Opinion
No. 234 / 99-1020
Filed April 25, 2001
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Robert C. Clem, Judge.
Appeal from district court order denying application for postconviction relief. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Robert J. Stahle of Willia, Stahle Andreasen, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and James J. Katcher, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
Gonzalo Ledezma appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction relief. He claims the district court erred in holding he was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's ineffective assistance. We conclude Gonzalo presented a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim by proving he was prejudiced by his attorney's deficient performance. We reverse the order of the district court, grant the application for postconviction relief, and remand for a new trial.
The factual and procedural background of this case generally follows the companion case of Ledezma v. State, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2001) ( Ledezma I), filed on this date. A discussion of the facts of this case will be limited to those relevant differences.
Gonzalo Ledezma is a Mexican national who illegally immigrated to Iowa with his brother Jose in August of 1994. Like Jose, Gonzalo's native language is Spanish, and he does not understand the English language. He reached a level of education in Mexico equivalent to reaching the fifth grade in the United States.
On August 13, 1994, Gonzalo was charged, along with Jose, with first-degree kidnapping in violation of Iowa Code sections 710.1(3) and 710.2 (1993), and second-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1(1) and 709.3(3) of Marie Big Bear. Additionally, Gonzalo was charged with first-degree theft in violation of Iowa Code sections 714.1(1) and 714.2(1). The theft charge was based on the claim that Gonzalo stole Marie Big Bear's panties following the incident which led to the kidnapping and rape charges.
Gonzalo waived a jury trial and was tried by the court. He was found guilty of the kidnapping and sexual abuse charges, and not guilty of the theft charge. He was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed Gonzalo's convictions on March 27, 1996.
In his application for postconviction relief, Gonzalo claimed his attorney, a public defender, and his interpreter, Ray Cota, provided ineffective assistance. Like Jose's application, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel targeted the failure to investigate and failure to testify.
Although Gonzalo and Jose were represented by different counsel, both counsel took the same approach to the investigation of the case. While the public defender's office had its own private investigator, Gonzalo's trial counsel never requested assistance. He did attempt to interview potential witnesses from the Western Tavern. However, after two people he contacted told him they were not at the tavern the night of the incident, he discontinued his investigation. Additionally, trial counsel did not attempt to determine if any clerks or customers at the 7-Eleven convenience store had witnessed the Ledezmas and Marie. Trial counsel explained his lack of investigative work stemmed from his belief that there was no one who had anything helpful to add to Gonzalo's defense.
Trial counsel not only failed to conduct an investigation in support of the consent defense, he failed to do outside investigation to prepare himself for depositions of the prosecution's witnesses. The only investigation trial counsel conducted to prepare for the depositions of Marie and several police department officials was to review materials produced by the prosecution. Trial counsel did not attend the second deposition of Marie, reasoning that it would be sufficient for him to just later review the transcript. He also advised Gonzalo not to testify at trial, although Gonzalo told him the encounter with Marie was consensual.
At trial, Gonzalo's counsel called no witnesses and presented no evidence in support of Gonzalo's consent defense. Trial counsel believed there was no evidence to challenge Marie's claim. He did not consider Gonzalo's proposed testimony to be evidence, and told Gonzalo he should not testify. Thus, instead of mounting an attack against the prosecution's case, trial counsel decided to rest with a defense lacking evidentiary support in the record. See Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 1990). He was hoping the court would compromise its verdict based on its knowledge of the severity of the sentence. This was the only explanation trial counsel offered at the postconviction relief hearing for not calling Gonzalo to testify at trial.
As we held in Ledezma I, trial counsel's failure to investigate and protect the right to testify resulted in sufficient prejudice. By not calling Gonzalo, trial counsel ignored the only witness who could contradict the prosecution's key witness and theory of the case. See id. Gonzalo's failure to take the stand because of the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel virtually guaranteed a guilty verdict under the circumstances. See Foster v. Delo, 11 F.3d 1451, 1458 (8th Cir. 1994). We conclude it is reasonably probable that the court would have rendered a different verdict if trial counsel would have actually introduced evidence in support of the consent defense.
We can only grant Gonzalo's application for postconviction relief if we find he preserved his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on direct appeal. Appellate counsel's reasoning for not raising the ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal mirrored that of Jose's appellate counsel in Ledezma I. That analysis governs our disposition of the preservation issue. Thus, we find Gonzalo adequately preserved his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for postconviction relief.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Carter, J., who dissents.
This is not a published opinion.
I dissent.
In applying the standard which the court agrees must be met in order to satisfy the prejudice element of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, I am convinced that prejudice has not been established. I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
This is not a published opinion.