Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-430.
December 15, 2004
ORDER AND OPINION
I. Introduction
In this action, plaintiff Linda LeBoon challenges the termination of her employment by the Lancaster Jewish Community Center Association ("LJCC"). She has asserted federal claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e). The first Title VII count alleges religious discrimination, and the second alleges retaliation for opposing race discrimination. LeBoon has also asserted a state-law claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
Each party has filed a motion for summary judgment. I will now dispose of both motions, denying LeBoon's motion, and granting the LJCC's motion regarding both of LeBoon's Title VII claims. In addition, since there are no extraordinary reasons for keeping the case in federal court with only a state law issue remaining, I will order the case dismissed in its entirety.
These facts are derived from both parties' mo tions for summary judgment, and the responses and exhibits thereto.
LeBoon worked for the LJCC between 1998 and her termination on August 30, 2002. Although she was responsible for a variety of tasks, she is best described as having worked there as a bookkeeper, or business manager. As discussed below, the LJCC is a nonprofit Jewish organization. LeBoon is an evangelical Christian.
During the time LeBoon worked for the LJCC, there were occasions upon which she questioned actions she was asked to take. On one such occasion, on May 31, 2002, LeBoon objected to a direction that she pay Beth Schlesinger, a recently hired employee, advance salary and insurance. Similarly, on July 8, 2002, LeBoon opposed the LJCC's decision to pay unearned vacation salary to an employee named Lisa Valva. LeBoon points out that both Schlesinger and Valva were Jews, and that she, herself, was not permitted to receive paid vacation until she had passed her one-year anniversary with LJCC.
On another occasion, LeBoon challenged a direction to report to the Pennsylvania Unemployment Commission that an individual worked an hour more each weekday than he actually worked, apparently in order to compensate him for five hours of work actually done on a weekend. After LeBoon complained about this to the Vice President of LJCC's Board of Directors, LeBoon claims her supervisor, Natalie Featherman, brought her into her office and told her to "stop snooping around our employees." In her Complaint, LeBoon claimed that she also opposed LJCC's decision to increase Featherman's salary, although she has not shown evidence of this in discovery.
Further, LeBoon has claimed:
During April, 2002, Plaintiff opposed the actions of [Featherman], Defendant's Executive Director, in terminating the contract of Sandy Simms on the basis of race, since Simms, a black woman, was replaced due to her race to make room for a Jewish bookkeeper who formerly worked at Jewish Family Services. Featherman said she did not want "those kind" working at the front desk, by which she referred implicitly to Simm's race.
Complaint at ¶ 9.
LJCC denies that it terminated Simms because of her race, or to make room for a Jewish bookkeeper, and also denies that LeBoon ever opposed Simms's termination. Ms. Simms has signed a statement in which she concedes that she took a day off from work without notifying the LJCC, and that Natalie Featherman told her the next day that she would no longer be permitted to work at the LJCC (she was not actually an employee of the LJCC, but, rather, of the Office of Aging):
[At the time of my termination] I went into Linda's office and directly asked her to intervene on my behalf with Ex. Dir. Featherman. Linda waved her hands and told me that she didn't want to get involved. I did not tell Linda LaBoon that I believed I was discriminated against because of my race AND Linda LaBoon did not tell me that she believed I was discriminated against because of my race. I am not aware that Linda LaBoon opposed the decision to release me.
Statement of Sandra Simms, attached as Exhibit A to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at ¶¶ 5 and 6.
However, Deborah A. Brown, a former receptionist at the LJCC has signed an affidavit in which she states: "In April, 2002, I heard LeBoon complain to Featherman that Sandy Simms was terminated as my assistant due to her race." Affidavit attached as Exhibit 27.
LeBoon has also testified at her deposition that she objected to Featherman and to coworkers after Featherman fired a maintenance worker named Troy Rollman, who appeared to have a speech disability, allegedly because Featherman "couldn't take his grunting." LeBoon Deposition Excerpt, attached as Exhibit 22 to LeBoon's Motion, at 324-333.
