Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-3176 Section "R" (3).
May 12, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions for summary judgment, one from defendant Cytec Industries, Inc. and one from defendants Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union and PACE Local 4-447. Plaintiffs oppose the motions. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants' motions for summary judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs David Lee, Kevin Dugas, Wayne Carbo, Cesha Johnson and Christopher Victoriano are current employees of defendant Cytec, a chemical company, at its Fortier chemical plant in Westwego, Louisiana. Plaintiffs are also current members of defendant Local 4-447, an amalgamated local union chartered by defendant Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union.
Plaintiff Carmen Jackson and her claims were dismissed with prejudice on June 30, 2004.
Cytec's Fortier Plaint consists of five departments: Operation (a/k/a/ Production), Reliability (a/k/a Maintenance), Technical, Production Services, and Plant Services. Some departments are further divided into units. For example, the Ammonia Unit, also known as the Kellogg unit, was a division of the Operation department until it was closed in mid-2001.
When Cytec decided to close the Ammonia Unit, the June 22, 2001 version of the collective bargaining agreement between Cytec and the Union governed the rearranging of employees who were members of the Local 4-447 union. Article XVI of the CBA, "Seniority," states that "seniority is a principle of employment policy which gives preference to one employee over another, based on the length of continuous service in the Company at the Fortier Plant." (Joint Ex. A, at 34). The CBA provides that the principle of seniority applies in cases of lay-off, recall, promotion, demotion and transfer of employees. Id. When workers join Cytec, they are assigned a badge number. The lower the employee's badge number, the greater the employee's seniority. Article 16.1(1)(a) further provides that if Cytec eliminates a department or unit within a department, "employees from the department shall exercise their seniority rights as per Article XVIII." Id. That article, entitled "Lay-Off," provides for two types of lay-offs, temporary and permanent. ( Id. at 44). Any "reduction in the work force" that lasts longer than six months is governed by the procedure established for a permanent layoff in article 18.3. ( Id.). As operations are restored after a displacement, article 18.4 gives employees "recall rights," or the opportunity to return to "the department and/or unit from which they were displaced based on their plant seniority," before the vacancies are posted for bidding by employees under Article XVII of the CBA, entitled "Promotions." ( Id. at 45, 39). Because Cytec closed the Ammonia Unit permanently, it applied the procedure described in article 18.3 to reassign the workers from the Ammonia Unit, even though it did not actually lay off any workers. (Cytec's Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 5). Cytec and the Union analyzed and agreed on how workers would be displaced based on the workers' seniority and the applicable CBA provisions. In July of 2001, Cytec posted the final bumping sheet on bulletin boards at the Westwego facility. (Cytec Ex. 1, O'Brien Decl. at 5; Union Ex. 6, Eccles Dep. at 58-59).
The Grievance Procedure
The collective bargaining agreement between Cytec and the Union establishes a four-step grievance and arbitration procedure, which states that any "dispute as to the interpretation and application of specific provisions" or "charge of violation of specific provisions" of the CBA must be presented for resolution by the grievance procedure within ten days after its occurrence. (Joint Ex. A at 25). The employee initiates the process by presenting the grievance to the employee's supervisor within ten days after its occurrence. ( Id.). If the employee does not receive a satisfactory response, "the grievance shall be submitted" to the department manager or his representative within two days after the written reply is received in Step 1. ( Id. at 26). If the grievance is not settled, it is then presented to Cytec's Industrial Relations Manager, who meets with the Union Grievance Committee not less than once a month. ( Id.). If the grievance is not resolved at Step 3, it is waived unless it is referred to arbitration within ten days. ( Id.). Arbitration results in an award or decision that is final and binding on the parties. ( Id. at 28). If Cytec fails to comply with the time limits provided, "the grievance shall automatically progress to the next step in the grievance procedure excluding Step 4(a)," which is arbitration. ( Id. at 27).
The Effects of the Ammonia Unit Closing
As a result of the reassignment of employees after the closing of the Ammonia Unit, many employees, including the plaintiffs, were displaced or "bumped" from higher-paying to lower-paying jobs. The plaintiffs allege that these displacements were not carried out in accordance with the provisions of the CBA. Several of the plaintiffs also allege that, following their displacements, Cytec again breached the CBA by cutting their pay or denying their rights to be recalled to positions from which they were displaced when those positions were later vacated.
A. David Lee
1. Displacement
On July 7, 2001, David Lee, badge number 3079, was displaced by Oliver Gautreaux from his maintenance helper position in the Plant Services department, in which he earned $18.77/hour, to a melamine bagger position in the same department, earning $12.83/hour. (Joint Ex. C; Pls.' Ex. 28). Lee asserts that Cytec and the Union breached the CBA by displacing him from his maintenance helper position.
2. Events After Displacement
After Lee was displaced, a maintenance helper position was vacated, near the end of 2001. Based on his more senior badge number (3017), Jeffery Hart was recalled to the maintenance helper position, but he resigned in November of 2001, before he took the position. (Pls.' Ex. 12, Lee Dep. at 17). Cytec chose not to fill the vacant maintenance helper position, citing Article 1.6 of the CBA, under which the Company retains the right and responsibility to establish the number and types of jobs, and Article 17.1, under which the Company is authorized to determine the number of employees required in any job classification. (Cytec's Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 14, Joint Ex. A at 11, 39). Lee asserts that Cytec breached the CBA when it did not recall him to the maintenance helper position when Hart resigned in November of 2001.
3. Grievances Filed
a. #01-36
On December 18, 2001, Wade Guilbeau, the Chairman of the Cytec Group of Local 4-447, filed grievance #01-36, arguing that when Jeffrey Hart resigned, David Lee should have had recall rights to the job. (Pls.' Ex. 19 at 2). Grievance #01-36 was voted to arbitration in a union meeting that took place in November or December of 2002. After the meeting, however, Guilbeau told Lee that the grievance "was not [Lee's] case" and therefore would not benefit him. (Pls.' Ex. 12, Lee Dep. at 29-30). Instead, Guilbeau told Lee that the grievance would benefit Lee's more senior co-worker Derek Houston (3046), because Houston had bumped through the maintenance helper position "on paper" and therefore had recall rights to the position that trumped Lee's rights. ( Id. at 26-31).
b. #03-14
Lee's badge number, along with the badge numbers of Dugas, Carbo and Victoriano, was also included in grievance #03-14, filed on July 16, 2003 by Walter Eccles, the Union committeeman for the Plant Services department. Grievance #03-14 complains generally that Cytec failed to follow the CBA when it closed the Ammonia Unit and displaced the affected employees. (Pls.' Ex. 19 at 1). Eccles requested that the grievance bypass steps one and two, which involve consultation with supervisors and department managers, and go directly to step three, in which Union representatives set up a meeting with Cytec representatives to discuss the grievance. (Pls.' Ex. 6, Eccles Dep. at 35-41; Joint Ex. A. at 26). Cytec's Human Resources Director, David Schnake, agreed to the bypass (Pls.' Ex. 3, Schnake Dep. at 17-21), and the third-step meeting was scheduled for March 11, 2004. (Pls.' Ex. 9, Piot Dep. at 40-41). That meeting was not held, and Cytec has therefore not entered a written response to the grievance, but Schnake testified that Cytec told the Union that Cytec would consider the grievance to be untimely. (Pls.' Ex. 3, Schnake Dep. at 17-19, 24-26).
The grievance states: "The union charges the company in violation of articles 16.1, 18.3 and any other articles not properly followed with the closure of NH3 plant. The union charges the company with violation of seniority in placement of the following employees and any others found in a review," and lists several employees' badge numbers, including those of Dugas, Lee, Carbo and Victoriano.
B. Kevin Dugas
1. Displacement
On February 24, 2003, Kevin Dugas, badge number 3052, was displaced from his position as an AMEL operator earning $25.00 per hour to a melamine bagger position earning $13.83 per hour. (Pls.' Ex. 13, Dugas Dep. at 8-9). Dugas contends that he should not have been bumped to the melamine bagger job, but rather to either a warehouseperson 209 or warehouseperson 210 position because he had more seniority than the people who held those jobs. ( Id. at 11-12). The workers he identifies were all displaced to positions as operations specialists or baggers by workers who had more seniority than Dugas. (Joint Exs. B and C).
2. Events After Displacement
Dugas does not allege any breaches of the CBA after his displacement.
3. Grievances Filed
Dugas filed grievance #03-05 on March 10, 2003. (Pls.' Ex. 13, Dugas Dep. at 29). Dugas' grievance charges Cytec with violating the CBA with respect to his displacement and alleges that Cytec gave "less senior workers preference to higher paying jobs than him." (Pls.' Ex. 16, Dugas Decl. at 5). Dugas submitted the grievance to his foreman, Ronnie Bordelon, who denied it the next day, noting "following the contract." ( Id. at 4). Dugas testified that "nothing happened" with respect to his grievance after that, although when Dugas inquired, Eccles told him that he was "working on it." (Pls.' Ex. 13, Dugas Dep. at 15-16, 22-23; Pls.' Ex. 16, Dugas Decl. at 2).
C. Wayne Carbo
1. Displacement
On September 3, 2002, Wayne Carbo, badge number 3080, was displaced from his position as an Acrylo operator IV in the Operations department, earning $25 per hour, to a melamine bagger position in the Plant Services department, earning $13.83 per hour. (Pls.' Ex. 39). Carbo, like Dugas, contends that he should not have been bumped to the melamine bagger job, but rather to either a warehouseperson 209 or warehouseperson 210 position because he had more seniority than several of the people who held those jobs. (Pls.' Ex. 14, Carbo Dep. at 13-14, 89-90).
2. Events After Displacement
Carbo contends that a month and a half or two months after he started working in the bagging room on September 3, 2002, he noticed that other baggers' time cards reflected that they were making more money than he was. ( Id. at 30-33). Carbo argues that this discrimination in pay was a violation of the CBA.
3. Grievances Filed
On November 6, 2002, Carbo filed grievance #02-26 complaining of "discrimination" under "article 1.8." (Cytec's Ex. 2F). Carbo testified that this grievance concerned his pay compared to the pay of other workers who were bumped. (Pls.' Ex. 14, Carbo Dep. at 42-43). On November 15, 2002, Bordelon wrote "None" in the space marked "Decision by Foreman" on Carbo's grievance. ( Id. at 4). Carbo did not pursue the grievance.
Article 1.8 prohibits discrimination among employees "due to race, color, creed, age, sex, sexual orientation, religion, or national origin." (Joint Ex. A).
D. Cesha Johnson
1. Displacement
Cesha Johnson, badge number 3123, was awarded a position as a maintenance helper, earning $18.14 per hour, in September of 2000. (Pls.' Ex. 29; Pls.' Ex. 11, Johnson Dep. at 7-9, 12-14). Although she was paid the hourly rate for a maintenance helper, she worked as a melamine bagger because Cytec had a shortage of baggers. ( See Cytec's Ex. 2L; Pls.' Ex. 11, Johnson Dep. at 12-14). On December 9, 2002, Johnson was displaced from the maintenance helper position that she held on paper, and her pay was reduced to that of a melamine bagger, $13.83 per hour. (Pls.' Ex. 29 at 2). Johnson alleges that Cytec breached the CBA by displacing her from her maintenance helper position and cutting her pay, because the CBA states that employees who are displaced but remain in their departments retain their rate of pay. (Pls.' Ex. 11, Johnson Dep. at 15-19, 37).
