Opinion
24A-CR-1788
12-17-2024
Chay M. Lecher, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT AMANDA O. BLACKKETTER BLACKKETTER LAW, LLC SHELBYVILLE, INDIANA ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA KATHERINE A. CORNELIUS DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Decatur Superior Court The Honorable Matthew D. Bailey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 16D01-2303-F3-258
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT AMANDA O. BLACKKETTER BLACKKETTER LAW, LLC SHELBYVILLE, INDIANA
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA KATHERINE A. CORNELIUS DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Weissmann, Judge.
[¶1] While on probation for dealing in methamphetamine, Chay Lecher was charged with four new felony drug offenses. Lecher pleaded guilty to one of those charges-dealing in methamphetamine-under a plea agreement that called for dismissal of the other charges and a sentence of up to 22 years imprisonment. The trial court imposed a 20-year executed sentence. Lecher appeals, claiming his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. We affirm.
Facts
[¶2] In 2019, Lecher was convicted of dealing in methamphetamine after selling the drug to police operatives on three occasions. While he was on probation for that offense in 2023, a probation search of his home revealed methamphetamine, heroine, marijuana, and morphine.
[¶3] The State charged Lecher with Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 5 felony possession of cocaine, and Level 6 felony possession of a syringe. The State also alleged Lecher was a habitual offender.
[¶4] The State and Lecher entered into a plea agreement under which Lecher: (1) pleaded guilty to the new charge of dealing in methamphetamine; (2) admitted he was a habitual offender; and (3) admitted he had violated the terms of his probation. The plea agreement provided for a sentencing range, with the minimum sentence being 11 years (8 years on home detention and 3 years of supervised probation) and the maximum sentence being 22 years (all in prison). The agreement also called for dismissal of the remaining charges.
[¶5] At his sentencing hearing, Lecher argued for the minimum sentence under the plea agreement. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years imprisonment, plus a 10-year habitual offender enhancement, for a total executed sentence of 20 years. Lecher appeals this sentence and asks this Court to revise it to the plea agreement's minimum.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, "after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." App. R. 7(B). The Court's review under Rule 7(B) is deferential to the trial court's decision, and the burden is on the defendant to persuade the Court that their sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
[¶7] When evaluating the appropriateness of a sentence, we first consider the statutory range established for that class of offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. The sentencing range for dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 3 felony is 3 to 16 years imprisonment. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b). The habitual offender enhancement ranges from 8 to 20 years when, as here, a Level 3 felony is the underlying offense. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1). Thus, the 20-year sentence the trial court imposed is 16 years below the maximum available for an enhanced Level 3 felony and 2 years below the maximum available under the plea agreement.
[¶8] As to the nature of the offense, Lecher possessed methamphetamine with intent to deliver while he was on probation for the same offense. The amount of methamphetamine in his possession significantly exceeded the amount of the drug he possessed in 2019 when he sold methamphetamine to police operatives. He also possessed heroin, cocaine, morphine, and marijuana.
[¶9] As to the character of the offender, Lecher's criminal record is extensive. Over two decades Lecher has been convicted of 20 felonies, 13 of which are drug related. But Lecher contends his criminal propensities have ended, and he has fully embraced recovery.
[¶10] Shortly after his arrest, Lecher began residing at the ARK of Decatur County, a residential sober living facility. At Lecher's sentencing hearing, the ARK staff expressed their high opinion of him, lauded his diligence in seeking and achieving sobriety, and viewed him as an unmatched leader at the facility. Lecher also completed several drug treatment or recovery programs during the year between his arrest and sentencing while working full time. Lecher's employer was impressed by his diligence and aptitude and viewed him as a prime candidate for greater advancement within the company.
[¶11] Citing such superlatives, as well as other evidence of his recovery efforts, Lecher contends his 20-year sentence is inappropriate based on our Supreme Court's ruling in Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611 (Ind. 2018). In that case, the Court decreased Livingston's 30-year prison sentence for several drug-related felonies to 23 years in community corrections based on her accomplishments during the four years between her arrest and sentence. Id. at 614. Livingston voluntarily engaged in various drug treatment programs, resided in sober living facilities for three years before enrolling voluntarily in a community corrections monitoring program, and created with her own funds a home for women recovering from addiction. Id.
[¶12] Though Lecher's post-arrest rehabilitation efforts parallel Livingston's in several ways, two critical distinctions separate this case from Livingston. First, Livingston demonstrated sustained rehabilitation over four years before pleading guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement. In contrast, Lecher's admirable but shorter fourteen-month rehabilitation period came after negotiating a plea agreement that cut his exposure from 36 to 22 years. While we do not discount Lecher's progress, the timeframe and circumstances suggest a more pragmatic motivation compared to Livingston's extended demonstration of changed character without guaranteed sentencing benefits.
[¶13] Second, Lecher's offense represents an escalation of criminal conduct while on probation for the same type of offense. This directly undermines the principles of community supervision that Lecher now seeks. While Livingston's offenses were serious, they, unlike Lecher's crimes, were not committed when Livingston was on probation for the same offense. And Lecher's latest crime reflected an escalation in his drug dealing, given the quantity and variety of drugs in his possession. While we commend Lecher's recent rehabilitation efforts, they do not offset his lengthy criminal history and decision to deal larger quantities of dangerous drugs while already on probation for dealing.
[¶14] When reviewing a Rule 7(B) claim, we consider whether the imposed sentence is inappropriate and not whether another sentence might be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). Given the nature of Lecher's offense and his character, we cannot say his 20-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's sentence.
Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.