On January 8, 2002, an organization called the Messiah Truth Project, Inc., gave a seminar at the LJCC. This organization, headed in the Lancaster area by an individual named David Goodman, had as its goal the education of Jews in order to counter the efforts of Jews For Jesus, and similar movements that specifically seek to convert Jews to Christianity. Apparently, the LJCC offered the Messiah Truth Project some logistical assistance, such as permitting it to make copies on its copying machine without charge.
On August 23, 2002, one week before LeBoon was terminated, she attended a Jews For Jesus concert at her church. There, she saw David Goodman, whom she knew from the LJCC. At Goodman's suggestion, (according to LeBoon), LeBoon introduced Goodman to one of the Jews For Jesus singers.
Olga Jaffae, a receptionist at LJCC, testified that "a couple of days after" LeBoon was terminated, she overheard a conversation in which Natalie Featherman told several LJCC board members that David Goodman had come to the LJCC and told her that LeBoon attended the Jews for Jesus meeting: "Natalie kind of was like making fun of that, you know, attending that meeting. And I think she said that she didn't really trust Linda." Deposition of Olga Jaffae, attached to Plaintiff's Motion as Exhibit 23, at page 12. LeBoon has asserted that Jaffae knew that Goodman came to see Featherman at the LJCC sometime between August 23 and August 30, 2002, and that he waited for Featherman over two hours. However, Jaffae testified that she did not see Goodman come to the LJCC, and did not know when he came. Id. at 13.
The LJCC has taken the position that LeBoon was terminated as a cost-saving measure. It has provided considerable evidence that the LJCC had been suffering such serious financial problems for years that the Board of Directors considered closing the building. LeBoon, however, has questioned the gravity of the LJCC's financial situation. She has also suggested that LJCC did not save money from terminating her because it had to pay other individuals to perform her former duties.
III. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is warranted where the pleadings and discovery, as well as any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.Pr. 56. The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In response, the non-moving party must adduce more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor, and cannot simply reassert factually unsupported allegations contained in its pleadings. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986);Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra at 325; Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must construe the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from it in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, supra at 255; Tiggs Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, at 323.
IV. Discussion
A. LeBoon's Claim for Religious Discrimination
Section 2000e-2(a) of Title VII provides that an employer may not discharge, or "fail or refuse" to hire an individual or discriminate "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Nevertheless, Title VII includes an exception protecting religious entities from suit on the basis of religious discrimination. Section 702 of that law provides:
This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society with its activities.42 USC § 2000e-1. This passage once permitted exemption from suit only with regard to religious activities. However, it was amended in 1972 to extend protection to all activities of religious organizations.Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
The LJCC claims that § 702 exempts it from LeBoon's claim of religious discrimination. I agree. LeBoon argues that the LJCC is not a religious organization of the kind referred to in § 702, primarily because religious services are rarely held there. It is evident from the caselaw, however, that § 702 is not limited to facilities where prayer takes place.
In Amos, supra, the United States Supreme Court found that § 702 permitted a nonprofit gymnasium run by "religious entities associated with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" to refuse to hire individuals who were not eligible for membership in the Mormon Church. 483 U.S. at 330. The lower court had found that "nothing in the running or purpose of [the Gymnasium] . . . suggests that it was intended to spread or teach the religious beliefs and doctrine and practices of sacred ritual of the Mormon Church or that it was intended to be an integral part of church administration." 483 U.S. at 332, n. 7. The lower court also noted that "no contention was made that the religious doctrines of the Mormon Church . . . treat physical exercise as a religious ritual." 483 U.S. at 332, no. 7.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected these as a criteria for the application of § 702. Justice Brennan wrote in his concurrence:
Nonprofit activities . . . are most likely to present cases in which characterization of the activity as religious or secular will be a close question. . . . This substantial potential for chilling religious activity makes inappropriate a case-by-case determination of the character of a nonprofit organization, and justifies a categorical exemption for nonprofit activities.483 U.S. at 345 (Concurring opinion).
