Lebrun v. Century Markets, No

6 Citing cases

  1. DaVilla v. Chadwick's of Boston Ltd., No

    BOARD No. 038087-96 (Mass. DIA Mar. 8, 2002)

    The reason given seems to be that the employee made no offer of proof. Although not prohibited from doing so, see Lebrun v. Century Markets, 9 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 692, 694, n. 4 (1995), the party seeking to declare the § 11A report inadequate need not make an offer of proof as to what medicals that party has to support the claim or complaint. The adequacy or not generally depends on the content of the four corners of the report and, if any, the deposition.

  2. LANZILLE v. AUGUST A. BUSCH COMPANY OF MA, No

    BOARD No. 035621-96 (Mass. DIA Nov. 3, 1999)   Cited 1 times

    We agree that the decision is flawed because of the gap in the medical evidence. However, the remedy is not reversal, but recommittal, in light of our opinions from Lebrun v. Century Markets, 9 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 692 (1995), to Bellanton v. The Flatley Company, 11 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 617 (1997). We do not think, as argued by the self-insurer, that the imprecision of the employee's motion to introduce additional medical evidence should mandate reversal.

  3. Cramer v. Wal-Mart, No

    BOARD No. 008490-94 (Mass. DIA May. 28, 1998)

    Neither the statute nor the regulation designate a specific time that such a motion must be filed. Where information is revealed as a result of the impartial physician's deposition that indicates that the report is inadequate, a motion bringing that to the judge's attention is certainly appropriate. See, e.g., Lebrun v. Century Markets, 9 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 692, 693, 696 (1995) (employee's post-deposition motion for finding of inadequacy should have been allowed, based on doctor's deposition testimony). Otherwise, the deposition would be of limited value, in practical terms.

  4. Brooks v. Labor Management Services, No

    BOARD No. 029727-93 (Mass. DIA Dec. 8, 1997)   Cited 2 times

    Id. at 643-644. See also Lebrun v. Century Markets, 9 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 692, 696-697 (1995). In both Mendez and Lebrun, we cited Cook v. Farm Service Stores, Inc., 301 Mass. 564 (1938), for its seminal exploration of the character of prima facie evidence in general, albeit within the context of auditors' reports.

  5. Martinez v. Tuttie Cleaners, No

    BOARD No. 3093392 (Mass. DIA Mar. 27, 1996)   Cited 1 times

    Where the provisions of § 11A authorize sua sponte action at the discretion of the adjudicator, he becomes the gate keeper of the sufficiency of the medical evidence. Lebrun v. Century Markets, 9 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. ___ (November 28, 1995). Thus, where § 11A applies and the facts in evidence present alternative theories of liability, a judge must take care to clearly identify what is and is not believable and found as fact and whether the medical evidence statutorily put before him provides an adequate basis to respond to the various theories in contention.

  6. George v. Chelsea Housing Authority, No

    BOARD No. 960791 (Mass. DIA Jan. 25, 1996)   Cited 17 times

    We do not address the issue of § 11A's constitutionality also raised by the employee because it is mooted by our ruling that this case requires additional medical evidence. See Lebrun v. Century Markets, 9 Mass. Worker's Comp. Rep. ___ (1995); see also O'Brien v. Blue Cross/BlueShield, 9 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 16, 25-26 (1995) (for a discussion of due process concerns where no additional medical evidence has been allowed). Section 11A(2) sets out factors that a § 11A report must address including: disability and extent thereof, causal relationship, medical end result, and loss of function, if applicable.