Opinion
Civil No. 9:97-CV-1741 (FJS/GLS)
September 24, 2003
FRANCIS T. MURRAY, Kingston, New York, for Defendants, Alfonso, Costello, and Kavanagh;
DAVID L. POSNER, ESQ., McCabe, Mack Law Firm, Poughkeepsie, New York, for Defendants, Turner, Dickson, Sheeley, Reynolds, and Short;
HON. ELIOT SPITZER, RISAL. VIGLUCCI, ESQ., Litigation Bureau, Albany, New York, for Defendant, Cunningham
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
On November 26, 1997, Calvin Lee filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to his most current amended complaint as supplemented by considerable judicial creativity in interpreting that complaint, he asserts a violation of his First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, he claims that his rights were violated when a private person, at the request of the police, burglarized his home. Moreover, this illegal search resulted in additional criminal charges which were ultimately dismissed and Lee's re-incarceration for nine years after his parole was revoked.
This incident has served as the central theme for this and three other lawsuits in this district. See Lee v. Donnaruma, 9:97CV00473, district court dismissal affirmed, 2003 WL 21105326 (2d Cir., May 15, 2003); Lee v. Easton, 6:97CV00530, district court dismissal affirmed by Second Circuit (Dkt. No. 13); and, Lee v. Goord, 9:99CV01196 (pending).
Following a long and sometimes torturous procedural history, all defendants except one — the private person, Barbara McClinton — have now filed either motions to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 40, 43, 56. McClinton was never served and the court has no jurisdiction over her. Lee has now responded to the motions. See Dkt. Nos. 61, 64. The motions have been referred to this court for report and recommendation by the Honorable Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., Chief District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.3(c).
The court recommends that the motions be granted and Lee's amended complaint be dismissed in its entirety for the following reasons: Lee has failed to serve McClinton; Lee's official capacity claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; Lee has failed to assert a cognizable claim against all served defendants; and, certain of the served defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
The court has taken some liberty in fashioning Lee's complaint because at times, it is incomprehensible.
On November 23, 1996, Ulster Detective John Dickson was called to the Ulster Police Department to interview Barbara McClinton, Melinda Ector and Shayan Jackson. McClinton, Ector and Jackson were involved in a fraudulent credit card scheme that had been uncovered by Marshall's Department Store security personnel. McClinton admitted her involvement in a scheme to make fraudulent credit cards purchases, and implicated Lee as the ringleader. Ector and Jackson made similar statements. As a result of their admissions, they were arrested and released on bail.
On November 24, 1996, Marshall's private security personnel warned McClinton that she was responsible for the cost of the fraudulently purchased merchandise or its return. As a result, McClinton burglarized Lee's home when she entered and retrieved the merchandise. While inside, McClinton observed weapons. She turned the stolen merchandise over to the Ulster Police Department, and then signed a second sworn statement indicating that she observed weapons in Lee's home. She was immediately arrested for her illegal activity at Lee's home.
On November 25, 1996, Detective Dickson interviewed Marshall's security personnel who related that they witnessed Lee purchase merchandise with a fraudulent credit card and forge a credit slip. Subsequently, the Division of Parole was notified and they issued a parole warrant for Lee's arrest. Detective Dickson also filed a complaint with Ulster Justice Court Judge Robert O'Sullivan charging Lee with forgery, criminal impersonation, petty larceny and conspiracy, and obtained an arrest warrant. Several law enforcement officers then executed the warrants, and arrested Lee.
At the time of Lee's arrest, Detective Dickson also executed a search warrant authorized by Judge O'Sullivan which permitted the search of Lee's home for handguns, ammunition and stolen property. The search revealed a Remington long rifle, a cross-bow, pistol and various merchandise.
Lee was served with a parole violation report containing eleven charges, three of which dealt with weapons possession. Lee commenced a habeas corpus proceeding to challenge his detention in the Ulster County Jail pursuant to the parole warrant. On March 19, 1997, Judge Mary O. Donohue dismissed the habeas corpus petition.
On April 24, 1997, an Ulster County Grand Jury charged Lee with forgery in the second degree and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. On April 28, Lee moved for dismissal on the ground that he was denied his right to testify before the Grand Jury. Assistant District Attorney Miranda consented to dismissal with leave to represent the indictment.