Also relevant is Feldstein v. The Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983), in which the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that the newspaper, owned by the Christian Science Publishing Society, was permitted by § 702 to hire as reporters only members of the Christian Science Church. This was despite the plaintiff's allegation that the Christian Science Monitor was "a highly regarded and impartial newspaper carrying news stories, articles, columns and editorials that are secular in nature and content." 555 F. Supp. at 977. The court wrote: "A religious activity of a religious organization does not lose that special status merely because it holds some interest for persons not members of the faith." Id. at 978.
Unlike the entities in Feldstein and Amos, the LJCC is not run by, and is not directly answerable to, any one religious body, i.e, any one synagogue or denomination of Judaism. However, 75-80% of the funding for LJCC during the relevant time period came from the Lancaster Jewish Federation campaign. Matlin Deposition, attached to Plaintiff's Motion as Exhibit 26, at 128. Further, rabbis of the three local synagogues were ex officio members of LJCC's board of directors, and they assisted the LJCC in programming and fundraising. Id. at 138.
Moreover, it is evident from a review of the LJCC's activities as reflected in the record, that it seeks to serve and foster the local Jewish community as a whole. The LJCC's mission statement, printed on the cover of its report on its 1998 Annual Meeting, and reportedly "emblazoned" on the walls of the LJCC's lobby, states that it seeks to "develop, involve and sustain a cohesive Jewish Community through Identity, Education and Cooperation for all Ages." Exhibit L to Defendant's Motion at Bates Stamp No. 370. LeBoon has argued that this focus on "identity, education and cooperation" shows that LJCC's mission is not spiritual. However, this fails to take account of the fact that LJCC seeks to sustain a specifically Jewish community.
LJCC board minutes also reveal the pervasive Jewish orientation of the organization. In notes from December 21, 1998, the LJCC's yearly Chanukah Dinner is described. Ted Busch (the executive director preceding Natalie Featherman) is noted to have said "that one of the most meaningful parts of the event was the rededication of the building, when all three Rabbis [one from each of the three local synagogues] ceremonially attached the last mezuzah to the door of the Social Hall. . . . Each mezuzah had been fitted with a kosher scroll." Id. at Bates Stamp No. 345. Plans for a "Melavah Malka" program are described. Id. at Bates Stamp No. 346. This is described as a "`Seder' for escorting the Shabbat Queen." Id. (The "Shabbat Queen" is not a beauty contest winner — in Judaism, the Sabbath is referred to in liturgy as a queen).
In September 28, 1999 Minutes, LJCC members are solicited to volunteer, and to contact potential audience members, for a Jewish Federation program concerning the plight of Jews in the former Soviet Union. Id. at Bates Stamp No. 372. A community trip to Israel is discussed. Id. at Bates Stamp No. 372, 373. It is also reported that the summer camp had hosted two Israeli shlichim [emissaries] who organized an "Israeli Day." Id. at Bates Stamp No. 374.
November 11, 1999 Board Minutes relate that generous donors to the LJCC are referred to as benefactors at the "Zahav" level ("zahav" is the Hebrew word for "gold"). "Zahav" benefactors contribute $613. This is a number of Jewish significance, since the Hebrew Bible is said to contain 613 commandments. The maintenance of a kosher kitchen at the LJCC was also discussed at that meeting, with the conclusion being that "with a kosher kitchen, and a policy that mandates the use of kosher products for all programs presented by the JCC we were creating an environment where all members of the Lancaster Jewish community could feel comfortable participating." Id. at Bates Stamp No. 380-381 (bold in original).
The LJCC's view of its own role is also reflected in January, 2000, notes listing talking points to be used in approaching potential new members: "The JCC is the best point of positive contact between all segments of the Lancaster Jewish community. . . . The Center produces Jewish education and cultural programming for the whole community, e.g. Yom HaShoa [Holocaust Commemoration Day], the Chanukah Dinner, community Purim carnival, Jewish U. [a Jewish education program], etc. . . . The JCC is a meeting ground for our own Jewish youth. The JCC is the first point of contact for Jews new to the area. The Center is the place for Jewish seniors to meet at the Friendship Club. . . . The JCC is the community connection to Israel." Id. at Bates Stamp 387-388. It is apparent from this that only Jews were to be solicited as LJCC members.
