substantial evidence rule or undefined scope of review); see also Tex. Lab. Code § 410.251. Lee contended that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply, that she only discovered after the January 2019 decision and order that a form that the School District presented in the prior case "was not in the file," that "the prior hearing was adjudicated on a false premise and extrinsic fraud," that there had been a "due process violation" from the outset of the case, and that the School District had not complied with the Division's rules. See 28 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 124.2 (Tex. Dep't of Ins., Div. of Workers' Comp, Insurance Carrier Notification Requirements), 124.3 (Investigation of an Injury and Notice of Denial or Dispute). Lee requested an order reinstating her "medical and all monies due [her] up to April 14, 2020, or in the alternative, remand back to [the Division] for further proceedings."
In its original answer, the School District contended that venue was improper in Dallas County because "the issues raised by [Lee] in her [petition]" were not covered under Section 410.301(a) of the Texas Labor Code and, thus, she should have filed her suit in Travis County based on Section 410.255, which provides: "For all issues other than those covered under Section 410.301(a), judicial review shall be conducted in the manner provided for judicial review of a contested case under Subchapter G, Chapter 2001, Government Code." Tex. Lab. Code § 410.255(a); see id. §§ 410.255(b) (stating that judicial review conducted under section is governed by substantial evidence rule), .301(a) (stating that judicial review of final decision of appeals-panel issues regarding compensability or eligibility for income or death benefits "shall be conducted as provided by this subchapter"). A petition for judicial review under Subchapter G of the APA generally "must be filed in a Travis County district court." Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.176(b)(1). The School District also pleaded as affirmative defenses that it was immune from Lee's claims and that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
After the district court in Dallas County transferred the case to Travis County, the School District filed a plea to the jurisdiction. It contended that Lee did not timely request judicial review of the appeals-panel decision because her petition seeking substantial evidence review was filed forty-one days after the decision was final and appealable, and her deadline for filing was 30 days pursuant to Section 2001.176 of the APA. See id. § 2001.176(a) ("A person initiates judicial review in a contested case by filing a petition not later than the 30th day after the date the decision or order that is the subject of complaint is final and appealable."); see also Tex. Lab. Code § 410.255(a). The appeals-panel decision was final on November 12, 2021, and Lee filed her original petition on December 23, 2021.
Lee filed an objection to the plea with evidence, and the School District filed a reply. Following a hearing, the district court granted the School District's plea and dismissed Lee's claims. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Briefing Requirements
As a threshold matter, we address the School District's objections to Lee's brief on the grounds that it was not filed timely or in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3) and (j). See Tex.R.App.P. 9.4(i)(3) (requiring certificate of compliance), (j) (providing requirements of electronically filed document), 38.6(a) (setting 30-day deadline for appellant to file brief).
We must hold Lee to the same standards as parties represented by counsel. See Shockley v. Yalk, No. 07-22-00128-CV, 2023 Tex.App. LEXIS 938, at *2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Feb. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that "pro se litigant is held to the same standard as an attorney and must comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure"); E.T. v. Texas Dep't of Fam. &Protective Servs., No. 03-15-00274-CV, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 10072, at *14 (Tex. App.-Austin Sept. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding "pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and requir[ing] them to comply with the applicable rules of procedure" (citing Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam))); see Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978) (explaining that pro se litigants are subject to same procedural rules "or else they would be given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel"). We, however, decline to resolve this appeal based on technical failures in complying with briefing requirements and proceed to address the substance of this appeal. See, e.g., Lion Copolymer Holdings, LLC v. Lion Polymers, LLC, 614 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. 2020) (stating that "courts should hesitate to resolve cases based on procedural defects and instead endeavor to resolve cases on the merits" (citing St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes, 595 S.W.3d 211, 213-14 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam))).
Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that challenges the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of the merit of the asserted claims. Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). We review de novo the trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Texas Dep't of Parks &Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004).
The plaintiff carries the burden to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). We analyze whether the plaintiff has "alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause." Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. We construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff's favor, taking them as true, and looking to the plaintiff's intent. Id. We may also consider evidence that the parties have submitted that is relevant to the jurisdictional issues, and we must do so when necessary to resolve those jurisdictional issues. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000).
Does the district court have jurisdiction over Lee's suit?
The dispositive question in this appeal is whether Lee's petition against the School District, which was filed forty-one days after the appeals-panel decision was final, was timely. See Tex. Gov't Code § 311.034 ("Statutory prerequisites to a suit . . . are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity."); Jones v. State Bd. of Educator Certification, 315 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, pet. denied) ("In suits against governmental entities, a timely filed petition for judicial review is a statutory prerequisite to suit, so that failure to comply deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to review the agency decision."); see also Heart Hosp. IV, L.P. v. King, 116 S.W.3d 831, 834-35 (Tex. App-Austin 2003, pet. denied) (discussing statutory prerequisites that are jurisdictional).
