Opinion
Civil No. 4:20-CV-700
02-18-2021
JAMES LEDDA, Plaintiff, v. ST. JOHN NEUMANN REGIONAL ACADEMY and DIOCESE OF SCRANTON, Defendants.
(Judge Conner)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal civil rights laws play and important, but well-defined, role prohibiting racial discrimination and retaliation in the workplace. However, it is clear that these laws do not serve as the vehicle for litigation of every workplace dispute or disagreement. Job-related conflicts come in many forms, but only those based upon specifically identified factors such as race fall within the ambit of the federal law.
The instant case aptly illustrates these limitations on the reach of federal civil rights laws. Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint, which alleges claims of racial discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff, James Ledda, alleges that he was discriminated against and terminated from his employment as teacher at St. John Neumann Catholic School because the administration and the Diocese perceived him as exhibiting racist behavior toward minority students.
Thus, at bottom, Ledda's amended complaint seemingly invites us to conflate the concepts of race and racism for purposes of Title VII and fashion a cause of action for reverse race discrimination under this statute based upon allegations that the plaintiff was falsely accused by his employer of being a racist. However, as we will explain in greater detail below, such a claim does not fall within the protections of Title VII. Accordingly, we will recommend that the motion to dismiss be granted.
II. BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case is taken from the facts alleged in the amended complaint, which we must accept as true when considering a motion to dismiss.
James Ledda, a Caucasian male, was employed as a Social Studies teacher at St. John Neumann Catholic School ("Neumann") in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, within the Diocese of Scranton. (Doc. 19, ¶ 17). At some point in his tenure at Neumann, he was promoted to Chair of the Social Studies Department. (Id., ¶ 16). On or about December 5, 2018, Ledda observed a student using a cell phone during school, which was against school policy, and he requested that the student, who was African American, hand over the cell phone. (Id., ¶¶ 18-20). He alleges that the student refused and threatened to hurt him. (Id., ¶ 21). Ledda reported the incident to the principal, Richard Cummings, but ultimately Ledda was required to take three paid days off and attend "anger management classes." (Id., ¶¶ 22-24). The amended complaint alleges that at some time during these three days off, the brother of the student whom Ledda had disciplined destroyed property in Ledda's classroom. (Id., ¶ 25).
When Ledda returned to school, Cummings asked him to sign a statement concerning the December 5 incident, but Ledda contends the statement did not include the student's threat toward him. (Id., ¶ 27). Additionally, despite assurances that there would be a meeting with Ledda, the student, and the student's mother, a meeting never occurred and the student remained in Ledda's class. (Id., ¶ 29). Further, Ledda alleges that when he returned to school, he became aware of rumors circulating the school that he was a racist. (Id., ¶ 30). Ledda alleges that he went to the Williamsport Police Department when he realized that the school was not going to take action against the student who threatened him. (Id., ¶ 31).
In January of 2019, the Diocese sent a member of its Human Resources department to investigate Ledda's complaint. (Id., ¶ 34). However, the amended complaint alleges that no action was taken, and further, that the defendants had made it clear that they believed Ledda was a racist based on comments made about a historical display he had used in class. (Id., ¶¶ 35-36). Then, on March 29, 2019, after Ledda had written up another African American student for making a crude comment in the hallway, Ledda had a meeting with the student and Cummings in which the student allegedly stated that he heard Ledda treated African American students differently than others. (Id., ¶¶ 37-38). That same day, Ledda alleges that he complained to Cummings about how Cummings handled the December 5 incident, and claims that Cummings made it look like Ledda had threatened the student. (Id., ¶¶ 39-41). Ultimately, Ledda was terminated on April 1, 2019. (Id., ¶ 43).
Thus, after filing a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRA") and receiving a Right-To-Sue letter, Ledda filed a complaint in federal court. (Doc. 1). He then filed an amended complaint, which is now the operative pleading in this case. (Doc. 19). The amended complaint sets forth two claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. The defendants have now moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that Ledda's complaint has not set forth sufficient facts to state a claim under Title VII. (Doc. 21). While cast as a claim of race discrimination under Title VII, the amended complaint actually appears to conflate allegations of race discrimination with assertions that Ledda was wrongfully discharged due to what were perceived to be his racist views. For example, Ledda insists that: "Plaintiff was terminated because he is Caucasian and the student is African-American because Defendants formed a belief that Plaintiff harbored racial animus toward persons of color." (Doc. 19, ¶ 44). This conflation of race and racism is a theme that runs throughout Ledda's amended complaint.
After review, we conclude that the amended complaint does not set forth sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for racial discrimination or retaliation under Title VII. Accordingly, we will recommend that the motion to dismiss be granted.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -U.S.-, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id., at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, [ ] "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement of relief.' "Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id., at 1950. Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider "undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, "documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered." Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that "[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment"). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Should Be Granted.
This case presents novel question concerning the reach of Title VII in a unique factual setting: a claim of reverse discrimination brought by a Caucasian employee and grounded on the assertion that Ledda's employers erred when they concluded that he was a racist.
As we have explained, Ledda asserts claims against the defendants under Title VII for racial discrimination and retaliation. He alleges that he was subjected to discipline and ultimately terminated because the defendants perceived him as harboring a racist bias against minority students. However, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Ledda has not set forth sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of reverse race discrimination or retaliation to survive the instant motion to dismiss.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against and/or discharging their employees because of their race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII discrimination claims are governed by a burden-shifting framework. See Jones v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2015). In brief, that framework requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, (3) under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful race-based discrimination. Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003). The last element also requires that the plaintiff demonstrate a causal connection between his protected status and the allegedly adverse action. Id. at 798. The key focus of the prima facie test is "always whether the employer is treating 'some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" Id. (citation omitted). The elements of the prima facie case "must not be applied woodenly but must rather be tailored flexibly to fit the circumstances of each type of illegal discrimination." Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup Int'l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996).
In this case, Ledda is pursuing a reverse discrimination claim, alleging that he was discriminated against because of his status as a member of a racial majority. Yet while cast in these terms, Ledda's factual averments describe adverse employment actions based upon a perception that he was a racist. Thus, the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint focus on alleged racism, as opposed to race, as the basis for Ledda's discharge. These allegation highlight for us the challenges courts have encountered when applying Title VII to reverse discrimination claims. In cases brought by non-minority plaintiffs alleging reverse discrimination under Title VII, the Third Circuit directs courts to employ a modified version of the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to evaluate whether the claims survive. See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). Under this analysis, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must plausibly allege facts to show "that the employer is treating some people less favorably than others based upon a trait that is protected under Title VII." Id. at 161.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Title VII also contains a retaliation provision. To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in protected activity; (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017). Ultimately, a plaintiff bringing a Title VII retaliation claim must be able to show that his participation in protected activity was the but-for cause of any alleged adverse employment action that he suffered. Univ. of Texas v. Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) ("Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in § 2000e-2(m). This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer"); see also Grevious, 851 F.3d at 257 (noting that a plaintiff alleging Title VII retaliation "has a higher causal burden than a plaintiff asserting a claim of direct status-based discrimination under Title VII"). "The ultimate question in any retaliation case is an intent to retaliate vel non." Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006).
As we have noted, Title VII claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Thus, if the employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation based upon race, the burden shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reason for its conduct, and if the employer does so "the plaintiff must be able to convince the factfinder both that the employer's proffered explanation was false, and that [discrimination or] retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment action." Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Judged against these legal benchmarks, we conclude that Ledda has not made a prima facie showing of reverse racial discrimination or retaliation. At the outset, we note that Ledda's complaint relies on the assertion that his supervisor, and consequently the Diocese, wrongfully perceived him as a racist. In this regard, while we have not found any authority directly addressing the question of whether accusations of racism equate to race discrimination under Title VII, in other contexts courts have found that conflating race and racism is a false equivalence. Thus, it has been held that "[w]hile 'falsely accusing someone of being a racist is morally wrong,' such accusations cannot form the basis of a [] racial discrimination claim," under state anti-discrimination law. Lovelace v. Washington Univ. Sch. of Med., 931 F.3d 698, 708 (8th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
We agree that Ledda's amended complaint impermissibly conflates these two very different concepts. Racism is a state of mind or a belief, whereas race is a state of being. To equate them under Title VII would, in our view, be a false equivalence.
By its terms, Title VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1).
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]
Yet, while the concept of race is central to the interpretation of the statute, "Title VII does not define the term 'race.' " Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1026 (11th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, "[t]he meaning of the word 'race' in Title VII is, like any other question of statutory interpretation, a question of law for the court." Village of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 607 (2d Cir. 2016). Addressing this issue of statutory interpretation, courts have adopted somewhat different frames of reference. Some courts have focused upon race as a concept tied "to common physical characteristics or traits existing through ancestry, descent, or heredity." Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1027. Other courts embrace a more expansive view, holding that "for purposes of Title VII, 'race' encompasses ethnicity" a broader social construct which goes beyond mere physical characteristics. Village of Freeport, 814 F.3d at 607. However, no court has deemed the holding of racist views, or the perceived adherence to racist beliefs, to fall within the ambit of the term "race" as it is used in Title VII.
There are sound reasons for this judicial reluctance to expand the definition of race in the fashion suggested by Ledda's complaint. Racism is commonly defined as "a belief that race is a fundamental determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race." This definition describes racism not as a concept defined by physical characteristics, or common ethnicity. Rather, racism consists of a bankrupt belief that stereotypes individuals based upon shared human traits and consigns whole groups to a lesser status simply because of these shared traits. This belief system is abhorrent and simply does not fit within any reasoned description of race. Moreover, race and racism are not concepts that are inextricably intertwined. Simply put, people of all races may harbor racist beliefs. Therefore, being identified as a racist does not necessarily carry with it some identification of a person's race.