Article 18.3(1) of the CBA states that "[e]mployees who remain in their department shall retain their rate of pay and shall continue to progress through their progression rate." (Joint Ex. A at 45). Cytec interprets this provision to apply only to progression jobs and notes that Johnson was displaced from a non-progression job (maintenance helper) to another non-progression job (melamine bagger) in a department (plant services) that has no progression jobs or progression rates. (Cytec. Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 26).
2. Events After Displacement
Johnson also alleges that she should have had recall rights to the maintenance helper job at the end of 2003, but that Derek Houston received recall rights to the position instead. ( Id. at 18-23).
3. Grievances Filed
a. #02-33 and #02-34
On December 18, 2002, Johnson filed two grievances. Grievance #02-33 complains that she "should have maintained her pay as a M. Helper since both jobs are in the same department as agreed upon in the contract." (Pls.' Ex. 18, Johnson Decl. at 3). Grievance #02-34 complains that Johnson was improperly displaced from her maintenance helper position on December 9, 2002. ( Id. at 4; Pls.' Ex. 11, Johnson Dep. at 21). Neither of these grievances has been heard in a step-three meeting. (Pls.' Ex. 11, Johnson Dep. at 30-31).
Grievance #02-34 also alleges generally that Johnson and others were denied recall rights when their old jobs became available, but it is unclear exactly what recall rights Johnson alleges she should have had at the end of 2002, immediately after she was displaced. When Johnson was asked about grievance #02-34 at her deposition, she testified that it related to her pay cut, but she did not mention recall rights. (Pls.' Ex. 11, Johnson Dep. at 15, 21). It appears that Johnson had no reason to complain about recall rights until the end of 2003, when a maintenance helper position was vacated and filled by Derek Houston. ( Id. at 25). As discussed infra, however, Victoriano relies on grievance #02-34 to assert that his recall rights claim was grieved.
b. #04-02
Johnson filed another grievance on January 13, 2004. Grievance #04-02 complained that Houston was wrongfully given recall rights to a maintenance helper position on January 3, 2004. (Pls.' Ex. 18, Johnson Decl. at 5; Pls.' Ex. 11, Johnson Dep. at 22-25; Cytec Ex. 2C).
E. Christopher Victoriano
1. Displacement
On October 15, 2002, Christopher Victoriano, badge number 3086, was displaced from his position as warehouseperson 210 earning $19.60 per hour, to a melamine bagger position earning $13.83 per hour, by Amy Tamplain, badge number 3011. (Pls.' Ex. 38; Joint Ex. B).
2. Events After Displacement
On December 3, 2002, Victoriano received a written recall to warehouse 209, and his pay was adjusted to that of a warehouseperson. (Pls.' Ex. 15, Victoriano Decl. at 1; Pls.' Ex. 38). After a week, Victoriano was told that he did not in fact have recall rights to the position in warehouse 209, but rather to the position in warehouse 210 where he had previously worked. (Pls.' Ex. 15, Victoriano Decl. at 1; Pls.' Ex. 11, Victoriano Dep. at 34-35). Accordingly, he was replaced in the bagger position. ( Id.). Nevertheless, Victoriano retained warehouseperson pay until his pay was cut to that of a bagger on March 6, 2003. (Pls.' Ex. 15, Victoriano Decl. at 3; Pls.' Ex. 38). Victoriano alleges that Cytec breached the CBA by displacing him, not recalling him to a warehouse position, and cutting his pay.
3. Grievances Filed
Victoriano did not file a grievance with respect to any of his claims. (Pls.' Ex. 10, Victoriano Dep. at 8-9). Nevertheless, he asserts that his recall rights claim is covered by grievance #02-34, filed by Johnson on December 18, 2002, that his pay cut claim is covered by grievance #02-13, filed by Tamplain sometime between August 5 and November 6, 2002, and that both claims are covered by grievance #03-14, filed by Eccles on July 16, 2003. Victoriano testified that when he complained about his displacement and pay cut in March of 2003, Union officials advised him that grievance #02-13 made the same complaints, and that if it were successful, everyone with the same complaint would benefit. ( Id.; Pls.' Ex. 21). Cytec denied grievance #02-13 in a step-three meeting on November 6, 2002. (Pls.' Ex. 21 at 2). According to the Union, on December 12, 2002, the membership voted to arbitrate Tamplain's grievance, but no arbitration has yet occurred. (Unions' Mem. in Support of Mot. Summ. J. at 24; Pls.' Ex. 4, Guilbeau Dep. at 102).
The Litigation
On November 12, 2003, and by amended complaint filed on March 25, 2004, plaintiffs sued Cytec, Local 4-447 and PACE International. Plaintiffs allege that Cytec breached the CBA and the Union breached its duty of fair representation when they agreed to the displacements in the bumping protocol and with respect to actions taken regarding plaintiffs' recall rights and pay after they were displaced. Plaintiffs seek an injunction restoring plaintiffs to their allegedly rightful positions and seniority, back pay, damages for mental anguish, and punitive damages.
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. Both defendants assert that plaintiffs' suit is a "hybrid" section 301 breach of contract and fair representation action that is subject to a six-month statute of limitations that bars plaintiffs' claims as untimely. Cytec argues that even if plaintiffs' claims are not time-barred, plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue as to whether Cytec breached the CBA. The Union further argues that even if plaintiffs' claim are not time-barred, plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue as to whether it breached its duty of fair representation by taking arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith action.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) ( citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs' claims that Cytec breached the CBA arise under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, which authorizes suits in federal court "for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The suit against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation is implied under the scheme of the NLRA. Daigle v. Gulf State Util. Co., 794 F.2d 974, 977 (5th Cir. 1986). Because plaintiffs have sued Cytec for a breach of the collective bargaining agreement and have sued the labor organization that represents them for breaching its duty of fair representation, plaintiffs have brought a "hybrid section 301/duty of fair representation" action. See Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1990).
