Opinion
401024/2009.
August 4, 2009.
DECISION/ORDER
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner Nehemiah Leckie ("petitioner") moves for an order and judgment, pursuant to CPLR Article 78, vacating and annulling the determination of respondent New York City Department for the Aging ("DFTA"), denying petitioner program benefits and awarding petitioner benefits as the court deems appropriate.
Background
By application dated April 10, 2008, petitioner applied to DFTA for Senior Citizen Rent Increase Exemption ("SCRIE") benefits. Petitioner submitted his April 10, 2008 application to . the SCRIE Program Walk-In Services Unit on May 5, 2008. On the application, petitioner indicated that he resided in a rent stabilized apartment located at 90 Convent Avenue, Apartment #57, New York, NY 10027, and that he had lived there since October 5, 1980. In addition, on the application, petitioner listed that his rent would be increased to $270.11 per month. Further, on the application, petitioner listed himself, Vilma Leckie (wife), Cassandra Leckie (daughter) and Norma Leckie (daughter) as individuals living in the subject apartment. He also indicated that he received $3,063.60 in Social Security Income per year, and that his wife Vilma Leckie received $432.00 in Social Security Income per year.
By "Tenant Denial Order" dated March 6, 2009, DFTA notified petitioner that he was not eligible for SCRIE benefits. Specifically, DFTA informed petitioner as follows:
We carefully reviewed your application and the supporting documents to determine if you are eligible for the exemption. We regret that the information indicates that you are not eligible for an exemption at this time, for the following reason(s):
• Rent paid by the tenant is less than One-Third (1/3) of the monthly household disposable income.
By an "Appeal of SCRIE Order" for dated March 26, 2009, petitioner appealed the denial. By letter dated April 13, 2009, said appeal was denied.
The instant Article 78 application ensued.
Petitioner's Contentions
Petitioner states that he is 72 years old, his wife Vilma is 69 years old, his daughter Cassandra, is mentally disabled, his daughter Norma, earns minimum wage part time. These factors suffice for him to qualify for SCRIE.
Respondent's Contentions
Here, after fully reviewing the documentation submitted by petitioner, DFTA appropriately determined that petitioner did not met the eligibility requirements for SCRIE benefits because his regulated monthly rent amount did not exceed one-third of the monthly household disposable income. Indeed, as noted in DFTA's final determination, at the time of petitioner's application and appeal, one-third of petitioner's monthly disposable income amounted to $334.75. This amount was greater than petitioner's monthly regulated rent of $251.85 (the amount of petitioner's monthly household income was also greater than $270.11, which was the amount petitioner's rent was increased to). As a result, petitioner did not meet the statutory requirements for SCRIE benefits.
Analysis
CPLR 7803 states that the court review of a determination of an agency, such as DFTA, consists of whether the determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty imposed. CPLR 7803(3) ( see Windsor Place Corp. v New York State DHCR, 161 A.D.2d 279 [1st Dept. 1990]; Mazel v DHCR, 138 A.D.2d 600 [1st Dept. 1988]; Bambeck v DHCR, 129 A.D.2d 51 [1st Dept. 1987], lv. den. 70 N.Y.2d 615). An action is arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion, when the action is taken "without sound basis in reason and . . . without regard to the facts." Matter of Pell v Board of Education, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231(1974). Rationality is the key in determining whether an action is arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. Matter of Pell v Board of Education, 34 N.Y.2d, at 231. The court's function is completed on finding that a rational basis supports the dfta'S determination ( see Howard v Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434). Where the agency's interpretation is founded on a rational basis, that interpretation should be affirmed even if the court might have come to a different conclusion ( see Mid-State Management Corp. v New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board, 112 A.D.2d 72 [1st Dept.], aff'd 66 N.Y.2d 1032).
On judicial review of an agency action under CPLR Article 78, the courts must uphold the agency's exercise of discretion unless it has "no rational basis" or the action is "arbitrary and capricious." Pell v Board of Ed. Union Free School District, 34 NY2d 222, 230-31, 356 NYS2d 833, 839 (1974) "The arbitrary and capricious test chiefly 'relates to whether a particular action should have been taken or is justified . . . and whether the administrative action is without foundation in fact.' Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts." 34 NY2d at 231, 356 NYS2d at 839 See also Jackson v New York State Urban Dev Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 417, 503 NYS2d 298, 305 (1986) (on review of agency action under CPLR Article 78, the courts may not "second guess the agency's choice, which can be annulled only if arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence").
Moreover, where, as here, the agency's determination involves factual evaluation within an area of the agency's expertise and is amply supported by the record, the determination must be accorded great weight and judicial deference. See Flacke v Onondaga Landfill Systems, Inc., 69 NY2d 355, 363, 514 NYS2d 689, 693 (1987). Courts are required to "resolve [any] reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative findings and decisions" of the responsible agency. Town of Henrietta v Department of Envtl. Conservation, 76 A.D.2d 215, 224, 430 NYS2d 440, 448 (4th Dep't 1980). See also Jackson, 67 NY2d at 417, 503 NYS2d at 305; City of Rome v Department of Health Dept., 65 A.D.2d 220, 225, 441 NYS2d 61,64 (4th Dep't 1978), lv. To app. denied, 46 NY2d 713, 416 NYS2d 1027 (1979).
And, "Where evidence conflicts, issues of credibility are the province of an administrative hearing officer, since 'the decisions by an Administrative Hearing Officer to credit the testimony of a given witness is largely unreviewable by the courts.'" Wooten v Finkle, 285 AD2D 407, 408 (1st Dept 2001) ( quoting Berenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436, 443 (1987). And the courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the conclusion of the administrative agency where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists ( Berenhaus, 70 N.Y.2d at 444, 522 N.Y.S.2d 478, 517 N.E.2d 193; Matter of Stork Rest. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 267, 26 N.E.2d 247; Matter of Acosta v. Wollett, 55 N.Y.2d 761, 447 N.Y.S.2d 241, 431 N.E.2d 966; Matter of Verdell v. Lincoln Amsterdam House, Inc., 27 A.D.3d 388, 390, 813 N.Y.S.2d 68).
Based on the record before this court, the court must dismiss the instant Petition.
DFTA's decision denying petitioner's SCRIE application was based on a considered review of the facts, supporting documentation, and the applicable law. The determination was a proper exercise of DFTA's discretion, was neither unreasonable, nor arbitrary and capricious, and, therefore, should not be disturbed by this court.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the application of Petitioner Nehemiah Leckie for an order and judgment, pursuant to CPLR Article 78, vacating and annulling the determination of respondent New York City Department for the Aging, denying petitioner program benefits and awarding petitioner benefits as the court deems appropriate, is denied in its entirety and the instant Petition is dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that counsel for respondent shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry within twenty days of entry on Petitioner.
This constitutes the decision and order of this court.