The School District contends that because Lee's claims in her petition sought substantial evidence review and raised issues not addressing the compensability of her injury- due process violations, fraud, and conspiracy not covered by Section 410.301(a) of the Texas Labor Code-her suit was not subject to the 45-day filing deadline in Section 410.252 of the Texas Labor Code but that it was subject to the filing deadline in Section 2001.176 of the APA: "not later than the 30th day after the date the decision or order that is the subject of complaint is final and appealable." See Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.176(a); see also Tex. Lab. Code §§ 410.252, .255(a), (b), .301(a). Section 410.301(a) provides that "[j]udicial review of a final decision of the appeals panel regarding compensability or eligibility for or the amount of income or death benefits shall be conducted as provided by this subchapter [Subchapter G of Chapter 410 of the Texas Labor Code]." See Tex. Lab. Code § 410.301(a); see also id. § 410.252 (setting 45-day filing deadline), §§ 410.301-.308 (addressing procedures for judicial review under subchapter such as burden of proof, admissibility of records, and limitations of issues). In contrast, Section 410.255 provides that "[f]or all issues other than those covered under Section 410.301(a), judicial review shall be conducted in the manner provided for judicial review of a contested case under Subchapter G, Chapter 2001, Government Code." Id. § 410.255(a); see Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.176(a) (setting 30-day filing deadline).
On appeal, Lee appears to agree with the School District that she filed her petition past the APA's 30-day deadline and that the district court does not have jurisdiction over her suit. Lee instead argues that the School District's "plea to the jurisdiction that [she] was 11-days late to file in district court cannot outweigh [her] original petition of due process violations where [the School District] was out-of-time 58-days (with a fraudulent dispute) and disputing the exact injuries [the School District] accepted as being compensable." In this situation, she contends that the district court should not have dismissed her claims but remanded them to the Division because she has never had the opportunity to exhaust her administrative remedies, the Division has exclusive jurisdiction, and that is "where the error occurred."
In eight issues, Lee contends that: (1) she was denied due process "in the handling of this dispute from the outset"; (2) the Division's benefit review officer "did not operate in good faith"; (3) the Division's benefit review officer did not have a record of a form from the School District for an extent of injury dispute "to make an accurate assessment"; (4) the School District was out of time to file a dispute for the purpose of disputing an extent of injury and "made an elaborate fraud of an extent of injury dispute"; (5) the School District was "time barred by the 60-day rule deadline according to [Section 409.021(c) of the Texas Labor Code]" and "the 45-day rule deadline according to 28 TAC § 124.3(e) . . . does not apply in [her] case, because there are no injuries found outside of the accepted compensable injuries" and an MRI of her right shoulder "showed a full tear rotator cuff on November 28, 2017," see Tex. Lab. Code § 409.021(c) (providing that insurance carrier waives right to contest compensability of injury if it does not contest it within 60 days of being notified of injury); 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 124.3(e) (Tex. Dep't of Ins., Div. of Workers' Comp., Investigation of an in Injury and Notice of Denial or Dispute); (6) the diagnosis for PTSD was received in December 2017 and the School District "had no recourse to dispute the accepted injury" and was time barred from disputing; (7) the Division's rule 124.3(e) does not apply in this case, see 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 124.3(e); and (8) the School District is time barred by Section 409.021(c) "to dispute compensability" and "fabricated" a form that is not on file with the Division, see Tex. Lab. Code § 409.021(c).
The parties, however, may not waive a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. See San Antonio River Auth. v. Austin Bridge &Rd., L.P., 601 S.W.3d 616, 627 (Tex. 2020) ("The parties cannot contractually agree to define a court's jurisdiction."); Carroll v. Carroll, 304 S.W.3d 366, 367 (Tex. 2010) ("Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action may not be conferred or taken away by consent or waiver." (citing Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993))). Thus, despite the parties' apparent agreement in this case that the district court does not have jurisdiction, we turn to our de novo review of the district court's order granting the School District's plea to the jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228; see also Savannah Ct. P'ship v. Patrick Gray Custom Homes, Inc., No. 02-23-00200-CV, 2024 Tex.App. LEXIS 1040, at *13 n.18 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 8, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Even if the parties had not raised the issue, we could review the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte." (citing American K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d 246, 260 (Tex. 2018); Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517 n.15 (Tex. 1995))); Geldard v. Watson, 214 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) ("The issue of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the lower court(s) may be raised sua sponte by an appellate court.").
