Since the corporation was nonexistent, the court obtained jurisdiction over no one, its judgment determined nothing and being void cannot be asserted as an estoppel. 59 Misc.2d 666, 300 N.Y.S.2d 243, 247 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1969) ; see alsoFirst Nat'l Bank v. Alexander , 236 S.W. 229, 230 (Tex. 1921) (judgment against nonexistent corporation is a "nullity"); Leckie v. Seal , 161 Va. 215, 223, 170 S.E. 844 (Va. 1933) ("where the right party is sued by the wrong name and makes no objection, the judgment against him by the wrong name is binding .... [though w]here the mistake in the name of the corporation .... is so material ... that no such corporation exists, it is fatal at the trial."). Some courts, however, appear to disagree with this principle.

It is well-settled that "[a] suit against a corporation in Virginia must be brought against the corporation itself, not against the corporation's trade name or a similar name." See Harvey v. Mech. Air Servs., 69 Va. Cir. 214, 215 (2005) (citing Leckie v. Seal, 161 Va. 215, 226-27 (1933)); see also Baldwin v. Norton Hotel, Inc., 163 Va. 76, 82-83 (1934) ("A corporation may be known by several names, . . . and a recovery may be had against it in its true name . . . ." (quoting Langhorne v. Richmond C. R. Co., 91 Va. 364, 336 (1895) (internal quotation marks omitted))). See generally Tate v. Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 179 Va. 365 (1942) (stating that the use of a fictitious name does not create two legal entities but instead allows a single entity to operate under multiple names).

Leckie v. Seal, 161 Va. 215, 224, 170 S.E. 844, 847 (1933).

Cf. Clevenger v. Grover, 212 N.C. 13, 193 S.E. 12, 124 A. L. R. 82, and Anno. at p. 86. The statement quoted in Leckie v. Seal, 161 Va. 215, 223, 170 S.E. 844, 846, from 1 Va. Law Reg. 548, to the effect that where the error in naming a defendant corporation is so material "that no such corporation exists, it is fatal at the trial," is not a categorical rule of unqualified application and is not applicable in the circumstances of this case. The plaintiffs' action should not have been dismissed for another reason.

Here an unregistered contractor, working under an assumed name, has not been permitted to recover for work done. The registration required of business enterprises is in itself a license to do business; and if they do business under a trade or assumed name without first having complied with this statutory requirement, they shall, upon conviction, be fined or imprisoned or fined and imprisoned. If there was any uncertainty as to legislative intent, that has been settled by Leckie v. Seal, 161 Va. 215, 170 S.E. 844: [9, 10] "The main object of the statute is to prevent fraud and to compel an individual or a corporation to disclose the name of the real owner of the business, in order that the person or corporation may sue in or be sued by the proper name. There is a further reason for the enactment of the statute and that is that prospective creditors of the firm or corporation may, by an examination of the lien dockets, determine to whom credit can be extended.

" Chief Justice Campbell in Leckie v. Seal, 161 Va. 215, 170 S.E. 844, 846, reaffirmed the doctrine in Virginia, thus: "In 1 Va.L.R. 548, the Virginia rule is thus stated: 'Where the mistake in the name of the corporation, whether plaintiff or defendant, is slight, and it clearly appears what corporation is meant — or as it is sometimes expressed, where the pleading incorrectly names a corporation, but correctly describes it — the mistake is amendable, and can be taken advantage of only by plea in abatement. But where the error is so material (especially, it is said, in the name of the defendant) that no such corporation exists, it is fatal at the trial.

In some states a corporation doing business under an assumed name is expressly required by statute to record such name. Corner Garage v. Pullen, 96 Vt. 458, 120 A. 863; Leckie v. Seal, 161 Va. 215, 170 S.E. 844. In other states, a corporation is prohibited by statute from doing business under an assumed name. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Company v. A. P. Radio Stores, Inc., D.C., 20 F. Supp. 703.