Because the INA's list of aggravated felonies, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), does not perfectly correspond to state criminal codes, "the BIA and courts of appeal must often ascertain whether a particular state law fits within the enumerated aggravated felonies." Lecky v. Holder , 723 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013). To do so, we apply the so-called "categorical approach," which "looks to the statutory definition of the offense of conviction, not to the particulars of the alien's behavior."
We review de novo the BIA's legal conclusions, including its determination that Silva's Massachusetts accessory-after-the-fact conviction is an aggravated felony. See Lecky v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013). We review the BIA's factual findings under a deferential standard, upholding them "as long as they are ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’ "
We review legal issues de novo, "albeit with deference accorded to the [Board's] reasonable interpretation of statutes and regulations falling within its bailiwick." Lecky v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). No deference is given to the Board's interpretation of state law.
But we give no deference to the BIA's "reading of an underlying [state] criminal statute (as to which it has no expertise)." Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77, 79 (1st Cir. 2013); see Lecky v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013). III. Discussion
This definition of “theft offense” has been applied by the Supreme Court and by many of our sister circuits.See Gonzales v. Duenas–Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 189, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007); Burke v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Corona–Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc); Hernandez–Mancilla v. INS, 246 F.3d 1002, 1009 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Vasquez–Flores, 265 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.2001); see also Lecky v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2013) (adopting the BIA's definition of “theft offense” as stated in VZS); Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778, 784–85 (2d Cir.2009) (same); Jaggernauth v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 432 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir.2005) (same). Because the BIA applied this definition in the present case, we likewise consider the same definition in this appeal.
A juvenile alien convicted as an adult in state court has a "conviction" under the INA. See Lecky v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2013); Rangel-Zuazo v. Holder, 678 F.3d 967, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2012); Singh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009); Savchuck v. Mukasey. 518 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2008);
In dismissing Count 21 of the indictment, the court noted that there was a circuit split as to the proper method of computing the $5,000 threshold under § 666 "with some courts holding that the $5,000 refers to the value of the bribe, while other courts hold[] that the $5,000 refers to the value of the business, transaction, or series of transactions." (Doc. 38 at 17 (citing United States v. Fernandez, 723 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013))). The court then concluded that under United States v. Willis, 844 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third Circuit required the $5,000 to be met by the value of the bribe, rather than the value of the business, transaction, or series of transactions.