Later, in October 23, 2000, a board member described some of the LJCC's successes that year as "Jewish Leadership and Jewish U as well as the Teenage Council as well as the Chanukah Dinner, Purim Carnival and most recently the Jewish Food festival." Id. at Bates Stamp 417.
A number of the programs sponsored by the LJCC, such as fitness and self-defense classes, are religion-neutral and open to members of the general public. Indeed, for years, the LJCC ran a secular pre-school program. However, this does not change the underlying purpose and orientation of the organization. In Amos, the lower court had found "that there [was] no clear connection between the primary function which the Gymnasium performs and the religious beliefs and tenets of the Mormon church or church administration." 483 U.S. 327. The LJCC, which regularly holds Jewish education courses and celebrations of Jewish holidays, is therefore far more religious in its daily activities that the gym found by the United States Supreme Court to be worthy of § 702 protection inAmos. See also Feldstein v. The Christian Science Monitor, supra.
Finally, LeBoon argues that the LJCC could not be a religious organization because it receives some government funding, and has certified to the United Way that it does not discriminate in employment. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Hall v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000). There, as here, a Baptist-run nursing school "represented itself as being an equal opportunity employer and . . . received federal funds." Id. The Hall court, however, found that the § 702 exemption could not be waived. Id.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected an argument that a Catholic School waived its right to exemption by knowingly hiring a non-Catholic. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1990). The Court of Appeals held that the § 702 exemption could not be waived, because it is not a privilege, but a right. Id. See also Siegel v. Truett-McConnell College, 13 F. Supp.2d 1335, 1343-45 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd 73 F.3d 1108 (11th Cir. 1995) (table) (Baptist college protected by § 702 even if "the College receives far more money from the federal and state government than it does from the Baptist Church", and where the college knowingly hired a non-Christian); but see Dodge v. The Salvation Army, 1980 WL 53857 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 9, 1989) (Salvation Army could not discriminate on the basis of religion in filling a position entirely funded by a targeted federal grant).
Thus, the LJCC, which admittedly receives the bulk of its funding from Jewish sources, and where LeBoon's position was not specifically federally funded, would be found entitled to the § 702 exemption under all of the authority discussed above.
I note, as well, that one study found that 51% of nonprofit organizations which, like the LJCC, deliver child care services, were religiously affiliated, and of those, 82% received public funds. Paul Taylor "The Costs of Denying Religious Organizations the Right to Staff on a Religious Basis When They Join Federal Social Services Efforts" 12 George Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 159 (Spring 2002), citing Stephen V. Monsma, "When Sacred and Secular Mix: Religious Nonprofit Organizations and Public Money" 68 (1996). The same survey found that 44% of the religiously affiliated organizations providing child care only hired — or gave preference to — staff who agreed with their religious orientation.Id. This supports my conclusion that the LJCC's funding situation does not affect its religious status.
In sum, I have no hesitation in finding that the LJCC is a religious organization within the meaning of § 702, and is therefore exempt from suit for religious discrimination. I note that this is a potentially significant finding not only for the LJCC, or even for Jewish Community Centers, of which there are many, nationwide. A Google search turned up 4,340,000 hits for the term "Jewish Community Center", but also 2,490,000 for the term "Muslim or Islamic Community Center," 654,000 for "Hindu Community Center" and 577,000 for "Buddhist Community Center." Accordingly, LeBoon's claim for religious discrimination will be dismissed.