After a full parole hearing, Administrative Law Judge Bruce Van Dyke found Lee guilty of three weapons violations and five violations relating to the credit card scheme, and recommended incarceration. The witnesses included Marshall's security personnel, McClinton, Ector, Jackson, Detective Dickson and Officer Reynolds. On May 12, 1997, the New York State Parole Board affirmed the ALJ's recommendation and returned Lee to prison for nine years.
Because Lee was sentenced to a longer prison sentence on his parole revocation than the maximum possible for the state charges, the District Attorney decided not to re-present the case to the Grand Jury. Thereafter, McClinton, Ector and Jackson pled guilty to disorderly conduct in satisfaction of all charges that had been brought against them. Lee challenged his parole revocation hearing, and his challenge was dismissed on November 18, 1997.
III. Discussion A. Legal Standard
In this case, defendants Alfonso, Costello, Kavanagh and State Trooper Cunningham filed motions to dismiss. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a cause of action shall be dismissed if a complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In other words, the court should dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the complaint which would entitle him to relief." Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999). "The task of the court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 'is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'" Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)). Therefore, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, a "court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor." Phelps, 308 F.3d at 184 (quoting Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994)).
The court "must confine its consideration 'to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.'" Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). "Moreover, 'when a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or incorporate by reference a [document] upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint,' the court may nevertheless take the document into consideration in deciding the defendant's motion to dismiss, without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (1995) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
On the other hand, defendants Dickson, Reynolds, Sheeley, Short, and Turner filed a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); accord F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . . an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2000). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]" Rexford Holdings, Inc. v. Biderman, 21 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). However, it is well settled that on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir. 1999).
Furthermore, in a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to "formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) (a court is to read a pro se party's "supporting papers liberally, and . . . interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest"). Indeed, the Second Circuit has stated that "[i]mplicit in the right to self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). Any ambiguities and inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Thompson v. Gjivoje, 896 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1990); see LaFond v. General Physics Serv. Corp., 50 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 1995).
This liberal standard, however, does not excuse a pro se litigant from following the procedural formalities of summary judgment. Showers v. Eastmond, OO-CV-3725, 2001 WL 527484, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2001). More specifically, Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) of this court specifically provides that "any facts set forth in the [moving party's] Statement of Material Facts shall be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by the opposing party." Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) further requires that the "non-movant shall file a Statement of Material Fact which mirrors the movant's statement in matching numbered paragraphs and which set forth a specific reference to the record where the material fact is alleged to arise." The courts of the Northern District have adhered to a strict application of Local Rule 7.1(a)(3)'s requirement on summary judgment motions. Giguere v. Racicot, OO-CV-1178, 2002 WL 368534, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. March 1, 2002) (inter alia citing Bundy Am. Corp. v. K-Z Rental Leasing, Inc., 00-CV-260, 2001 WL 237218, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2001)).
Furthermore, this Circuit subscribes to the view that nothing in Rule 56 imposes an obligation on the court to conduct a search and independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute. Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 288 F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 2002). As long as the local rules impose a requirement that parties provide specific record citations in support of their statement of material facts, the court may grant summary judgment on that basis. Id. at 470-71.
In this case, Lee provided the court with a document titled "statement of facts" in his response to the motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 64. However, this document fails to comply with Local Rule 7.1(a)(3). Consequently, the court will accept the properly supported facts contained in the defendants' 7.1 Statement (Dkt. No. 56) as true for purposes of this motion. With these standards in mind, the court now turns to the sufficiency of Lee's claims.
The court notes that this does not apply to the various conclusions of law contained in the defendants' 7.1 Statement.
B. The Unserved Defendant
Service must be made upon a defendant within 120 days of filing the complaint or any claims against that defendant will be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). In this case, defendant Barbara McClinton has never been served. Lee's amended complaint was filed on November 12, 1999, and over three years have elapsed without service. Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction over this unserved defendant and recommends dismissal.
C. Eleventh Amendment
In Lee's complaint, he raises claims against the defendants in their official and individual capacity. The Eleventh Amendment provides that: "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Although the Amendment does not specifically prohibit suits against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has consistently applied that immunity to such cases. See Bumette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1999)(c/f/ng Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974)). Moreover, it is well established that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies not only when a state is a named defendant, but when liability must be paid from state coffers. See New York City Health Hosp. Corp. v. Perales, 50 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 1995)(c/f/ng Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665); Dawkins v. State of New York, 93-CV-1298, 1996 WL 156764, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1996).
In this case, Lee raises claims against the defendants in their official and individual capacities. Since the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity claims against these state officers, this court recommends dismissal.
D. Motion to Dismiss by the County Defendants
As previously mentioned, Lee's complaint is at times difficult to comprehend. He recites facts that have no bearing on the pending claims. Despite these shortcomings, this court construes all reasonable inferences in Lee's favor since he is the non-moving party.
Lee is raising various claims against Ulster County employees. He appears to be alleging that the county defendants failed to honor various contractual obligations. Specifically, Lee accuses Alfonso of denying him "the opportunities provided to other residents as a matter of policy in his residential life, as well as his ability to conduct business via the County agencies which provided funding for other minority run businesses." Am. Compl. P. 3, ¶ 6. He also contends that Alfonso, through an employee, "placed [him] in a vulnable[sic] position as an Ulster County resident and business person." Am. Compl. P. 14, ¶ 27.
This information was obtained from Lee's response to the motion for summary judgment. DM. No. 64.
Lee contends that Thomas Costello took "confidential information provided to the UCNY Human Rights Commission, to the Town of Ulster police captain . . . to jointly determine that said complaint was 'mere speculation' or 'totally unbelievable on its face.'" Am. Compl. P. 4, ¶ 8. Lee accuses the Ulster County Human Rights Commission of:
The ambiguous practice of erratically allowing someone access to that information who has not been trained, and is not a part of that specific agency without the expressed permission of the complainant. The delayed filing and impermissible filing of plaintiffs [sic] complaint by someone who didn't qualify as an employee of the Human Rights Commission resulted in additional violations of [his rights]. It also unduly risk erroneous determinations in the intake process of discrimination complaints. Am. Compl. PP. 3-4, ¶ 7. He accuses Ulster County of condoning police misconduct which resulted in the loss of his clientele.Am. Compl. PP. 8-9, fl 19. Finally, the allegations against former District Attorney Kavanagh are as follows:
[Facilitated the unjust enrichment for the Department of plaintiffs [sic] personal property, and promotion of detrimental information to the public, via the media, destroying plaintiffs standing and credibility within the community . . . Their claim of criminal conduct . . . prior to conviction is tantamount to slander and libel.Am. Compl. P. 5, ¶ 9.
Generally, the defendants argue that Lee has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. They contend that Lee has failed to raise any specific factual allegation which shows a constitutional violation. They point out that if Lee was in a vulnerable position as a resident and business person, it was the result of his criminal activity. Furthermore, they maintain that the law does not prohibit representatives from two municipal governments from speaking with each other. Lastly, the defendants maintain that Lee's complaint appears to be raising claims against the former District Attorney for making his indictment public. The defendants argue that since indictments are public information, Lee fails to state a claim.
This court finds that Lee fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. As the defendants correctly point out, Lee's vague reference to the fact that his rights were violated by the named defendants fails to demonstrate how his rights were violated. The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that "complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of [a] litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning." Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987). Furthermore, it may well be that Lee received negative press concerning his criminal charges, however, it was due to his criminal activity. As mentioned, indictments are public information and if he lost contracts, it was due to his conduct, not that of the defendants. Accordingly, this court recommends granting defendants Alfonso, Costello and Kavanagh's motion to dismiss since Lee has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. E. Town of Ulster and Police Department Summary Judgment Motion
Lee contests his arrest and property search, and accuses the defendants of abusing their authority when they used a private citizen to conduct a search of his home. Lee also contends that the County was unjustly enriched when they confiscated his property, including a boat, dog, car and truck.
The defendants raise several defenses in their motion for summary judgment which can be summarized into three categories. First, the defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Second, they contend that since the arrest warrant was legitimate, the search was legal. Lastly, they contend that Lee is barred from re-litigating the issues that he has already contested during his parole hearing.
This court will not address this defense because dismissal on other grounds is warranted.
"Qualified immunity strikes a balance between the need to provide a means for the vindication of constitutional guarantees and the societal costs . . . in litigation against public officials." Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1281 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Public officials are "shielded] from liability for civil damages if their actions were objectively reasonable, as evaluated in the context of legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time." Id. at 1281 (citation omitted). Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, . . . rather than a mere defense to liability." Id. at 1281 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive." Loria, 306 F.3d at 1281 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001)) (alteration in original).
