The employee admitted that when he went outside at the time of plaintiff's fall, approximately 3½ hours later, the temperature had dropped sharply and the sidewalk was "becoming slippery." "[W]hen `weather conditions cause property to become dangerous by reason of the accumulation of ice, the law affords the landowner a reasonable time after the . . . temperature fluctuation which caused the hazardous condition to take corrective action'" ( Lee v. Equitable Life Assur. Socy. of U.S., 237 AD2d 835, 835). Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of a professional meteorologist stating that, because of the precipitation overnight and the falling temperatures in the early morning, ice and black ice would have formed in the area of the accident between 8:30 A.M. and 8:45 A.M. We therefore conclude that plaintiff raised an issue of fact "whether the condition was visible and apparent and had existed for a sufficient length of time before plaintiff's accident to permit defendant[s] to discover and remedy it" ( Merrill v. Falleti Motors, 8 AD3d 1055, 1056; see Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837; see generally Hesson v. Coppola, 302 AD2d 857). Plaintiff abandoned her contention that defendants had actual notice of the dangerous condition by failing to include that contention in her brief ( see Ciesinski v. Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984).

However, after he fell, plaintiff observed water dripping off the roof and freezing on the patio's floor. Lacking any climatological data, it can be inferred that the icy condition most likely began to form in the late morning/early afternoon of March 22, 1993 and was ongoing at the time of plaintiff's fall. Under such circumstances, defendant clearly did not have a reasonable opportunity to remedy the situation (see, Lee v. Equitable Life Assur. Socy., 237 A.D.2d 835). Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant had actual notice of the icy condition; nor did defendant have constructive notice since that required a showing that the icy condition existed for a sufficient length of time before the accident to enable defendant to remedy it (see, Hamilton v. Rite Aid Pharmacies, 234 A.D.2d 778; Jornov v. Ace Suzuki Sales Serv., 232 A.D.2d 855; Gernard v. Agosti, 228 A.D.2d 994). We note that defendant's general awareness that snow melt from the roof dripped onto the patio floor and froze does not constitute notice (see, Piacquadio v. Recine Realty Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 967, 969).

Supreme Court denied the motion and defendant appeals. We affirm. "[W]e have recognized that when `weather conditions cause property to become dangerous by reason of the accumulation of ice, the law affords the landowner a reasonable time after the cessation of the storm or temperature fluctuation which caused the hazardous condition to take corrective action'" (Lee v. Equitable Life Assur. Socy., 237 A.D.2d 835, quoting Downes v. Equitable Life Assur. Socy., 209 A.D.2d 769; see, Lopez v. Picotte Cos., 223 A.D.2d 823, 824). Based upon the record before us, we agree with Supreme Court that questions of fact exist as to whether defendant had notice of the icy condition of the parking lot and a reasonable time after the cessation of the storm to remedy this condition which preclude summary judgment. In support of its motion, defendant offered, inter alia, the deposition testimony of plaintiff, plaintiff's fiancé, certain nonparty witnesses as well as defendant's owner.