It is not clear whether LeBoon's claims that Jews were offered more favorable working conditions than non-Jews, as oppo sed to her claim that she was fired because of her beliefs, would be covered by § 702, which has been used only regarding staffing decisions. Even if they are not covered by § 702, however, these claims would not survive summary judgment: (a) As to insurance coverage, LeBoon admitted that LJCC did not offer COB RA to any of its emp loyees, and that both Jewish and non-Jewish emp loyees were offered continuation coverage under LJCC's insurer. LeBoon Deposition Excerpt, attached as Exhibit P to LJCC's Motion at 98, 99, 113; (b) Although LeBoon argued that B eth Schlesinger, a Jewish employee, was paid in advance, Le B oon is unaware of any time a non-Jewish employee requested advance pay but was denied it. Id. at 337-339, 341; (c) LeBoon admitted that she had no reason to believe that non-Jews were discriminated against in being offered the opportunity to receive compensation in lieu of medical insurance, other than the fact she was not offered it. Id. at 349-352; (d) LeBoon admitted that both Jews and non-Jews received mileage reimbursement, and that she is not aware of any non-Jewish employee other than herself who was denied it. Id. at 354-355; and (e) Although LeBoon complained that she was not permitted to take vacation pay until earned, and Stephan Dabrowski was permitted to take vacation pay in advance, Dabrowski is not Jewish. Id. at 356, and Deposition Excerpt of Natalie Featherman, attached as Exhibit F, at 105.
B. LeBoon's Claim for Retaliation
In her amended complaint, LeBoon has asserted a Title VII count claiming that she was dismissed in retaliation for opposing the terminations of Mr. Rollman and Ms. Simms, both of which actions LeBoon believed to be discriminatory. To advance a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, LeBoon is required to show that she engaged in a protected activity, and that she was then subject to an adverse employment action. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000). She must also show a causal link between her protected action and LJCC's adverse action. Id.
LeBoon has failed to establish the third point. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has directed trial courts to look to "a broad array of evidence", both direct and circumstantial, in looking for a causal link in a summary judgment motion on a retaliation case. Farrell, supra, at 285. Nevertheless, a plaintiff must show enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 280.
Here, the only evidence LeBoon offers is that she protested the discharges and that she was subsequently terminated for a reason the validity of which she disputes. This evidence is not sufficient to establish causation. At the outset, the timing of LeBoon's firing — six months after Rollman was terminated, and three months after Simms was dismissed — is, in the words of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, not unusually suggestive. Krouse v. American Sterilizer Company, 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, more evidence is required to show a causal link. Farrell, supra, at 280, citing, Krouse supra.
A plaintiff may in some cases establish a causal link by showing that the reason the employer gave for terminating her was unlikely or inconsistent. Farrell, supra, citing Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1986). LeBoon has produced evidence that her termination was not, as LJCC asserted, a cost-cutting measure. However, LeBoon has alleged numerous other reasons why she was dismissed, notably because of her religious practices. In this circumstance, I believe that some evidence is required to tie LeBoon's termination specifically to her complaints to Featherman about perceived discrimination based on race or disability.
LeBoon has not come forward with this evidence. She does not claim that either Rollman or Simms was ever mentioned to her again. She has not pointed to any evidence that would suggest she was viewed as an unwanted protector of her co-workers' civil rights. She has not alleged or shown a pattern of antagonism that began after she took the alleged protected activity. See Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2001);Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 921 (3d Cir. 1997); Robinson v. SEPTA, 982 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1993). She has not shown "other evidence gleaned from the record as a whole from which causation can be inferred."Farrell, at 206 F.3d 281.
Thus, even if a jury were to credit LeBoon's version of all facts (LJCC has denied that LeBoon ever complained to Featherman about the alleged discrimination), it could not reasonably connect these specific actions by LeBoon to her termination. Accordingly, LeBoon's retaliation claim cannot survive LJCC's motion for summary judgment.
C. LeBoon's State Law Claim
Absent extraordinary circumstances, a federal trial court will not continue to exercise pendent jurisdiction over any state claims after federal causes of action are dismissed from a case. Bright v. Westmoreland County, 380 F.3d 729, 751 (3d Cir. 2004). For this reason, LeBoon's state claim will be dismissed as well.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I now enter the following order:
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of December, 2004, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the responses thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that:
a. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED;
b. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with regard to Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e);
c. This case is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of federal jurisdiction. JUDGMENT IS ENTERED in this case in favor of Defendant. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to close this case for statistical purposes.