(1991); (4) wilfully lied about the whereabouts of the subject of a bench warrant an officer was attempting to serve, Hudson, 135 Ga.App. at 742–743(3); (5) wilfully lied to an officer, who was trying to execute an arrest warrant, about the present location of the arrestee, Duke v. State, 205 Ga.App. 689, 423 S.E.2d 427 (1992); and (6) deliberately misled the first responding officer about his role in a car wreck, Wells v. State, 297 Ga.App. 153, 154(1), 676 S.E.2d 821 (2009). Other cases upholding misdemeanor obstruction convictions involve words plus something more. See, e.g., Steillman v. State, 295 Ga.App. 778, 781(2), 673 S.E.2d 286 (2009) (using fighting words and resisting arrest for disorderly conduct; involving felony and misdemeanor obstruction); Pinchon v. State, 237 Ga.App. 675–676, 516 S.E.2d 537 (1999) (arguing with police officer, refusing to comply with instruction to take written citation, and attempting to walk away when officer told defendant she was under arrest); Leckie v. State, 231 Ga.App. 760–761, 500 S.E.2d 627 (1998) (after being advised he was under arrest for disorderly conduct, defendant announced he was not going to jail, purposefully turned away from the officer and attempted to avoid being handcuffed). Harris did not refuse to comply with an officer's directive or command. No officer ever asked to enter his house.
The evidence sufficed to sustain the conviction for misdemeanor obstruction with respect to the first officer. See Leckie v. State, 231 Ga. App. 760, 761 ( 500 SE2d 627) (1998); Pearson, supra, 224 Ga. App. at 469 (2); see also Cline v. State, 221 Ga.App. 175, 176 ( 471 SE2d 24) (1996). Judgment affirmed. Andrews, P.J., and Ellington, J., concur.
Certainly the assertion of one's constitutional rights cannot be an obstruction of an officer or every assertion of such rights would lead to obstruction charges. Leckie v. State, 231 Ga. App. 760, 761 ( 500 S.E.2d 627) (1998) and Stepherson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 219, 221 (3) ( 483 S.E.2d 631) (1997), contain "dicta that verbal exchanges can constitute obstruction, but cite as authority for this Duke v. State, [ 205 Ga. App. 689 ( 423 S.E.2d 427) (1992)], which holds instead, that, lying to the police can constitute obstruction. In these cases, the basis for obstruction was physical resistance to an arrest for disorderly conduct.
Cf. "Even verbal exchanges may satisfy that element [of obstruction]." Leckie v. State, 231 Ga. App. 760, 761 ( 500 S.E.2d 627) (1998); see also Stepherson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 219, 221 (3) ( 483 S.E.2d 631) (1997). Both cases give dicta that verbal exchanges can constitute obstruction, but cite as authority for this Duke v. State, supra at 690, which holds, instead, that lying to the police can constitute obstruction.
Shortly after the commission of these crimes, after disobeying the commands of uniformed officers and attempting to flee, Kenyada was arrested in possession of the firearm used in the attempted car thefts and the aggravated assaults. Gill v. State, 229 Ga. App. 462, 463-464 (2) ( 494 S.E.2d 259) (1997) (defendant's flight may be some evidence of guilt); see Leckie v. State, 231 Ga. App. 760, 761 ( 500 S.E.2d 627) (1998). This evidence was sufficient within the meaning of Jackson v. Virginia, supra, to sustain Kenyada's convictions for attempted armed robbery, aggravated assault, obstruction, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.
Argument, flight, stubborn obstinance, and lying are all examples of conduct that may satisfy the obstruction element. Id. at 690 (verbal exchanges, wilfully lying); Leckie v. State, 231 Ga. App. 760, 761 ( 500 S.E.2d 627) (1998) (stubborn obstinance); Walker v. State, 228 Ga. App. 509, 512 (4) ( 493 S.E.2d 193) (1997) (flight). Whether a defendant's conduct has the effect of hindering or obstructing the officer in making his arrest is for the trier of fact to decide.
But the conduct must rise to the level of knowing and willful opposition to the officer. For examples of conduct that satisfy the obstruction element of § 16-10-24(a), see Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2004) (belligerent refusal to comply with officer instructions); Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2009) (telling friend to disobey an officer's order); Leckie v. State, 231 Ga.App. 760, 500 S.E.2d 627, 627-28 (1998) (unleashing string of profanities, obstinately refusing to go to jail, and purposefully turning away from officer to avoid being handcuffed); Walker v. State, 228 Ga.App. 509, 493 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1997) (flight from arrest); Duke v. State, 205 Ga.App. 689, 423 S.E.2d 427, 428 (1992) (lying with intent of misdirecting officer as to performance of official duties). Misdemeanor obstruction of an officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) does not require proof of forcible resistance or a threat of violence.
See Timberlake v. State, 727 S.E.2d 516, 517-18 (Ga.App. 2012) (finding obstruction when defendant initially refused to stand outside lane of traffic, did not return to vehicle when asked, argued with officer, and hindered officer's attempts to see if he was armed); West v. State, 673 S.E.2d 558, 561-62 (Ga.App. 2009) (finding obstruction when defendant refused repeated orders to leave scene after woman called 911 claiming he was following her), overruled on other grounds, Worthen v. State, 823 S.E.2d 291 (Ga. 2019); Wilson v. State, 607 S.E.2d 197, 199 (Ga.App. 2004) (finding obstruction against first officer when defendant refused a pat down during traffic stop and fought back first officer's attempts to subdue defendant after he punched second officer); Leckie v. State, 500 S.E.2d 627, 628 (Ga.App. 1998) (finding obstruction when defendant, “after being advised he was under arrest [for disorderly conduct], announced he was not going to jail, purposefully turned away from the officer and attempted to avoid being handcuffed”); see also Arsenault v. State, 571 S.E.2d 456, 458 (Ga.App. 2002) (“Refusing to obey lawful commands of an officer who is seeking to protect his safety will sustain a conviction under this statute.”).
Doc. 15 at 8 (citing Steillman v. State, 295 Ga.App. 778, 673 S.E.2d 286 (2009); Pinchon v. State, 237 Ga.App. 675, 516 S.E.2d 537 (1999); Leckie v. State, 231 Ga.App. 760, 500 S.E.2d 627 (1998)). But the Georgia Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that words alone can constitute obstruction when those words involve more than “speaking to, remonstrating with, or even criticizing an officer.”
Panzer v. State, 273 Ga. App. 868, 869 (2005); see e.g., Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2004) ("By repeatedly refusing to comply with [the officer's] reasonable instructions, and by acting belligerently and confrontationally, [the plaintiff] hindered" completion of the traffic stop.); Leckie v. State, 231 Ga. App. 760 (1998) ("[P]roof of flight may be sufficient to establish hinderance."); Duke v. State, 205 Ga. App. 689, 690 (1992) ("[L]ying with the intent of misdirecting [an officer] as to the performance of his official duties can certainly constitute a hinderance and authorize a misdemeanor conviction under . . . O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a)."). Construing the facts in Plaintiffs' favor, the Court concludes that a reasonable officer in Lee's position could not conceivably have believed that he had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for obstruction.