.Lee v. Ard , 785 F. App'x 247, 248 (5th Cir. 2019) ; see alsoThomas v. Pohlmann , 681 F. App'x 401, 407 (5th Cir. 2017) (claim not barred by Heck where plaintiffs alleged excessive force that occurred after they were taken into custody).Champagne v. Martin , No. 18-1785, 2019 WL 3430457, at *5 (E.D. La. 2019)

Thus, when the excessive force claim arises from “‘a single violent encounter' in which the plaintiff insists he was an innocent party,” Heck would apply to bar the claim. Lee v. Ard, 785 Fed.Appx. 247, 248 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bush, 513 F.3d at 498 and citing DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 656-57). However, the excessive force claim is not barred by Heck “if it is ‘temporally and conceptually distinct'” from the incidents leading to the criminal conviction.

Another reason further supports that Heck does not apply to the subsequent use of force allegations: those alleged uses of force are ‘temporally and conceptually distinct' from the conviction.” Lee v. Ard, 785 Fed.Appx. 247, 248 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Bush, 513 F.3d at 498); see, e.g., Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n inmate cannot bring a § 1983 claim for excessive use of force by a prison guard, if the inmate has already been found guilty for misconduct that justified that use of force. But Heck does not bar a § 1983 claim for a prison guard's excessive use of force after the inmate has submitted and ceased engaging in the alleged misconduct.”

Under Heck, a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 if that claim questions the validity of a criminal conviction unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction has been reversed or invalidated. Id.; Lee v. Ard, 785 F. App'x 247, 248-49 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. 477). Concerns of finality and consistency of judgments forbid collateral attack on criminal convictions by way of § 1983. Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 567, 208 L. Ed. 2d 183 (2020).