In Hartford Insurance Company v. Crain, this Court faced an analogous question to the dispositive one in this case about whether a petition for judicial review of a Division appeals-panel decision was timely filed when it was not filed within the 30-day deadline of Section 2001.176 of the APA but was filed within Texas Labor Code Section 410.252's filing deadline. See 246 S.W.3d 374, 375 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.). In that case, we concluded that the APA's 30-day deadline to file a petition for judicial review did not apply and held that Section 410.252's filing deadline "applies to all appeals-panel decisions, regardless of whether the issue relates to compensability or income or death benefits." See id. at 379. We reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case to the trial court based on our conclusion that the petition for judicial review that was filed within 40 days after the date the appeals-panel decision was final was timely. Id.
When we decided that case, the deadline in Section 410.252(a) for filing a petition for judicial review was 40 days, but the statute was amended in 2011 to change the deadline from 40 days to 45 days. See Act of June 17, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1066 (S.B. 809), § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1066 (current version at Tex. Lab. Code § 410.252).
In our analysis, we observed that Section 410.252 is in Subchapter F of Chapter 410, which subchapter is titled "Judicial Review - General Provisions," not in Subchapter G, which is titled "Judicial Review of Issues Regarding Compensability or Income or Death Benefits," and then reasoned:
Section 410.252 specifically states that a party has 40 days to file suit once an appeals-panel decision has been filed. There is no mention in section 410.252- which is contained in the general provisions of subchapter F-that the 40-day deadline is limited to those decisions that are reviewed under subchapter G. Three provisions later, section 410.255 states that "judicial review shall be conducted in the manner provided for judicial review of a contested case" under the APA (emphasis added). The APA sets forth general procedures for administrative contested cases, including the applicable standard of review and the requirement that the review be conducted without a jury. See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 2001.171- 178. Because section 410.252 of the labor code specifically creates a deadline applicable to the judicial review of appeals-panel decisions, it controls over the more general provision of section 410.255, which merely provides that judicial review of certain appeals-panel decisions shall be conducted in the manner provided for judicial review under the APA. We read section 410.255's requirement that review of appeals-panel decisions be conducted "in the manner provided for judicial review" under the APA as relating to matters such as the standard of review and the lack of a jury trial, rather than the deadline for filing a petition.Id. at 377; see also Tex. Lab. Code §§ 410.252, .255.
We also concluded that statements in sister court opinions that seemed contrary to our holding in that case were unpersuasive and dicta. See Hartford Ins., 246 S.W.3d at 378-79. We explained that some of our sister courts "[had] noted that the 30-day deadline for filing a petition for review under the APA applies to decisions by the [Division] appeals panel regarding issues other than compensability or income or death benefits" but that "none of the cited cases hold that a trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review a [Division] appeals-panel decision because a party failed to meet the APA's 30-day deadline." Id.
See State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Herrera, 189 S.W.3d 405, 407 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (stating that "according to all involved," if disputed issues encompass matters of coverage, "then the 30-day period supposedly applies"); Walker v. Argonaut Sw. Ins., 929 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ) ("[I]f Walker sought judicial review for any purpose other than the panel's determinations on compensability or eligibility for or the amount of income or death benefits, he was required to file his suit within thirty days of the decision.").
We further observed that our interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions was consistent with the Division's notice to the parties in that case that the filing deadline in Section 410.252 was the one that applied. Id. Similarly, the Division's notice in this case notified the parties that they had 45 days to seek judicial review of the appeals-panel decision "pursuant to Labor Code Section 410.252." See id. ("An agency's interpretation of its enabling statute is entitled to deference by the courts so long as it is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute." (citing Public Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. Gulf States Util. Co., 809 S.W.2d 201, 207 (Tex. 1991))); see also Tex. Lab. Code § 410.252(a).
Following our analysis in Hartford, we conclude that the 45-day filing deadline in Section 410.252(a) applies here, and thus, that Lee timely filed her petition for judicial review. See Hartford, 246 S.W.3d at 378-79 ; see also Tex. Lab. Code § 410.252(a); Woodard v. Texas Dep't of Ins., Div. of Workers Comp., No. 01-22-00761-CV, 2023 Tex.App. LEXIS 6662, at *16-17 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (describing procedures for administrative appeal of ALJ's decision and suit for judicial review of appeals-panel decision). Because Lee filed her petition within the 45-day filing deadline for doing so, we conclude that the district court erred when it granted the School District's plea to the jurisdiction.
We decline to reach the other appellate issues raised by Lee concerning whether her claims should be remanded to the Division, which have not yet been addressed by the trial court in the first instance. See, e.g., PHI Air Med., LLC v. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 641 S.W.3d 542, 553 (Tex. App.-Austin 2022, no pet.) (declining to reach issue "because the trial court has not in the first instance" considered that issue); see also Tex.R.App.P. 47.1 (directing courts of appeals to hand down opinions that are "as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal").
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we reverse the district court's order granting the School District's plea to the jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and Remanded