In a typical "hybrid" action, an employee sues his employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and sues his union for breaching its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee's grievance regarding the employer's breach of the agreement. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). Ordinarily, if a collective bargaining agreement provides a final and binding procedure for resolving disputes relating to the agreement, a plaintiff is bound by the terms of the agreement and "must at least attempt to exhaust" those procedures. Id. at 184. The plaintiff's failure to exhaust the exclusive remedies provided by the collective bargaining agreement before seeking judicial remedies may be excused if "the union has sole power under the contract to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure, and if . . . the employee-plaintiff has been prevented from exhausting his contractual remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to process the grievance." Id. at 185. In that case, the plaintiff may sue his employer despite his failure to exhaust his contractual remedies, provided that he can prove that the union breached its duty of fair representation in handling his grievance. Id. at 186. Because an employee is ordinarily required to exhaust the grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement and is excused from doing so only if the union has breached its duty of fair representation by wrongfully refusing to process his grievance, the action against the employer and the action against the union are "inextricably interdependent." DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983). The Fifth Circuit explained this concept, as follows:
The interdependency arises from the nature of the collective bargaining agreement. If the arbitration and grievance procedure is the exclusive and final remedy for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, the employee may not sue his employer under § 301 until he has exhausted the [grievance] procedure.Daigle, 794 F.2d at 977. (citations omitted). Therefore, if the collective bargaining agreement states that the grievance procedure is an employee's exclusive remedy, the employee must prove that his union breached its duty of fair representation in order to maintain a section 301 claim against his employer. See id.
In other cases, a hybrid action arises from a joint action by the employer and the union. See Landry, 901 F.2d at 410-411. "In this type of hybrid suit, the alleged breaches by the employer and the union may occur at the same time, as opposed to the sequential breaches seen in a more typical hybrid action." Herrera v. Int'l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of America, 858 F. Supp. 1529, 1538 (D. Kan. 1994). For example, an employee may allege that the union breached its duty to represent him fairly during the negotiation of an agreement that affects the employee's rights. Id.
"Hybrid" claims are subject to a six-month statute of limitations. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169. The Fifth Circuit has held that the six-month limitations period applies to claims that allege an employer's breach of the collective bargaining agreement and a union's breach of the duty of fair representation, even when the union's alleged breach is not related to the grievance or arbitration procedure provided by the collective bargaining agreement. See Barrow v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 10 F.3d 292, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying six-month limitations period to claim that employer breached CBA and union breached duty of fair representation by not timely filling all positions); Barrow v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 932 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying six-month limitations period to claim that employer breached the CBA and union breached its duty of fair representation by agreeing to adopt a new seniority system); see also Landry, 901 F.2d at 411-12 (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the six-month limitations period does not apply to claims that arise from the process of contract negotiation). Thus, regardless of the particular breach of the duty of fair representation that is alleged against the union in conjunction with the breach of the collective bargaining agreement alleged against the employer, a "hybrid" claim is subject to a six-month statute of limitations.
The limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts that form the basis of the duty of fair representation claim. See Barrow, 10 F.3d at 300; Hebert v. Gen. Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 270, No. Civ.A. 03-1744, 2004 WL 1597144, at *5 (E.D. La. July 16, 2004). The period begins "when the plaintiff either knew or should have known of the injury itself, i.e., the breach of duty of fair representation, rather than of its manifestations." Barrett v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 868 F.2d 170, 171 (5th Cir. 1989).
Here, plaintiffs' complaints arise from two different alleged breaches of the CBA by Cytec, each requiring a separate timeliness analysis. First, plaintiffs allege that Cytec breached the seniority provisions of the CBA and impaired their seniority rights when it determined how plaintiffs would be displaced after the Ammonia Unit closed and that, in connection with Cytec's breach, the Union breached its duty to represent them fairly when it agreed to that arrangement. Second, four of the plaintiffs allege that Cytec breached the CBA after the displacements occurred, when Cytec placed them in improper pay classifications and denied their rights to be recalled to their former positions. In connection with these alleged breaches by Cytec, plaintiffs contend that the Union breached its duty to represent them fairly during the grievance process.
A. Plaintiffs' Claims Challenging their Displacements
Plaintiffs first allege that their displacements after the closing of the Ammonia Unit violated the seniority provisions of the CBA and that the Union breached its duty to represent them fairly by agreeing to the arrangement. Defendants contend that plaintiffs' claims are time-barred because plaintiffs' claims accrued when Cytec and the Union adopted the displacement protocol and notified employees in July of 2001 that they would be displaced to lower-paying positions.
The Court finds that the limitations period on plaintiffs' cause of action regarding their displacements began to run in July of 2001, because that is when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the acts that form the basis of their claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. See Barrow, 932 F.2d at 480. Eileen O'Brien, Cytec's Human Resources Manager at the Westwego facility at that time, attests that Cytec posted the final bumping sheet on bulletin boards at the Westwego facility in July of 2001. (Cytec Ex. 1, O'Brien Decl. at 5). That final bumping sheet identifies each of the plaintiffs by name and indicates that each of them would be negatively impacted because they would be displaced into a lower-paying position. (Joint Ex. C). O'Brien attests not only that the bumping sheet was posted in July of 2001, but also that it was the employees' responsibility to check the bulletin boards for postings and to review those postings. (Cytec's Ex. 1, O'Brien Decl. at 6). Although plaintiffs rely on their own inability to recall seeing the sheet to contend that "the evidence is not clear that a July 16, 2001 bump sheet was posted in every unit of Cytec," plaintiffs have not produced any evidence that raises a genuine issue as to whether the sheets were in fact posted. ( See Pls.' Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 14). Indeed, Carbo admitted that he saw a bump sheet posted within three months after July of 2001 ( see Pls.' Ex. 14, Carbo Dep. at 104:1-6). Further, Eccles testified that the information was posted and that he saw it on the bulletin board at the main gate. (Union Ex. 6, Eccles Dep. at 58-59). Considering O'Brien's and Eccles' unrefuted testimony that the bump sheet was posted and that it was the employees' responsibility to check for postings, no genuine issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiffs knew or should have known in July of 2001 of the facts underlying their claim that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by agreeing to an arrangement that violates the seniority provisions of the CBA.
Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations did not being running until each of them was actually displaced from his or her position. The court in Smith v. St. Regis Corp., 850 F. Supp. 1296, 1309-10 (S.D. Miss. 1994), rejected a similar argument made by plaintiffs who contended that the statute of limitations on their cause of action should not begin to run until they were actually terminated pursuant to a notice of termination that was posted on the company's bulletin boards several days earlier. Relying on Fifth Circuit precedent, the court concluded that the statute of limitations began to run on the day notice of the terminations was posted, even if the actual termination occurred later, because that was when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the defendants' acts that formed the basis of their hybrid section 301/duty of fair representation claims. Id. Here, plaintiffs should have known of the acts that form the basis of their cause of action in July of 2001 when they discovered that the Union had agreed to the displacement protocol, regardless of when the effects of the protocol actually occurred. See Barrow, 932 F.2d at 480 (holding that limitations period began to run when plaintiff knew that a new seniority system would have a discriminatory effect on him); see also Hebert, 2004 WL 1597144, at *7-8 (rejecting plaintiffs' theory that subsequent applications of an allegedly illegally adopted non-seniority based referral procedure constituted a continuing violation that made duty of fair representation claim timely and finding instead that the claimed breach was complete and the limitations period began to run when the system was adopted).
Although plaintiffs also argue that events during the implementation phase could have changed the announced displacements, there is no evidence that they were told at the time that the announced displacements were tentative or that they were not adversely impacted as indicated in the announcement. Further, the Fifth Circuit has held that once plaintiffs learn of facts that would cause a reasonable person to inquire further, they have an affirmative duty to diligently investigate and are charged with knowledge of all facts such an investigation would have disclosed. Landry, 901 F.2d at 412-13. Under this inquiry notice standard, plaintiffs knew or should have known about the act that they allege was unlawful, namely, that the Union agreed to the challenged displacement protocol in violation of the CBA, in July of 2001, when the company posted the bumping sheets that told them they would be displaced. Because plaintiffs at that point knew or should have known of the facts that form the basis for their claim that the Union breached its duty to fairly represent them, but did not bring this suit until over two years later, on November 12, 2003, their hybrid claim that Cytec breached the CBA and the Union breached its duty of fair representation by providing for their displacements is untimely.
The Court notes that some courts have held that the limitations period on this type of hybrid claim, in which the alleged breach of a union's duty arises in a nongrievance context, may be tolled if a plaintiff files a grievance related to the breach within six months of learning of the breach. See Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1509-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Adkins v. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, 769 F.2d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that "there was no accrual of the claim for purposes of the limitation period so long as plaintiffs were making a valid, timely, and nonfrivolous attempt to pursue their contractual remedies in reasonable good faith"); Herrera, 858 F. Supp. at 1540. In that case, if the plaintiff diligently pursues the grievance through the grievance procedures and makes a good faith attempt to exhaust contractual remedies, the claim does not accrue until the grievance is either procedurally exhausted, or the plaintiff knows or should have known that the union abandoned the grievance or that the procedure otherwise broke down to the employee's disadvantage. See Galindo, 793 F.2d 1510 n. 3; Adkins, 769 F.2d at 336; see Herrera, 858 F. Supp. at 1540-41.
The Court finds this tolling analysis inapplicable to plaintiffs' displacement claims. This follows because plaintiffs did not grieve their displacements within six months of when those claims accrued in July of 2001. Although Guilbeau filed grievance #01-36 on December 18, 2001, purportedly on behalf of David Lee, that grievance related to Lee's recall rights claim, and did not grieve his displacement. The record does not reveal any other grievance relating to plaintiffs' displacements in the six months following July of 2001. Because plaintiffs did not file any grievances relating to their displacements within six months of July 2001, when they knew or should have known that the Union had allegedly breached its duty of fair representation by agreeing to the displacement protocol, and did not file this lawsuit until November of 2003, their hybrid claims regarding their displacements are untimely.
B. Plaintiffs' Claims Challenging Events After Their Displacements
Four of the plaintiffs allege that Cytec committed additional breaches of the CBA, after plaintiffs were displaced, by denying them the right to be recalled to their positions and by placing them in improper pay classifications. David Lee challenges Cytec's failure to recall him to his maintenance helper position when the position was vacated in November of 2001, a claim that Guilbeau grieved on December 18, 2001 in grievance #01-36. Cesha Johnson challenges Cytec's failure to recall her to a maintenance helper position at the end of 2003, which she grieved on January 13, 2004 in grievance #04-02. Wayne Carbo alleges that he received a different amount of pay for melamine bagger work than others who did the same work, which he allegedly noticed in November of 2002 and grieved on November 6, 2002 in grievance #02-26. Finally, Christopher Victoriano challenges his December 2002 replacement in the bagging room after he was told that his recall to warehouse 209 from the bagging room was a mistake, and his corresponding pay cut, which occurred in March of 2003. Victoriano alleges that his recall rights claim is covered by grievance #02-34, filed by Johnson on December 18, 2002, that his pay cut claim is covered by grievance #02-13, filed sometime between August 5 and November 6, 2002, and that both claims are covered by grievance #03-14, filed by Eccles on July 16, 2003.
1. Timeliness
These claims fall into the more typical category of hybrid claims that allege a breach of the CBA by the employer and a breach of the Union's duty of fair representation during the grievance process. The six-month statute of limitations on these hybrid claims accrued when plaintiffs had actual or imputed knowledge that the Union breached its duty to represent them fairly during the grievance procedure. See Barrett, 868 F.2d at 171. A plaintiff may be charged with knowledge of this type of breach of the duty of fair representation when the union notifies him of its decision not to file or pursue a grievance on his behalf. See Daigle, 794 F.2d at 978. Plaintiffs filed this suit on November 12, 2003. For plaintiffs' recall rights and pay claims to be timely, plaintiffs must not have known about the Union's breach of its duty of fair representation any earlier than May 12, 2003.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed because plaintiffs' grievances were not filed within the ten days provided in the CBA. Although this objection may constitute a reason to deny the grievance within the grievance process, the timeliness of a grievance under the CBA appears to have no bearing on the timeliness of plaintiffs' statutory hybrid section 301/duty of fair representation claim. For example, one court has stated that "[a]ny argument that the contractual limitations period should be tolled . . . is one for the arbitrator to decide, for once it is decided that the dispute is covered by the arbitration agreement, procedural questions are for the arbitrator." See Dlugach v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 501 F. Supp. 171, 174 (E.D. Tex. 1980); see also Whittle v. Local 641, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of American, AFL-CIO, 56 F.3d 487, 490 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Timeliness is a procedural issue and in an arbitration proceeding, procedural issues are for the arbitrator to decide . . . Appellant's delay in filing their arbitration, while a matter of legitimate concern before the arbitrator, simply has no bearing on whether they timely filed the § 301 suit.").
a. David Lee
Lee alleges that he should have been recalled to a maintenance helper position in November of 2001. On December 18, 2001, Guilbeau filed grievance #01-36, purportedly on Lee's behalf. After a meeting in November or December of 2002, however, Guilbeau told Lee that the grievance "was not [Lee's] case" and therefore would not benefit him. ( See Pls.' Ex. 12, Lee Dep. at 29-30). Based on this evidence, the Court finds that by December of 2002 at the latest, Lee knew or should have known that the Union was not pursuing a grievance on his recall rights claim. Accordingly, Lee's fair representation claim accrued at that time and the statute of limitations expired six months later, by the end of June, 2003 at the latest. Because Lee did not file suit until November 12, 2003, the statute of limitations expired, and Lee's hybrid claim regarding his recall rights is untimely.
Lee would like to rely on grievance #03-14, the grievance Walter Eccles filed on behalf of several employees, including Lee. (Pls.' Ex. 19). Assuming that a grievance filed within six months after Lee first knew about the Union's breach would toll the statute of limitations, grievance #03-14 was filed on July 16, 2003, more than six months after Lee's duty of fair representation claim arose. ( Id.).
b. Cesha Johnson
Johnson alleges that she should have been recalled to a maintenance helper position at the end of 2003. Johnson grieved the issue in grievance #04-02 on January 13, 2004. This grievance was filed after Johnson filed this lawsuit on November 12, 2003, but it was added to the suit by amended complaint on March 25, 2004. There is no indication that the Union told Johnson that it would not process this grievance or that she had any other reason to know that the Union had allegedly breached its duty of fair representation with respect to the grievance. Accordingly, the Court will consider Johnson's hybrid claim regarding her recall rights to be timely.
C. Wayne Carbo
Carbo allegedly noticed that he was earning less pay than others doing the same work in November of 2002. Carbo filed a grievance on this issue on November 6, 2002. On November 15, 2002, however, Bordelon, Carbo's foreman, wrote "None" in the space marked "Decision by Foreman" on Carbo's grievance. (Pls.' Ex. 17, Carbo Decl. at 4). Carbo did not pursue the grievance, and it does not appear that any other action has been taken on the grievance. The Union asserts that Carbo was a self-represented grievant and that the Union does not participate in self-represented grievances until step three of the grievance process. ( See Unions' Ex. 5, Guilbeau Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 7; see also Pls.' Ex. 4, Guilbeau Dep. at 164-65 (testifying that Carbo processed his grievance himself and would have to provide Guilbeau with a copy to proceed to step three of the grievance process)). Carbo has produced no evidence to rebut the Union's assertions, nor has he produced any evidence to show that his grievance has reached step three. Once Carbo received a written denial of his grievance at step one of the process, as a self-represented grievant, Carbo knew or should have known that the Union would not take any further action on his grievance without some action on his part. Because Carbo did not file suit or take any other action on his grievance within six months of November 2002, when he received notice that his grievance was denied, his pay discrimination claim is untimely.
To the extent that Carbo attempts to rely on grievance #03-14, his reliance fails for the same reason as Lee's, see supra, n. 7, because the grievance was filed more than six months after Carbo's duty of fair representation claim arose.
d. Christopher Victoriano
Victoriano alleges that he was denied his recall rights a week after he was recalled to a warehouse position on December 3, 2002, when he was replaced in the bagger room, and that his pay was improperly cut in March of 2003. Victoriano did not file a grievance on these issues, allegedly because the Union told him that he was covered by a grievance filed by another employee sometime between August 5 and November 6, 2002, and he relied in good faith on that representation. (Pls.' Ex. 10, Victoriano Dep. at 8-9). The Union itself states that if it prevails at arbitration on that grievance, Victoriano may benefit from the remedy. (Union's Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 24). Victoriano also testified that he continued to speak to Union representatives about his situation until shortly after he retained counsel to file this lawsuit. ( Id. at 23-24). In cases in which a union may have lulled a plaintiff into not filing a timely grievance by leading the plaintiff to believe that relief might be forthcoming, courts have found that equitable tolling principles should apply. See Hill v. Georgia Power Co., 786 F.2d 1071, 1075-77 (11th Cir. 1986) (collecting authorities). In this case, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Union lulled Victoriano into inaction, which precludes summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss as untimely Victoriano's claims as to his recall rights and his pay.
2. The Union's Duty of Fair Representation in the Grievance Procedure
The Court now considers the merits of Johnson's and Victoriano's hybrid claims. Because Johnson and Victoriano must show that the Union breached its duty of fair representation to succeed on their hybrid claims, the Court proceeds to examine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Union breached its duty to represent plaintiffs fairly in the grievance process.
a. Scope of the Duty of Fair Representation
The duty of fair representation requires union officials to represent all employee members fairly in the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177. The union is required to "serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Id.; see Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 76 (1991). The fair representation requirement stands "as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law." Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182.
A union nevertheless retains considerable discretion in processing the grievance claims of its members. See Landry v. T. Smith Stevedoring, Inc., 880 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir. 1989). Thus, "a breach of the duty of fair representation occurs `only when the union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.'" Id. at 852 (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190). A union's actions are arbitrary "only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational." O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 78. Thus, "any substantive examination of a union's performance must be highly deferential." Williams v. Simmons Co., 185 F. Supp. 2d 665, 678 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (citing O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 78). In order to succeed on their claims against Cytec and the Union, Johnson and Victoriano must show that the Union's representation of their grievances was not simply less than satisfactory; they are required to prove that the Union's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190; Landry, 880 F.2d at 852.
b. The Union's Representation of Plaintiffs' Grievances
The Court addresses plaintiffs' three remaining hybrid claims; Johnson's recall rights claim, for which she filed grievance #04-02 on January 13, 2004; Victoriano's recall rights claim, which he asserts is covered by grievance #02-34, filed on December 18, 2002; and his pay claim, which he asserts is covered by grievance #02-13, filed sometime between August 5 and November 6, 2002. Victoriano also alleges that his claims about his recall rights and his pay are covered by grievance #03-14, filed on July 16, 2003. Grievances #04-02 and #02-34 have not been heard in a step-three meeting. (Pls.' Ex. 11, Johnson Dep. at 30-31). Cytec denied grievance #02-13 in a step-three grievance meeting on November 6, 2002. (Pls.' Ex. 21 at 2). According to the Union, on December 12, 2002, the membership voted to arbitrate the grievance, but no arbitration has yet occurred. (Unions' Mem. in Support of Mot. Summ. J. at 24; Pls.' Ex. 4, Guilbeau Dep. at 102). Finally, grievance #03-14 was scheduled for a third-step meeting on March 11, 2004, but the meeting was cancelled. (Pls.' Ex. 9, Piot Dep. at 40-41). Cytec has indicated to the Union that Cytec would consider grievance #03-14 to be untimely. (Pls.' Ex. 3, Schnake Dep. at 17-19, 24-26).
Plaintiffs allege that the Union delayed processing their grievances and, in doing so, breached the duty to represent them fairly. The Court finds that plaintiffs have raised no genuine issues of material fact that the Union failed to act within the wide range of reasonableness such that its conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. Plaintiffs' general allegations that the Union breached its duty of fair representation with respect to these grievances by failing to set them for third step meetings or by other "continued inaction" do not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Union has breached its duty. (Pls.' Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 18). Grievance #04-02, filed on January 13, 2004, was active for only three months before it was added to this lawsuit by amended complaint. Similarly, grievance #03-14, filed in July of 2003, was active less than a year and a half before plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. Guilbeau attests that non-discharge grievances commonly take over a year to work their way through the grievance process. (Unions' Ex. 5, Guilbeau Decl. at ¶ 9). He also testified that many grievances filed in 2002 and 2003, when grievances #02-13 and #02-34 were filed, are still awaiting arbitration because the membership has decided that cases involving the discharge of employees have scheduling priority over non-discharge cases. (Pls.' Ex. 4, Guilbeau Dep. at 242-244; Unions' Ex. 5, Guilbeau Decl. at ¶ 8-10 (stating that discharge grievances are higher priority, that non-discharge grievances commonly take over a year to be put to a vote of the membership, and that grievances may not be arbitrated for a year or more after being voted to arbitration)). Johnson and Victoriano have produced no evidence that the Union has arbitrarily taken more time to process their grievances or to rebut the Union's assertion that such a delay is common. This conclusion is sufficient to reject Johnson and Victoriano's argument that any delay in processing these grievances is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
Plaintiffs assert that Wade Guilbeau is responsible for setting up a third-step meeting to discuss a grievance with Cytec. (Pls.' Ex. 6, Eccles Dep. at 42-43). There was conflicting testimony on this point. Eccles testified that Guilbeau is responsible for setting up the third-step meeting, while Guilbeau and John Piot, the grievance committeeman, testified that Piot is responsible for setting up the third-step meeting. (Pls.' Ex. 4, Guilbeau Dep. at 76; Pls.' Ex. 9, Piot Dep. at 8-9).
Johnson specifically contends that the Union has discriminated against the grievances she filed, including #02-34 and #04-02, because, of the 12 grievances she has filed since December 2002, four of them have been settled, while the four relating to her displacement and her recall rights claim are still pending. (Pls.' Ex. 18, Johnson Decl. at 1-2). The Court finds that Johnson's argument fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Union's actions are outside the wide range of reasonableness accorded to a union's conduct. There is no specific evidence about the nature of Johnson's other grievances, their timing, or how the Union handled them from which a trier of fact could conclude that the Union is acting arbitrarily or with discriminatory animus. See Landry, 880 F.2d 846. The vague circumstances Johnson alleges, without more, fail to satisfy her summary judgment burden.
In short, Johnson and Victoriano simply point out that their grievances have not been fully processed. Evidence that grievances were lodged and were not taken to arbitration is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Union's actions were arbitrary. See Hebert, 2004 WL 1597144, at *14 (citing Bache v. American Tel. and Tel., 840 F.2d 283, 292 (5th Cir. 1988)). The situation here is different from that in Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., on which plaintiffs rely. 581 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1978). In that case, plaintiffs submitted evidence that indicated that their union arbitrarily ignored their meritorious grievances or failed to process the grievances without investigating and evaluating their merits. Id. at 295-96. The Union in this case, in contrast, despite its disagreement with the merits of plaintiffs' grievances, has taken steps to pursue the grievances and indicates that it will continue to do so. ( See Unions' Ex. 5, Guilbeau Decl. at ¶ 8). Even if the Union ultimately decides not to pursue plaintiffs' grievances because it rejects the contract interpretation on which they are based or believes the grievances have no merit for some other reason, the Union has not acted arbitrarily unless its interpretation is itself arbitrary, and plaintiffs have made no such showing. See Bache, 840 F.2d at 291; Landry, 880 F.2d at 853 (noting that "[a] union is not required to advocate a different interpretation preferred by some individual union members"); Williams, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 677 (refusing to infer a breach by a union for not pursuing a claim that arguably had no merit). Because Johnson and Victoriano have not provided evidence of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith action by the Union with respect to their grievances, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue as to whether the Union breached its duty of fair representation in handling those grievances.
Plaintiffs have also alleged that Guilbeau exhibited an arrogant attitude and failed to take action on their grievances because they challenge his interpretation of the contract. These general complaints about Guilbeau's attitude and inaction do not raise a genuine issue as to whether the Union discriminated specifically against Johnson's and Victoriano's grievances regarding their recall rights and pay. There is no evidence that Guilbeau singled out those grievances for discriminatory treatment or arbitrarily delayed processing them longer than other grievances. On the contrary, as noted above, the evidence is that it commonly takes several years to process non-discharge grievances like those at issue here. See discussion, supra at p. 36-37.
Plaintiffs also complain that Guilbeau failed to honor an undated request from a large percentage of Cytec employees for a meeting to discuss general issues such as "pay cuts, job transfers, job available, bidding." (Pls.' Ex. 22). The meeting request plaintiffs rely on does not accuse the Union of not pursuing employee grievances, nor does it even mention the four grievances that plaintiffs now allege the Union failed to pursue or the employees who filed them. Because the meeting request is not specific to a particular person or grievance, but reflects only the employees' desire to discuss employee complaints in general, it cannot serve as an indication of any arbitrary conduct or discriminatory animus toward the specific grievances at issue in this case. Plaintiffs have provided no other evidence that could connect Guilbeau's alleged refusal to honor the meeting request to Johnson and Victoriano's grievances. The general failure of a union official to meet with members is not sufficient to establish that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. See Landry, 880 F.2d at 853. Even if the Union's representation of plaintiff "was not perfect" and was "somewhat negligent," plaintiffs must, but have not, provided sufficient summary judgment evidence to show that it was also arbitrary or in bad faith. See Connally v. Transcon Lines, 583 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1978). Because there is no indication that the Union's actions are outside the wide range of reasonableness accorded to a union's conduct, plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim that the Union breached its duty of fair representation, and the Union is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim that it breached its duty to fairly represent them in the grievance procedure.
3. Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract Claim Against Cytec
Because establishing that the Union has breached its duty of fair representation is an "indispensable predicate" to a section 301 action against the employer, plaintiffs' complaint against Cytec for breaches of the CBA related to recall rights and improper pay claims are dismissed as well. See Barrett, 868 F.2d at 172.
C. Plaintiff's Claims Against the International Union
Plaintiffs also assert that the International Union is liable for the Union's alleged breach of its duty of fair representation because it was aware of and ratified the illegal conduct of its local chapter. (Pls.' Mem. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 19-20). All of plaintiffs' displacement claims and many of plaintiffs' post-displacement claims against the local chapter are untimely, and claims against the International Union are subject to and would be similarly barred by the six-month statute of limitations. The Court has also found that the local chapter of the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation with respect to any of plaintiffs' timely claims regarding their recall rights or pay classifications, so there is no breach that could be attributed to the International Union. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claims against the International Union are likewise dismissed.
D. State Law Claims
In their complaint, plaintiffs assert unspecified state law claims that are "incident to" their cause of action. Cytec moves for summary judgment dismissing any such claims on the ground that they are vague, inadequately pled and are preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Plaintiffs have not responded to this portion of Cytec's motion.
Section 301 of the LMRA preempts state law claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with the CBA or that hinge upon an interpretation of the agreement. McCall v. McQueen, 962 F. Supp. 890, 892 (E.D. La. 1997) (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407-10 (1988)). Here, plaintiffs' claims are premised on the propriety of actions taken by Cytec under the CBA and actions taken by the Union according to the grievance procedure established by the CBA. Because all of plaintiffs' claims hinge upon the terms and/or the interpretation of the CBA, the Court finds that they are preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment for defendants with respect to plaintiffs' state law claims.
E. The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
In their complaint, plaintiffs asserted that they were bringing a claim under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. Sections 101(a)(5) and 609 of the LMRDA make it unlawful for a union to "fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline" any of its members for exercising rights secured under the LMRDA. In Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, the Supreme Court held that "otherwise discipline" includes only punishment authorized by the union as a collective entity to enforce its rules. 493 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1989).
The Union moves for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims under the LMRDA because none of the actions plaintiffs complain of constitutes "discipline" under the LMRDA. Plaintiffs have not opposed this portion of the Union's motion and have not produced any evidence of actions by the Union that would violate the LMRDA. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment for defendants with respect to plaintiffs' claims under the LMRDA.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants' motions for summary judgment.