Lecky v. Holder

7 Citing cases

  1. De Lima v. Sessions

    867 F.3d 260 (1st Cir. 2017)   Cited 12 times

    Because the INA's list of aggravated felonies, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), does not perfectly correspond to state criminal codes, "the BIA and courts of appeal must often ascertain whether a particular state law fits within the enumerated aggravated felonies." Lecky v. Holder , 723 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013). To do so, we apply the so-called "categorical approach," which "looks to the statutory definition of the offense of conviction, not to the particulars of the alien's behavior."

  2. Silva v. Garland

    27 F.4th 95 (1st Cir. 2022)   Cited 7 times
    Interpreting statutory language broadly, rather than as limited by other statutes, when potentially limiting statutes were not cross-referenced in the broader statute

    We review de novo the BIA's legal conclusions, including its determination that Silva's Massachusetts accessory-after-the-fact conviction is an aggravated felony. See Lecky v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013). We review the BIA's factual findings under a deferential standard, upholding them "as long as they are ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’ "

  3. Graca v. Garland

    23 F.4th 106 (1st Cir. 2022)   Cited 3 times
    Determining the scope of a state criminal statute in part by looking to certain of the state's other criminal statutes, and approvingly noting that the BIA "interpreted the existence of a separate California joyriding statute to cabin the breadth of the California unauthorized use [of a motor vehicle] statute"

    We review legal issues de novo, "albeit with deference accorded to the [Board's] reasonable interpretation of statutes and regulations falling within its bailiwick." Lecky v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). No deference is given to the Board's interpretation of state law.

  4. Portillo v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.

    69 F.4th 25 (1st Cir. 2023)

    But we give no deference to the BIA's "reading of an underlying [state] criminal statute (as to which it has no expertise)." Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77, 79 (1st Cir. 2013); see Lecky v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013). III. Discussion

  5. Castillo v. Holder

    776 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2015)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that Virginia unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is not a theft offense because a conviction is possible for "a defendant's use of a vehicle in a manner not specifically authorized by its owner, even if such use is consistent with the owner's general policy regarding use, occurs during the period the vehicle is entrusted to the defendant, and results in no damage to the vehicle"

    This definition of “theft offense” has been applied by the Supreme Court and by many of our sister circuits.See Gonzales v. Duenas–Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 189, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007); Burke v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Corona–Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc); Hernandez–Mancilla v. INS, 246 F.3d 1002, 1009 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Vasquez–Flores, 265 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.2001); see also Lecky v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2013) (adopting the BIA's definition of “theft offense” as stated in VZS); Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778, 784–85 (2d Cir.2009) (same); Jaggernauth v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 432 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir.2005) (same). Because the BIA applied this definition in the present case, we likewise consider the same definition in this appeal.

  6. United States v. Camero-Castaneda

    5:20-CR-513-D (E.D.N.C. Oct. 26, 2021)

    A juvenile alien convicted as an adult in state court has a "conviction" under the INA. See Lecky v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2013); Rangel-Zuazo v. Holder, 678 F.3d 967, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2012); Singh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009); Savchuck v. Mukasey. 518 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2008);

  7. United States v. Collare

    Crim. No. 1:20-CR-00017 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 19, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    In dismissing Count 21 of the indictment, the court noted that there was a circuit split as to the proper method of computing the $5,000 threshold under § 666 "with some courts holding that the $5,000 refers to the value of the bribe, while other courts hold[] that the $5,000 refers to the value of the business, transaction, or series of transactions." (Doc. 38 at 17 (citing United States v. Fernandez, 723 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013))). The court then concluded that under United States v. Willis, 844 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third Circuit required the $5,000 to be met by the value of the bribe, rather than the value of the business, transaction, or series of transactions.