The Supreme Court has established a two part inquiry to determine if an official is entitled to qualified immunity. The first question is whether "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Id. at 1281 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201) (alteration in original). The answer to this question serves as "a clear standard against which officers can measure the legality of future conduct." Id. at 1281 (citation omitted). Thus, if an officer's conduct did not violate a constitutional right, it is not necessary to proceed further, and the court should find that the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.
However, if the officer's conduct is determined to have violated a constitutional right, the second question is "'whether the right was clearly established' at the time it was allegedly infringed." Id. at 1281 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 1281 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202).
Simply put, if an officer's conduct violated a right, the court must analyze the objective reasonableness of the officer's belief in the lawfulness of his actions. An officer is entitled to qualified immunity if he reasonably believed that his actions did not violate the plaintiff's rights, even if that belief was mistaken. However, if an officer's belief was not objectively reasonable, the plaintiff's claims must be allowed.
It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizes, however, its protection applies to governmental action. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). "[T]he basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, (1967)).
In this case, the uncontroverted record shows that McClinton, a private citizen, was not acting as an agent of the Ulster Police Department when she burglarized Lee's home. The defendants provide the court with a sworn statement by McClinton acknowledging that she did not break into Lee's home under the instruction of the police. Defs.['] Mot. Summ. J., Ex. G, P. 2. The defendants also provide a sworn statement by defendant Dickson indicating that he was initially unaware that McClinton had broken into Lee's home. Defs.['] Mot. Summ. J., Ex. T, P. 4, ¶¶ 8-9.
Subsequently, McClinton was arrested for her actions.
This court finds that Lee's simple assertion that McClinton was acting as an agent for the police is insufficient to prove this allegation. Lee fails to proffer any evidence upon which the court could infer McClinton was instructed or acting for the police when she obtained the Marshall's merchandise from Lee's home. In fact, the record is clear that McClinton was not acting on behalf of the police or any governmental official. Consequently, Lee's claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated is without merit. This court recommends the dismissal of Lee's claim against Ulster police officers for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
Furthermore, since no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, a reasonable officer could not have known that they were violating Lee's rights when they arrested him and searched his property. Accordingly, this court recommends granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Dickson, Reynolds, Sheeley, Short and Turner, based on qualified immunity since Lee fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
F. Motion to Dismiss by the State Defendant
Lee is suing State Trooper Cunningham for violating his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The only time Lee mentions Cunningham in his complaint is as follows:
he or someone under his direction responded to plaintiffs [sic] 911 call, and after finding out who the culprit was, did not apprehend and place under arrest the person found to have broken into and robbed from plaintiffs [sic] home, on December 24, 1996, in violation to plaintiffs [sic] [First] and [ Fourteenth] Amendment rights under the U.S.C.A.Am. Comp. PP. 7-8, ¶ 18.
Cunningham argues that the court should grant dismissal for various reasons. First, Cunningham contends that there was no duty to investigate the activity of a private citizen. Second, Lee fails to allege any specific fact indicating that Cunningham caused a constitutional deprivation. Third, Cunningham contends that even if this court were to find that there was a viable constitutional claim, he is entitled to qualified immunity.
This court finds that Lee has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Even after reading Lee's complaint as liberally as possible, this court cannot decipher a claim against Cunningham which would be constitutionally viable. The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that "complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of [a] litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning." Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987).
The allegation that Cunningham or someone under his direction failed to arrest McClinton is not a constitutional violation. Moreover, McClinton was arrested for her illegal activity in Lee's home. Whether Cunningham or someone under his direction actually arrested McClinton is not a constitutional violation. Accordingly, this court recommends dismissing Cunningham from this suit since Lee fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED, that Barbara McClinton be dismissed from this suit since the court lacks jurisdiction over this unserved defendant; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that dismissal of the official capacity claims against the defendants be GRANTED since they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that defendants Alfonso, Costello and Kavanagh's motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 40) be GRANTED since Lee fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that defendant Cunningham's motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 43) be GRANTED since Lee fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that defendants Dickson, Reynolds, Sheeley, Short, and Turner's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 56) be GRANTED since Lee fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted and they are entitled to qualified immunity; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation upon the parties by regular mail.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to so much of the foregoing report that constitutes recommendations. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court within TEN days. FAILURE TO SO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).