Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1413 (JDB).
February 18, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, plaintiff, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, seeks all records related to him in the possession of the United States Marshals Service ("USMS"). Defendant has moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed an opposition. Based on the factual record and the applicable law, the Court will grant defendant's motion.
Background
By a letter addressed to the Office of General Counsel of the USMS dated January 14, 2004, plaintiff requested
[A]ll records pertaining to myself possessed by the Marshals Service. In particular I am requesting a copy of the inventory list that details each and every item that was taken from me at the time the Marshals Service placed me in their custody. Specifically, I am interested in a wrist watch that was confiscated while I was in the holding pen by one U.S. Marshal.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Declaration of Arleta D. Cunningham ("Cunningham Decl."), Exhibit ("Ex.") A. Plaintiff's letter stated he was in the USMS's custody in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, when the events occurred. Id. Given that information, the USMS searched for records responsive to plaintiff's request at the district office located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Cunningham Decl., ¶ 4.
As a result of the search, the USMS located 49 pages of records responsive to plaintiff's request. Id., ¶ 5 Ex. C. Forty pages of records were disclosed to plaintiff in their entirety, six pages were disclosed with deletions pursuant to Exemption 7 (C) of the FOIA, and three pages were referred to the Executive Office for United States Attorneys ("EOUSA") for review. Id., ¶ 6 Ex. C.
By letter to the Office of Information and Privacy ("OIP") dated April 19, 2004, plaintiff stated that the USMS's response to his FOIA request did not mention his watch or any efforts by the agency to locate it. Id., ¶ 7 Ex. D. On July 8, 2004, OIP affirmed the USMS's action on plaintiff's request. Id., ¶ 8 Ex. E. OIP stated that the USMS had conducted a second search and found no further responsive records. Id., Ex. E. OIP suggested to plaintiff that he submit a request to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. Id. Plaintiff then filed his complaint in this Court.
Standard of Review
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (c). Material facts are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
In considering whether there is a triable issue of fact, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The non-moving party must do more than simply "show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Moreover, "any factual assertions in the movant's affidavits will be accepted as being true unless [the opposing party] submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the assertion." Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982)). The mere existence of a factual dispute by itself, however, is not enough to bar summary judgment. The party opposing the motion must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. To be material, the fact must be capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation; to be genuine, the issue must be supported by admissible evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. See id.; Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
FOIA cases are typically and appropriately decided on motions for summary judgment. Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 368 (11th Cir. 1993); Rushford v. Civiletti, 485 F.Supp. 477, 481 n. 13 (D.D.C. 1980). In a FOIA case, the court may award summary judgment solely on the basis of information provided by the department or agency in affidavits or declarations that describe "the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith." Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). Agency affidavits or declarations must be "relatively detailed and non-conclusory. . . ." SafeCard Services v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Such affidavits or declarations are accorded "a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents." Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). An agency must demonstrate that "each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced, is unidentifiable, or is wholly [or partially] exempt from the Act's inspection requirements." Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
Discussion A. Adequacy of the Agency Search
When, as in this case, a plaintiff is challenging the results of an agency's search, in order to obtain summary judgment an agency must show, "viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the requester, that . . . [it] `has conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.'" Steinberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). To meet its burden, the agency may submit affidavits or declarations that explain in reasonable detail and in a non-conclusory fashion the scope and method of the agency's search. Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In the absence of contrary evidence, such affidavits or declarations are sufficient to demonstrate an agency's compliance with FOIA. Id. at 127. The agency must show that it made a "good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested." Oglesby v. Dep't of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see Campbell v. United States Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In determining the adequacy of a FOIA search, the Court is guided by principles of reasonableness. Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68.
The USMS searched for records in the agency's office in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Cunningham Decl., ¶ 5. That was the location identified in plaintiff's request. Id., ¶ 4. The agency utilized the Prisoner Processing and Population Management/Prisoner Tracking System and the Warrant Information Network systems of records. Id., ¶ 5. The USMS maintains records in these systems in connection with the receipt, processing, transportation and custody of prisoners, the execution of arrest warrants, and the investigation of fugitives. Id.
It is apparent from the declaration submitted by the agency representative that defendant has made a "good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which reasonably can be expected to produce the information requested." Moore v. Aspin, 916 F.Supp. 32, 35 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Oglesby v. Dep't of the Army, 920 F.2d at 68). No more is required. Therefore, defendant's search for plaintiff's requested records was adequate to fulfill defendant's obligations under the FOIA.
B. Exemption 7 (C)
Exemption 7 (C) of the FOIA protects from mandatory disclosure records compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent that disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(7) (C). In determining whether this exemption applies to particular material, the Court must balance the interest in privacy of the individual mentioned in the record against the public's interest in disclosure. Beck v. Dep't of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984). It is the "interest of the general public, and not that of the private litigant" that the court considers in this analysis. Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). "[T]he only public interest relevant for purposes of Exemption 7 (C) is one that focuses on `the citizens' right to be informed about what their government is up to.'" Davis v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)). The privacy interests of third parties mentioned in law enforcement files are "substantial," while "[t]he public interest in disclosure [of third-party identities] is not just less substantial, it is insubstantial." SafeCard Servs., Inc., v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1991).Defendant invoked Exemption 7 (C) to withhold the names of federal law enforcement officers and the name and prison number of another inmate in the custody of the USMS. Cunningham Decl., ¶ 11. This information withheld was included on three records — an Individual Custody and Detention Report, a USMS Agent Arrest Sheet, and a letter from the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the USMS. Id.
The deletion of the names and identifying information of federal, state and local law enforcement personnel under similar circumstances has been routinely upheld. See Lesar, 636 F.2d at 487 (finding legitimate interest in preserving identities of government officials where disclosure could subject them to annoyance or harassment in either their official or private lives); Pray v. Dep't of Justice, 902 F.Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995) (possibility of animosity toward FBI agents outweighed any possible benefit of disclosure), aff'd in relevant part, 1996 WL 734142 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 20, 1996). In addition, the names and identities of individuals of investigatory interest to law enforcement agencies and those merely mentioned in law enforcement files have been consistently protected from disclosure for the reasons defendant asserts here. See Perrone v. FBI, 908 F.Supp. 24, 26 (D.D.C. 1995) (citing Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 779); Baez v. Dep't of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Branch v. FBI, 658 F.Supp. 204, 209 (D.D.C. 1987). For these reasons, the Court concludes that defendant has properly invoked Exemption 7 (C) to protect the identities of these categories of individuals.
C. Segregability
If a record contains information that is exempt from disclosure, any reasonably segregable information must be released after deleting the exempt portions, unless the non-exempt portions are inextricably intertwined with exempt portions. See Trans-Pacific Policing Agreement v. United States Customs Serv., 177 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 1999); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The Court errs if it "simply approve[s] the withholding of an entire document without entering a finding on segregability, or the lack thereof." Powell v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 927 F.2d 1239, 1242 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Church of Scientology v. Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1979)).
Having reviewed defendant's declaration, the Court concludes that defendant has withheld only the records or portions of records exempt under FOIA's provisions, and that all reasonably segregable material has been released. See Cunningham Decl., ¶ 12. With respect to these records, the agency declarations and attachments adequately specify "in detail which portions of the document[s] are disclosable and which are allegedly exempt." Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d at 827.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted. An appropriate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.