Racism, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/racism (last visited February 18, 2021).
Indeed, on this score, there may be an unintended but subtly racist aspect to the allegations in Ledda's amended complaint. That amended complaint seems to equate Ledda's race with his perceived racism suggesting in a stereotypical fashion that accused racists necessarily belong to a specific race. Thus, Ledda avers that: "Plaintiff was terminated because he is Caucasian and . . . because Defendants formed a belief that Plaintiff harbored racial animus toward persons of color." (Doc. 19, ¶ 44). This stereotypical linkage of issues of race and racism is incorrect as a matter of law and fact.
Further, drawing this false equivalence for purposes of Title VII may be at odds with the treatment of false claims of racism in other legal fields. For example, in Pennsylvania, the law of defamation holds that:
[D]erogatory characterizations without more are not defamatory. Take accusations of racism. In Pennsylvania, "a simple accusation of racism" is not enough. MacElree v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 544 Pa. 117, 674 A.2d 1050, 1055 (1996). Rather, the accusation must imply more, by for instance suggesting that the accused has personally broken the law to "act[ ] in a racist manner." Id.McCafferty v. Newsweek Media Grp., Ltd., 955 F.3d 352, 358 (3d Cir. 2020). Given that accusations of racism, standing alone, are not viewed as actionable defamation, it would be curious to suggest that they rise to the level of federal race discrimination claims under Title VII.
Finally, it is our view that adopting Ledda's apparent interpretation of Title VII could turn Title VII on its head. Title VII is designed to prevent real discrimination based upon race in the workplace. That true racial discrimination can take many forms including a racially hostile workplace, i.e., a workplace infected by overt racism. Thus, employers have an affirmative duty under federal law to root out racism in the workplace. However, if we adopted Ledda's interpretation of Title VII, the statute would also protect employees from adverse actions based upon what was perceived to be their racist conduct. Title VII should not be read in a way which forbids racial discrimination at work while also affording some measure of protection to workers whose conduct may be perceived as racist. Accordingly, we decline to adopt this interpretation and instead conclude that Ledda has not made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination under Title VII.
Nor has he made a prima facie showing of retaliation for protected conduct. As we have stated, in order to state a claim for retaliation, Ledda must show that he engaged in protected activity, was subject to adverse action, and a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 257. With respect to the first prong, "Title VII protects . . . those who oppose discrimination made unlawful by Title VII." Moore, 461 F.3d at 341. The employee must have a reasonable, good faith belief that the practice he is opposing constituted unlawful discrimination under Title VII. Id.; Clark County v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001).
Here, we cannot conclude that Ledda's complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations to show that he had a good faith belief that he was opposing discriminatory conduct under Title VII. Rather, the amended complaint sets forth general conclusory allegations that Ledda believed the school and the Diocese thought he was racist. As we have explained, an accusation of racism, however wrong, does not fall within the protections of Title VII. Moreover, while the complaint asserts that Ledda complained of "discriminatory treatment," the allegations do nothing more than indicate that Ledda was upset with the way Cummings handled the incidents with the students. They do not assert, with any clear factual support, that Ledda complained to Cummings about discriminatory treatment by either Cummings or the Diocese.
Moreover, Ledda must show that he would not have been terminated absent his complaint about his discipline he received. See Nassar, 570 U.S. 338; Rumanek v. Indep. School Management, Inc., 50 F.Supp.3d 571, 579 (D. Del. 2014). Ledda asserts that the two-day time period between his complaint to Cummings and his termination is sufficient to show a causal connection. Indeed, it is well-settled that an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the complaint and the adverse action may support an inference of causation. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503. However, accepting Ledda's allegations as true, as we must at the motion to dismiss stage, Ledda was terminated from Neumann because the administration and the Diocese believed he was displaying racist behavior toward minority students, not because he complained of discriminatory treatment. Accordingly, we find that Ledda has not made a prima facie showing of retaliation.
In sum, while Ledda asserts that he was wrongfully terminated based on false accusations of racism, the law simply does not support this claim under Title VII. Ledda's complaint does not set forth sufficient factual allegations to support a claim of reverse racial discrimination or retaliation. Accordingly, we recommend that the defendants' motion to dismiss be granted.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that a plaintiff might be able to make a claim of reverse discrimination under Title VII by asserting well-pleaded facts which indicated that his employer engaged in race-based discriminatory behavior and then alleging that the defendants' claims that an adverse employment action was taken based upon the plaintiff's racist conduct was a mere pretext for racial animus in the workplace. However, as we construe the amended complaint here it does not contain such well-pleaded facts. Instead it erroneously treats race and racism of equivalent concepts and bases a Title VII claim of racial discrimination upon allegations that the plaintiff was perceived to be a racist.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 21) be GRANTED and the plaintiff's amended complaint should be dismissed.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 18th day of February 2021.
S/ Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge