The possibilities of danger, so far as she knew, were then in front and not behind. The instant case is to be clearly distinguished from the headlight cases, such as LeDoux v. Alert Transfer Storage Co., 145 Wn. 115, 259 P. 24. There the plaintiff, riding as a guest on a motorcycle, was at all times aware that the headlight threw a beam only twenty or thirty feet, whereas the statute required a light showing rays visible for five hundred feet. We held that the guest was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, saying that he knew, or would be conclusively presumed to know, that the vehicle was operated in violation of a positive law of the state.

He was also aware of the speed at which they were traveling. One riding on a motorcycle as a guest is chargeable with the operator's contributory negligence, where he knows that the operator is not within the law in reference to headlights and speed. LeDoux v. Alert Transfer Storage Co., 145 Wn. 115, 259 P. 24; Sadler v.Northern Pac. R. Co., 118 Wn. 121, 203 P. 10; Bauer v. Tougaw, 128 Wn. 654, 224 P. 20; Graves v. Mickel, 176 Wn. 329, 29 P.2d 405; Meath v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 179 Wn. 177, 36 P.2d 533. It is true, as appellants contend, that joint venture must be specially pleaded, and the random statement, "Drennen and I were out Christmas evening together and I was sharing expenses with him" does not establish a joint venture. However, the court's reference to a joint venture may be treated as surplusage. Without it there remains the court's conclusion of contributory negligence founded upon the pertinent finding that Allen was aware of the excessive speed and defective headlight and that his acceptance of the ride under these conditions is negligence.

The question as to whether the appellant acted as a reasonably prudent person was one of fact for the jury. The cases of Pinckard v. Pease, 115 Wn. 282, 197 P. 49, and LeDoux v. Alert Transfer Storage Co., 145 Wn. 115, 259 P. 24, are each entirely different in their facts. [4] It is said further that the driver of the car at the time of the accident was as much the agent of the appellant as he was of the respondent.

Some courts have held that by so doing a guest assumes the risk and is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In LeDoux v. Albert T. S. Co. 145 Wn. 115, 259 P. 24, where, about midnight, an unlighted motorcycle, on which plaintiff was riding as the guest of the operator of the vehicle, rail into defendant's unlighted truck, the court said [ 145 Wn. 116]: "The appellant thus knew, or is conclusively presumed to know, that the vehicle was operated in violation of a positive law of the state.

The appellants contend that the same rule should apply to a passenger in the vehicle. The following cases are cited in support of this contention: Cable v. Spokane Inland Empire R. Co., 50 Wn. 619, 97 P. 744, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1224; Sadler v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 118 Wn. 121, 203 P. 10; Hoyle v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 105 Wn. 652, 178 P. 810; Golay v. Northern Pac. R. Co., supra; Keene v. Pacific Northwest Traction Co., supra; Beckwith v. Spokane International R. Co., supra; Benedict v. Hines, supra; Bauer v. Tougaw, 128 Wn. 654, 224 P. 20; LeDoux v. Alert Transfer Storage Co., 145 Wn. 115, 259 P. 24; Rhodes v. Johnson, 163 Wn. 54, 299 P. 976. In the Golay, Keene, Beckwith and Benedict cases, the injured persons were drivers of the automobiles involved in the respective collisions.

So, even were we to assume that Hubbard was in some degree negligent in the manner of driving his automobile in approaching the crossing and in failing to make careful observation of the possible approach of a motor or locomotive from the west, the side on which he was sitting, his negligence was not so apparent to Haaga as to lead Haaga to assume that he should take notice and make observation of the surroundings to any greater extent than he did. Indeed, we are unable to see in the evidence any outward sign of negligence on the part of Hubbard that would be likely to lead Haaga to notice that Hubbard was in any degree negligent. Counsel for the logging company rely upon the following of our decisions: Cable v. Spokane Inland Empire R. Co., 50 Wn. 619, 97 P. 744, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1224; Hoyle v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 105 Wn. 652, 178 P. 810; Sadler v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 118 Wn. 121, 203 P. 10; Le Doux v. Alert Transfer Storage Co., 145 Wn. 115, 259 P. 24. There is, we think, in each of those cases an element not present here. They involve either some degree of authoritative control in the injured person over the driving of the automobile or vehicle; or some special knowledge of the injured person of the impending danger, apart from the knowledge of the driver; or such manifest negligence on the part of the driver as obligated the injured person to take notice of such negligence. The rule in general terms applicable to the situation in which we find Haaga in this case, was well expressed by Judge Gose in Wilson v. Puget Sound Elec. R., 52 Wn. 522, 101 P. 50, 132 Am. St. 1044, quoting with approval from the language used in Cable v. Spokane Inland Empire R. Co., 50 Wn. 619, 97 P. 744, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1224, as follows: